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Growth in part-time faculty workforces in U.S. higher education since 1970 has 
been remarkable. Part-time faculty growth as a percentage of the whole has occurred 
most rapidly in comprehensive universities in recent years and carries with it important 
implications for student instruction. Comprehensive universities are of critical importance 
to the realization of higher levels of educational attainment by underserved and 
nontraditional college populations. The purpose of this study is to understand 
instructional faculty hiring processes in comprehensive universities. The study is derived 
from an application of grounded theory research methods within and across three 
university settings. Analysis shows administrators at all levels of the organizational chart 
(i.e., department chair, dean, and provost) follow a cycle of activities that results in both 
 
 
direct and indirect (or systemic), outcomes in faculty hiring. First, they scan the 
environments in which they are situated for possible risks to their work including faculty 
hiring. Second, they perceive risks, including risks of opportunity, from their own 
viewpoints. Third, and of central importance, they assert decision role changes in 
response to the risks they perceive. That is, they take action. Finally, they establish 
ownership of new decision responsibility. A visual model depicting the grounded theory 
is shared. Findings position faculty hiring as an outcome of rule following decisions and 
risk response rather than rational choice. Part-time faculty hiring is found to function as 
an organizational release valve, which circumvents role tension of the sort experienced 
among department, college, and university administrators in full-time faculty hiring. 
Implications for university-level faculty hiring policy and practice, as well as for future 
research, are discussed. One conclusion is that university decision makers should be more 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 Contingent, or contract-based employment has grown substantially in higher 
education over the last 40 years. Faculty employment off the tenure track now approaches 
75% nationally by some estimates (American Federation of Teachers, 2009; Curtis & 
Thornton, 2013). Philosophical justifications of the remarkable shift from tenure track to 
non-tenure track (NTT) appointments have been the subject of great debate, and analytic 
explanations of root causes and contributing factors are plentiful from an array of 
disciplinary perspectives, from economics to political science to organizational studies. 
However, few studies have explored how, why, or in which contexts university leaders 
have made decisions to rely increasingly upon contingent labor.  
 Until recently, few studies had been conducted examining the changes in faculty 
appointments from a decision making perspective. Instead, most of the literature on 
appointment types has applied statistical methods to large databases, in order to either 
describe the national trend toward a prevalence of non-tenure track labor or to determine 
which environmental factors seem to affect the shift (Baldwin & Chronister, 2001; 
Gappa, Austin, & Trice, 2007; Schuster & Finkelstein, 2006). Cross and Goldenberg 
(2009) provide a notable exception with their book, Off Track Profs: Nontenured 
Teachers in Higher Education. From case studies of 10 American Association of 
Universities (AAU) campuses (elite public and private research universities), they found 
that information-based decision making processes were rendered impossible, primarily as 
a result of insufficient data and data management. In place of central, policy-oriented 
approaches to growth in contingent labor, Cross and Goldenberg found that hiring off the 
tenure track follows a decentralized, highly routinized process, which is seldom 
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questioned by campus leaders. They state: “The growth in non-tenure track faculty at 
elite research universities is not always the result of conscious policy but instead often 
emerges as a by-product of other initiatives” (p. 29). 
 Despite Cross & Goldenberg’s (2009) contribution, few studies have explored the 
issue of NTT hiring decisions, especially with regard to comprehensive university 
settings1. Such settings ought to be of particular interest. Comprehensive universities, or 
what the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching terms master’s colleges 
and universities, are known for their exceptional commitment to baccalaureate teaching, 
to serving first generation students and those from low-income backgrounds, 
undergraduate commuters, and those of nontraditional age (Lively, 1999; McCormick, 
2000; McDonough, et al., 1998; McDonough, 1997). These groups, often collectively 
dubbed “nontraditional students,” now constitute the majority of the postsecondary 
student population in the United States (Complete College America, 2011). 
 In my review of the literature I was also unable to locate any analytic model, 
typology, or other organizing instrument that would aid in better understanding of what 
Birnbaum (1988) might call a “perverse black box” of faculty hiring off the tenure track. 
One important element of this inquiry will be my skepticism of two assumptions common 
to discussion of the NTT growth phenomenon: a) individuals of authority, such as 
university provosts, make highly rational choices in creating NTT labor forces (see 
Jaschik & Lederman, 2013), or b) the generation-long upward trend in reliance on NTT 
faculty is deeply “arbitrary” (Street, et al., 2012). Cross & Goldenberg’s (2009) study 
suggests that neither extreme is likely accurate, but basic questions, such as what the 
                                                 
1 The U.S. Department of Education defines comprehensive universities as “undergraduate colleges with a 
major emphasis on baccalaureate programs, or offer a wide range of baccalaureate programs and are 
committed to education through the master’s degree” (American Federation of Teachers, 2007, p. 27). 
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phases of decision making entail, who is involved, which kinds of information they use, 
and how they use that information, have yet to be empirically answered. 
 Other studies that have framed analyses in terms of decision making have 
examined decisions by faculty senates, department heads, central administrators, and 
trustees (e.g., Baldridge & Kemerer, 1976; Baldridge, et al., 1973; Bastedo, 2005; 
Cameron & Tschirhart, 1992; Eckel, 2000, 2002; Minor, 2001). They have examined an 
array of specific decision areas, such as: academic program closure (Eckel, 2000, 2002), 
the effects of faculty unionization and issues of faculty jurisdiction in decision making 
(Baldridge & Kemerer, 1976; Baldridge, et al., 1973), trustee roles (Bastedo, 2005), and 
resource allocation (Adams, et al., 1976; Minor, 2001). These studies have tended to 
focus on highly formal decisions, wherein the relevant actors can be reliably identified in 
advance of the decisions, and such contexts have accommodated strong case study 
research designs. By focusing on decisions in which the relevant parties are readily 
identifiable and the processes follow formal rules, however, researchers have opted not to 
investigate decisions with unclear processes and those in which the relevant actors (at 
least to some degree) have not been ascertained at the outset. One reason the research is 
sparse on decisions resulting in the growth of NTT appointments is that the locus of 
authority for such decisions is unclear or contested, and formal procedures have in many 
cases not been used (Cross & Goldenberg, 2009; Street et al., 2012). Indeed, the Delphi 
Project, which convened a meeting of more than 40 stakeholder group representatives, 
reported (2012) that current NTT hiring practices embrace a “triage” approach, in which 
stop-gap measures are undertaken without regard for long-term labor planning (p. 16). 
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 In this study, I continue in the tradition of examining decision making in the 
context of a specific decision area. That is, I investigate the decision making origins of 
NTT hiring in comprehensive universities. However, I make a departure from many 
previous studies by examining a decision area for which both: a) the role of formal 
decision processes (e.g., executive discretion, strategic plan development, trustee 
instruction, committee recommendation, etc.) is unclear, and b) the relevant actors cannot 
be presupposed with great certainty. I employ a grounded theory research method in 
order to bring a highly exploratory research design to bear on the black box processes 
that result in growth in NTT labor. 
The Increase in NTT Hiring: Background Context and Explanations 
 Tenure is no longer the presumptive system of university faculty employment in 
the United States, and it has not been for some time. The American Association of 
University Professors has published statistics showing a reduction in tenured and tenure 
track appointments (hereafter “tenure track”) as a percentage of the professoriate from 
56.8 percent in 1975 to 31.2 percent in 2007. This shift corresponds to an increase in non-
tenure track appointments from 43.2 percent in 1975 to 68.8 percent in 2007, with about 
three quarters of that increase attributable to part-time non-tenure track (PTNTT) hiring. 
These estimates do not take into account graduate student instructors, who may or may 
not inhabit roles akin to other part-time course instructors according to circumstance. 
Schuster and Finkelstein (2006), whose work describing this shift is preeminent, 
summarize Leslie’s (2007) TIAA-CREF report succinctly: 
Between 1987 and 2004, Leslie reported a net gain of just under 10,000 tenured 
positions plus another 25,000 or so untenured but tenure-eligible positions. This 
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adds up to roughly 35,000 new tenured or tenure-eligible appointments during the 
past decade and a half. But (gulp!) this number stands in stark contrast to the huge 
net gain—some 285,000—in full-time non-tenure-eligible positions (p. xvi). 
As for the PTNTT population, Schuster and Finkelstein (2006) note: “Between 1969-70 
and 2001, the number of part-timers increased by 376% , or roughly at a rate more than 
five times as fast as the full-time faculty increased” (p. 40). 
 Some of the most recent and robust reporting of the data on this change comes 
from the American Federation of Teachers (2009), which states that across all 
institutional types tenure track appointments declined nearly six percent as a portion of 
the workforce, between 1997 and 20072. New full-time non-tenure track (FTNTT) 
appointments increased by less than one percent in that time, whereas PTNTT (2.8 
percent) and increased reliance upon graduate student workforces (2.4 percent) accounted 
for the lion’s share of the NTT growth. The result is a tenure track workforce that as of 
2007 had fallen to 27 percent of teaching and research positions in American colleges and 
universities, with no sign of stabilization. 
 The degree to which universities of all types are exchanging tenure track 
appointments for NTT appointments is unclear at best. Schuster and Finkelstein (2006) 
throw water on the erroneous notion that NTT labor growth has come directly at the 
expense of tenure track jobs. One reason is that the massive growth of two-year colleges 
has been a major force driving PTNTT. The authors calculate the growth of part-time 
faculty in two-year colleges at 801 percent between 1969 and 1998 (p. 47). Clearly, the 
two-year sector represents the largest shift away from tenure track labor to that point, and 
                                                 
2 It is important to note that the AFT (2009) report shows the number of tenure track faculty members 
employed in the United States grew during the 1997-2007 period by nearly 95,000. However, NTT 
appointments grew faster. 
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not by exchanging tenure track jobs for NTT but rather by growing at an extraordinary 
rate, with extraordinary emphasis on NTT hires. Not to be forgotten, though, is the 236 
percent increase in PTNTT faculty in four-year institutions not considered research-
focused or doctoral-granting3 in the three decades ending in 1998. 
 More recently the most dynamic growth in part-time faculty employment has 
occurred in comprehensive universities. American Federation of Teachers (2009) analysis 
shows that between 1997 and 2007 part-time instructional labor grew in public 
comprehensive universities by 10.3 percent and in private comprehensives by 9.9 percent 
(p. 10), even holding aside graduate student instructors4. In fact, despite more than 
doubling the growth of either the public or private comprehensive university sectors in 
real numbers of faculty over that span (63,870 versus 29,084 and 28,154 respectively), 
the public two-year sector experienced a much more modest rate of growth in part-timers, 
at only 3.9% (p. 10). Stated another way, an American Council on Education report 
(Anderson, 2008) shows that while two-year public colleges accounted for the greatest 
proportion of part-time faculty in 1992 (62.4%) and continued to do so by 1998 (64.3%), 
more marked increases in part-time faculty employment came within the public and 
private comprehensive university sectors (34.8% to 39.4% and 51.4% to 54.5%, 
respectively). 
 There are also differences among disciplines in the growth of NTT appointments. 
While the picture is a bit murky, such that one cannot simply point to broad disciplinary 
                                                 
3 Schuster & Finkelstein (2006) do not differentiate baccalaureate granting colleges, such as liberal arts 
colleges, from comprehensive universities. Common language surrounding institutional types and 
comparability of typological categories across studies is often troublesome, although broad strokes 
agreement on findings is strongly evident. 
4 Graduate students are commonly employed by the universities they attend in part-time instructor roles 
supporting undergraduate curricula. 
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groupings as the primary drivers of change (e.g., the professions, the sciences, etc.), it is 
important to note the fact that change has been uneven across the academy. Anderson 
(2008) finds, “The largest increases among part-time faculty occurred in the fine arts, 
social sciences, and health sciences, while there was no significant change in education, 
engineering, humanities, or the natural sciences” (p. 7). He goes on to state that the 
largest increases in FTNTT employment came within Business and Natural Science 
disciplines.  
There are demographic differences in the growth and representation of NTT 
faculty. Research shows that women represent a disproportionately large part of the part-
time faculty workforce compared with their full-time representation, and in addition to 
part-time faculty earning drastically less compensation per hour of work from universities 
in general, women part-timers are paid less than their male part-time counterparts 
(Toutkoushian & Bellas, 2003; Trower & Chait, 2002). Faculty of color are also 
underrepresented in tenure track positions (Trower & Chait, 2002). 
 Many explain NTT hiring in terms of its relationship to the unbundling of faculty 
roles (Schuster & Finkelstein, 2006). The inclusive notion of faculty work that has come 
to be associated with tenured and tenure track labor includes: research, teaching, shared 
governance (i.e., service), and outreach5. Contingent labor often entails a much narrower 
job description such that a faculty member is hired exclusively for research or for 
teaching. This development can be observed by studying the dizzying myriad of faculty 
designations now present in many university faculty manuals (e.g., professor, associate 
professor, assistant professor, lecturer, visiting professor, teaching fellow, professor of 
                                                 
5 A common colloquial metaphor is that of “the three-legged stool,” which suggests that faculty work is 
somehow most stable when the three areas of work (legs) are integrated: research, teaching, and service 
(inclusive of internal service, or shared governance, as well as external service, or outreach). 
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practice, artist-in-residence, teaching assistant, research assistant, etc.). What the 
unbundling phenomenon does not explain, however, is why growth in appointments off 
the tenure track has occurred most rapidly in comprehensive universities in recent years. 
Multiple rationales contribute to existing understandings of the causes of NTT 
proliferation without specificity to institutional type. 
A number of budget planning and human resource reasons have been proffered in 
relation to the growth in NTT appointments. First, many authors cite cost savings 
advantages, in terms of both salary and benefits, as a central rationale for NTT hiring. 
This is true whether comparing full-time contingent faculty with tenure track faculty 
(Bland et al., 2006; Schuster & Finkelstein, 2006), or whether comparing part-time 
contingents with tenure track faculty on a per class hour basis (Curtis & Jacobe, 2006). 
Moody’s Investors Service adopted this line of thinking recently, when it downgraded the 
credit rating it attributed to the entire field of American higher education (Martin, 2013). 
Moody’s specifically advocated “elimination or reduction of tenure” as a remedy to 
unsustainable university spending. Additionally, fiscal explanations include the allure of 
budgetary flexibility inherent to renewable faculty contracts. For example, central 
administrators can more deftly maneuver to meet changing course enrollment needs 
semester by semester simply by choosing not to renew contracts in low-enrollment areas 
and instead creating additional positions where course demand is higher. Such 
noncommittal appointments can provide particular facility in academic staffing at public 
universities, where state subsidies continue to decrease in relation to college cost (Gappa 
et al., 2007; O’Meara et al., 2008; Eckel et al., 2005; Longanecker, 2005; McGuinness, 
2005; National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education, 2006). Authors also note 
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that contingent appointments, which typically focus on either teaching or research, can be 
useful in tailoring job responsibilities more closely to the desires of either hiring 
departments, the faculty member, or both (Gappa et al., 2007; O’Meara et al., 2008).   
Politically, declining public support for tenure policies can make championing 
those policies a tough stance to defend for elected officials and campus leaders who 
answer to them (O’Meara et al., 2008). Lay perceptions of faculty as ivory tower elitists 
have resulted in skepticism toward tenure as a sacred cow of academic tradition that 
appears to confer lifelong job security in return for only a few years’ work. Additionally, 
the implementation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the legal 
demise of mandatory retirement policies in public universities in the early 1990s, has 
been blamed for exacerbating the amount of “dead wood” faculty members whose golden 
years have become unproductive (Gappa et al., 2007). 
Technological changes to instruction delivery platforms in higher education have 
also been posited as a contributing factor behind NTT growth (Gappa et al., 2007). 
Academic units with a focus on distance learning often require less research, campus 
service, and outreach from their faculty. In just the past few years, massive online open 
courses (MOOCs) have threatened such sweeping change to traditional classroom 
instruction that even residential campuses are moving to make them a part of their 
offerings (Carey, 2012; Lewin & Markoff, 2013). MOOCs, whether for-profit or not-for-
profit, tend not to employ local faculty on the tenure track. 
Economic research suggests the plausibility of a rational labor cost calculus on the 
parts of budget directors. For instance, Ehrenberg and Klaff’s (2003) case study of 
faculty labor shifts in relation to salary in the State University of New York system 
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demonstrated the zero-sum nature of the appointments proposition. They discovered that 
as tenure track salaries increased an exchange of tenure track positions for contingent 
positions followed closely on its heels. Such a finding suggests that labor costs directly 
influence appointment type (e.g., a department chair, or dean, examines a budget sheet 
and calculates that the financial costs of hiring a tenure track faculty member at that point 
in time have exceeded a threshold, and it is now preferable to hire NTT labor in order to 
save money). 
The popular concept of the academic ratchet and administrative lattice (Massy 
and Zemsky, 1994) is yet another entry point for explanations of the expansion of NTT 
appointments. Those who support this line of thinking suggest that the changes in 
appointment types have occurred with the collective, tacit endorsement of tenure track 
faculty members. The premise of the academic ratchet supports the idea that contingent 
faculty have increasingly been used to replace teaching otherwise carried out by tenure 
track faculty. In their seminal article presenting the concept, Massy and Zemsky describe 
how tenure track faculty, whose greatest career rewards often come from research 
responsibilities, have not fought to retain their domain of expertise in non-research areas. 
In order to compensate, administrations have become bloated with support staff. Further, 
reporting by the American Federation of Teachers (2009) would appear to support the 
notion that growth in tenure track labor is to some degree being exchanged, not only for 
growth in contingent faculty labor but also for growth in administrative labor in campus 
budgets. It states, “The number of administrators, the majority of whom were full time, 
also increased by a substantial percentage. This group grew by 41 percent, to a total of 
about 59,000, between 1997 and 2007” (p. 6). What this one finding tells us about the 
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status of university missions and strategies within the diverse, decentralized system of 
American higher education, let alone at the campus level, is not fully clear. Research and 
theory are unsettled with regard to possible relationships between university priorities 
and growth on one side of the house versus the other (i.e., faculty versus administration) 
(Massy & Zemsky, 1994; Milem, Berger, & Dey, 2000). However, it seems important to 
recognize the plausibility that the two are related.  
Problem Statement 
Research offers an abundance of plausible explanations as to why contingent 
faculty appointments continue to proliferate. However, the literature underlying such 
explanations typically relies upon logic or unempirical data, and if it analyzes empirical 
data it primarily provides analysis at either the national or state level. The result is a 
paucity of data-based understanding of the roles of organizational actors, at the 
university, college, and department levels, in making decisions that affect continued 
proliferation in contingent appointments.  
Without this deeper understanding of the decision making mechanisms that 
control faculty hiring on campuses we are left with a cacophony of assumptions about the 
nature of the growth in contingent labor. Economic explanations imply but cannot 
confirm that people occupying positions of authority in university budget centers employ 
expenditure information toward a goal of cost savings in order to affect increased reliance 
on contingent labor. Human resource explanations imply but cannot confirm that people 
overseeing hiring strategy employ course enrollment information toward a goal of 
meeting changeable enrollment demands. Political explanations imply but cannot confirm 
that university presidents and provosts actively avoid participation in decisions affecting 
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faculty appointments policies. Cultural explanations imply but cannot confirm that 
decisions are so routinized as to fit the tautology that decisions occur in such a way 
because that is “the way we do things around here” (Schein, 1993).  
But why do we care how academic staffing decisions are made? To begin with, 
multiple stakeholders have expressed deep concern over the results of such decisions. 
Empirical studies of productivity offer findings that highlight the limitations of PTNTT 
faculty labor in comparison to that of TT faculty (Raveling & Soto, 1998; Umbach, 
2007). On the other side, anecdotal evidence fuels popular belief that tenure policies 
impose their own limits, by failing to sufficiently motivate faculty members (Carlin, 
1999; Taylor, 2010). Over the past several decades this discourse has effectively 
deposited the interested parties at an impasse. The growth in NTT appointments goes on, 
and frustration with the tenure system maintains pace. If the discussion is to continue in a 
more productive manner, then it needs to shift focus. I submit that university 
stakeholders, as a group invested in academia as a place of reason, will be interested in 
important decisions being made based upon intent. Conceivably, all interested parties 
could agree that hiring decisions ought to be made with the purpose of yielding desirable 
consequences (or at least do little enough harm) in keeping with university mission and 
strategy. The many rationalizations of growth in NTT appointments contribute to a sense 
of plausibility that decisions are made purposefully, in an informed way, and in a manner 
intended to support university mission. There is simply very little evidence that those 
decisions are made in such a rational manner. Likewise, there is little evidence to 
conclude those decisions are made without any intent whatsoever, and this leaves those 




 The purpose of this study is to better understand decision making processes 
regarding non-tenure track instructional faculty hiring in comprehensive universities. The 
primary literature base informing my analysis is that of organizational decision making. 
Collectively, theories of decision making provide a complex analytic lens. March (1994) 
notes: “By far the most common portrayal of decision making is one that interprets action 
as rational choice” (p. 1). Bess and Dee (2008) call attention to Huber’s (1986) definition 
of decision making as an example of the rational choice perspective: “[Decision making 
is] the process commonly portrayed as occurring early in ‘problem-solving processes’—
the sensing, exploration, and definition of problems and opportunities—as well as the 
generation, evaluation, and selection of solutions” (p. 589). As March (1994) concludes, 
though, the notion that decision making consists of a person logically concerned with 
consequence pursuing a sequence of steps is so self-evident as to be deceptive. 
Logic, according to March (1994), can take either of two forms in decision 
making. A logic of consequence underlies the sequence of steps suggested above, such 
that decision ultimately occurs as a result of the decider’s preferences for outcomes. The 
process for arriving at such a decision includes a gathering of information and a use of 
that information such that predicted decision outcomes can be compared for selection. By 
contrast, a logic of appropriateness guides decision makers according to accepted rules of 
behavior. For instance, in some circumstances an individual’s identity as a proponent of 
conservative fiscal policy may prompt them to consistently oppose new expenditures. 
One can easily imagine a situation in which such an individual would prefer a smaller, 
impermanent investment in contingent faculty labor if that aspect of their identity plays a 
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prominent role. That person, then, embraces a decision grounded in their values as 
opposed to any sort of calculus of possible outcomes. The difference between a logic of 
consequence and a logic of appropriateness is the difference between asking what is best 
and asking what is right; it is the difference between which is the most promising among 
an array of courses for preferred outcomes (consequence) and, alternatively, which path 
most accurately reflects the principles and values most relevant to the decision maker at 
present (appropriateness). 
Another issue is whether decisions function to produce clarity and consistency or 
to reduce them, according to March (1994). For instance, in decisions affecting faculty 
appointments in universities, characteristics of the decision process should reveal the 
relative degree of clarity or ambiguity of pertinent university goals. They should also say 
something about how consistent or inconsistent the decision process is with ongoing 
strategy and implementation. It may be fair to say that most readers will interpret clarity 
and consistency to be the universally desirable decision traits and ambiguity and 
inconsistency to be undesirable. In fact, evaluation is more challenging. March suggests 
that too much decision consistency, for instance, can become a liability. Competency 
traps occur when decisions become routine to the point that the underlying rules or 
choices become applied to superficially similar situations without due consideration of 
either appropriateness or consequence. They are consistent, yet they abet a new hazard as 
a result. Cross and Goldenberg (2009) have suggested that NTT faculty appointment 
decisions in some universities have become heavily routinized, which implies that they 
occur with great consistency yet may not be considered effective. 
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A third issue March (1994) discusses involves whether decision making is 
intended as a means to an end (a solution to a problem) or as part of the ongoing exercise 
of revealing the identity of an individual or an organization. For example, March states: 
“The dispersion of consequences over time and space is a fundamental complication in 
defining decision intelligence. Actions taken here and now have consequences here and 
now, but they also have consequences somewhere else and some time later” (p. 231). 
Thus, while many decision makers may more readily profess to solving problems than 
explicating identities, the view that their decisions only address contemporary issues is 
likely myopic. For instance, if a budget director adopts a preferred practice of hiring NTT 
labor under certain circumstances, then that practice could eventually become integrated 
into that unit’s identity, regardless of original intent to that effect. 
The final overarching issue in decision making, according to March (1994), is 
whether people control decisions or organizational systems do. People who work in any 
organization, certainly universities, experience and promulgate any of a variety of 
decision biases as a result of their environment. For instance, decision makers have a 
notion of success, which assists them in considering intentional choices or in matching a 
course of action with their understandings of what is appropriate. Yet, top-level decision 
makers are likely to display biases toward the same definitions of success, vis-à-vis 
similar choice patterns and rule commitments, as those that landed them in high level 
roles. Success becomes tautological, then; many decision makers may pass through the 
same role in the organization, but the decisions attributable to that role remain quite 
similar. This decision by system perspective is similar to Bourdieu’s (1977) concept of 
habitus, the predisposition of individuals to certain behaviors based on socio-cultural 
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heritage (in other words, experience unwittingly constrains choice). For example, 
McDonough (1997) provides strong evidence of the applicability of Bourdieu’s concept 
of habitus to the college-going decisions of high school students. McDonough explains, 
“Through this research, I found that individuals’ cultural capital is evident in a sense of 
‘entitlement’: students believe they are entitled to a particular kind of collegiate education 
based on their family’s habitus or class status and organize their college searches around 
a range of acceptable institutions,” (p. 155). In other words, the participants in 
McDonough’s study demonstrated decision biases attributable to their social 
environments. 
Each of the issues March (1994) raises creates challenges for evaluating decision 
making. Decision engineering, or improving the quality of decisions, hinges upon 
personal predispositions about what is desirable in a decision. Each decision 
characteristic (i.e., choices, rules, clarity, ambiguity, consistency, etc.) carries 
implications for the process and the outcome, but evaluations of those processes or 
outcomes depend upon the observer. In short, two observers may identify the very same 
decision characteristics and have completely different evaluations of the quality of that 
decision. 
The purpose of this study is an analytic one, not a persuasive one. The goal is to 
better understand decision making processes regarding non-tenure track instructional 
faculty hiring in comprehensive universities. Therefore, my analysis does not argue as to 
which are the most desirable aspects of the processes I examine, or which are most 
troublesome. I do not produce a grand theoretical model for best decision practices. 
Instead, I focus on generating detailed descriptive model of the processes I investigate, or 
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what is known as substantive theory, as befits a grounded theory method (Jones, Torres & 
Arminio, 2007). 
Many university stakeholders have strong opinions regarding the value of 
traditional tenure and the continuing changes in the nature of faculty work. They may 
also hold strong opinions more generally about how decisions ought to be made in 
university settings. This study provides important insights on decision making at the 
campus level, via comprehensive universities, where the phenomenon of the shift in 
faculty appointments is currently most dynamic. 
Research Questions 
My primary research question is as follows: What are the decision making 
processes by which unionized comprehensive universities produce non-tenure track 
instructional staffs? Supporting questions include: 
1. Who is involved in making these decisions? 
a. What constitutes involvement? 
b. What differentiates formal from informal participants? 
c. Under which circumstances do people enter or exit the process? 
d. What are the goals of the participants? 
2. What information is used in making these decisions? 
a. Which empirical data are used? How are they used, and who uses 
them? 
b. What anecdotal, theoretical, or other information is used? How is it 
used, and who uses it? 
3. How do the components of the decision making process fit together? 
18 
 
a. What are the elements of the decision making process? 
b. How are the components of the process related? 
Significance 
 This study holds immense potential for new findings in mapping faculty hiring 
processes off the tenure track. A dearth of university-level research exists with regard to 
examination of faculty hiring practices in the milieu of massive growth in contingent 
faculty appointments. Instead, most of the literature on appointment types has tended to 
apply statistical methods to large databases, in order to either describe the national trend 
toward a prevalence of non-tenure track (NTT) labor or to determine which 
environmental factors seem to affect the shift (Baldwin & Chronister, 2001; Gappa, 
Austin, & Trice, 2007; Schuster & Finkelstein, 2006). As a result, a good deal is known 
about faculty hiring outcomes over the past several decades, specifically describing the 
remarkable growth in NTT labor. Few studies of this phenomenon have taken an 
approach involving decision making concepts, and few have employed qualitative 
research methods. These research method choices allows me to examine faculty hiring 
processes, not just their outcomes. 
Another characteristic of this study, which sets it apart from other studies of the 
same phenomenon, is its focus on the comprehensive university setting. Existing research 
on faculty issues also favors research university settings (Rhoades, 1998; Tierney, 2008). 
This study contributes to a thicker literature regarding comprehensive universities. These 
settings play a critical role in American higher education by serving a particularly diverse 
student population and placing strong emphasis on baccalaureate instruction. Given the 
appointment types of instructors have been shown to affect student outcomes (Eagan & 
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Jaeger, 2009; Jaeger & Eagan, 2010; Jaeger & Eagan, 2009; Umbach, 2007), 
understanding decision-making about appointments in comprehensive universities has 
important implications for student success. Further, studying the shift in faculty 
appointments in comprehensive universities is important because that is the institution 
type where growth in part-time faculty appointments have been occurring at the greatest 
pace of late. 
 Perhaps most importantly, once stakeholders are able to pair the well-known 
outcomes of faculty appointment decisions with this study’s extrapolation of the 
processes producing and perpetuating those decisions, they ought to enjoy greater facility 
in affecting organizational change. The shift in faculty appointment types has been well-
documented over approximately four decades. Some stakeholders have been vociferous 
in their promotion of such change and may conceivably wish the deterioration of the 
traditional tenure system to occur even faster. Others have voiced caution and concern 
over the slippage of tenure as an important piece of the academic puzzle that produces 
measurable outcomes of high value. Proponents of neither position are at present well-
equipped to produce change at the campus level, because decision making surrounding 
faculty appointments at the campus level remains a proverbial black box. By studying the 
shift in appointment types from a decision making perspective, and by doing so in 
settings where the shift is most dynamic, I help to map the black box and provide tools to 
stakeholders seeking change. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Overview 
 This study focuses on the question of how comprehensive universities construct 
non-tenure track instructional faculty labor forces. Specifically, I am interested in 
understanding decision making processes that produce faculty hiring outcomes. Although 
the study of phenomena in higher education through a decision making lens is well-
established (e.g., shared governance, administrative decision making in various contexts, 
the work of academic senates, budgetary and allocations processes, etc.), relatively little 
is known empirically about the decision making that leads to faculty hiring, especially 
hiring off the tenure track. Due to the understudied nature of this question, much of the 
relevant literature is theoretical in character. A broad understanding of decision making 
theory, in particular, provides crucial orienting concepts for the purpose of generating 
new understanding through this study’s exploratory design (see Chapter Three). 
Likewise, research on non-tenure track (NTT) and tenure track (TT) appointments 
provides important context regarding the consequences and content of the decision 
making under study. 
This chapter proceeds through three sections. The first section reviews literature 
on the unique value of academic work in comprehensive university settings. The second 
section reviews the rise in nontraditional faculty appointment types and related work 
outcomes. It also connects faculty work in comprehensive universities to faculty hiring in 
this particular sector. The third section poses the phenomenon of faculty hiring within the 
context of decision making; it reviews decision making theory as an area of literature that 




The purpose of this section is to review the unique character and research interest 
of comprehensive universities. The U.S. Department of Education defines comprehensive 
universities as “undergraduate colleges with a major emphasis on baccalaureate 
programs, or offer a wide range of baccalaureate programs and are committed to 
education through the master’s degree” (American Federation of Teachers, 2009, p. 27). 
The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching classification system simply 
dubs them “master’s colleges and universities.” The Carnegie Foundation (2010) states 
that of 4,364 accredited U.S. institutions of higher education in 2009, 724 of them 
(15.6%) were master’s colleges and universities; further, the sector accounted for 
4,656,600 students6, or 22.5 percent of the national total (the largest enrollments are in 
community colleges—39.6%). The sector is comprised of both state (“public”) and 
independent (“private”) colleges and universities, though one key difference between the 
two is in many cases a difference in collective bargaining rights for faculty. 
In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court declared in National Labor Relations Board v. 
Yeshiva University that full-time faculty in private colleges and universities hold 
governance powers of sufficient substance to preclude their adoption of important 
organized labor practices, like collective bargaining over salary and the inclusion of 
strike clauses in contracts. Full-time faculty members in state institutions, as well as part-
time faculty members in either sector, were not precluded from such activities. In his 
review of faculty collective bargaining agreements, Rhoades (1998) notes: 
The most heavily unionized sector in higher education in terms of contracts is 
community colleges: 94 percent of public-sector community college faculty are 
                                                 
6 This number appears to be based on fall semester 2009 headcount. 
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represented by bargaining agents. Nationwide, 70 percent of all collective 
bargaining agreements—and 78 percent of agreements in the public sector are in 
two-year colleges. […] Yet, more faculty in four-year than in two-year 
institutions (138,254, versus 103,967) are covered by collective bargaining 
agreements. Why? Because large state systems of comprehensive colleges and 
universities tend to be unionized (85 percent of faculty in public four-year 
institutions other than research universities are unionized) (p. 12). 
State law also shapes whether and how university faculties may employ union 
representation, but the main point should not be lost: union contracts are frequently 
important to considerations of full- and part-time faculty work in public comprehensive 
institutions; and they can also be important to considerations of part-time faculty work in 
private comprehensives. 
Besides the special relevance of unions, one of the most well-documented aspects 
of comprehensive universities is that research on them is relatively scarce (Daly & Dee, 
2006; Finnegan, 1993; Henderson, 2006; Tierney, 2008; Wolf-Wendel & Ward, 2005; 
Youn & Price, 2009). In fact, Rhoades (1998) employs this rationale to help explain the 
importance of his study of faculty collective bargaining agreements: 
However, I have focused on unionized faculty for more than just reasons of 
numbers and convenience. The types of colleges and universities that are most 
likely to be unionized often are overlooked in the higher education literature. 
Higher education scholars are much more likely to focus on the more than 100 
research universities in which they are employed than on the more than 3,200 
other institutions that make up American higher education. There is much 
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literature on small, selective private colleges, but the literature on public 
comprehensive state colleges, and on community colleges, is limited, particularly 
in the area of faculty (pp. 11-12). 
More than a decade later, Youn and Price (2009) retained the same argument: “Although 
much of the expansion and change that took place in American society after World War 
II substantially influenced the fates of comprehensive colleges and universities, these 
institutions are among the least studied by social science researchers” (207). Scholars 
continue to note a dearth of research on comprehensive universities. 
 Some things can be empirically stated, however, particularly with regard to 
comprehensive universities’ historical missions. In her multi-site case study on full-time 
faculty hiring policies and practices in comprehensive universities, Finnegan (1993) 
offered the observation that mission fluidity over time has contributed to a lack of 
understanding about comprehensives. She explains: 
The sector consists of former normal schools cum teachers colleges cum state 
colleges and universities, historically black private denominational and public 
land-grant colleges, technical institutes, women's colleges, and metropolitan and 
regional independent and denominational colleges. Throughout this century, these 
institutions increasingly have broadened their original single-purpose missions by 
adopting multi-purpose objectives and an extended curriculum. […] Today, the 
common characteristic across the sector is the provision of utilitarian education on 
the baccalaureate and master's levels (p. 623-624). 
The emphasis on broad educational goals and utilitarian outcomes is consistent with 
O’Meara’s (2005) assertion that comprehensive universities have been among those most 
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receptive toward Boyer’s (1990) expanded notions of academic work (i.e., the 
scholarship of integration, application, and teaching). Of the two sites in her case study, 
Finnegan selected one private university, which had arrived at its current form by a 
course of accumulation. She states, “Typical of many private comprehensive universities, 
Merger University was established in the mid-fifties as a result of a fusion of three 
independent postsecondary institutions” (p. 625). One begins to understand the 
appropriateness of “comprehensive” as the primary descriptor of this sector, if mission 
accumulation and not mission focus explains their genesis. 
 If Finnegan’s (1993) public comprehensive is indicative of its fellows, then its 
origins story, too, may provide helpful context. Finnegan summarily describes its 
formation in terms of mission expansion rather than mission acquisition, although the 
resulting universities appear to have similar attributes: “Regional State University was 
established first as a normal school in 1890 and subsequently was raised to the 
baccalaureate level as a teachers college. In the early sixties, the mission was broadened 
to include liberal arts. A decade later, professional curricula were added” (p. 625). This 
description seems to support Henderson’s (2011) claims regarding the historical and 
social roles embodied in public comprehensives:  
Historically, it is the [state comprehensive universities] that have democratized 
higher education, providing access to underserved populations and providing 
service to their regions, leading some to argue that they more deserve to be known 
as the People’s Universities than do the land grant universities. The [state 
comprehensive universities’] students have tended to be first-generation college 
students seeking vocationally-oriented degrees in a wide range of areas from 
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education to construction management. The missions of the state comprehensive 
universities], adapted from their roots in normal schools and teacher’s colleges, 
branch campuses, historically black colleges, and technical schools, have 
traditionally been centered on teaching and service, not research (p. 37). 
In sum, state comprehensives, like independent comprehensives, have adapted to meet 
the needs of diverse student bodies by incorporating a uniquely broad array of 
activities—activities that previously would have been carried out in settings with much 
more constrained missions.  
 In order to pursue broad missions and respond to this array of student background 
and interest, comprehensive university settings ask a great deal of their faculty. 
Comprehensive universities are known to occupy an uncomfortable middle market 
segment, in which they neither enjoy the resplendent resources connoted by reputational 
prestige, nor may they operate within a class of postsecondary institutions that appeal to 
students primarily on cost and convenience (Zemsky et al., 1999). In her 2010 study of 
underrepresented minorities’ preparation for doctoral study during undergraduate careers 
in the California State University (CSU) system (public comprehensive institutions), 
DeAngelo conveys the stress faculty participants described in interviews over the 
challenges of teaching the “wide range of students the CSU serves, some of whom would 
have been accepted anywhere, and some in need of sustained remediation” (p. 29). 
DeAngelo’s study also reveals the mission of preparing students for graduate study 
within the CSU system faces challenges. Both faculty and students demonstrate 
“inferiority complexes” (p. 37) regarding the prestige of the CSU in relation to those of 
research and doctoral-granting institutions. At the same time, key faculty in the study (of 
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their own volition), as well as state and federal programs housed on CSU campuses, 
recognize comprehensives as loci of opportunity for underrepresented minorities to 
dramatically improve their own lives and enhance national economic goals. This is one 
example of how the academic work of comprehensive universities is both difficult and 
important. Not to be missed is the related point that the economic benefit of 
postsecondary education is most substantial at the baccalaureate level (Baum et al., 
2010); and as a sector comprehensive universities are well-positioned to confer those 
benefits to students and families who do not enjoy sociological, preparational, and 
financial means to receive them from selective and prestigious institutions. 
 In addition to the challenges of teaching students of vastly disparate ability and 
ambition, hiring and assessment criteria for comprehensive university faculty have 
become more stringent over time. Finnegan’s (1993) study of changes in full-time faculty 
hiring in comprehensive universities poses each decade, the 1960s, ‘70s, and ‘80s, as a 
different era in faculty hiring standards. Through the 1960s, Finnegan finds a decade in 
which “academic boomers” were hired on extremely favorable terms in order to staff 
institutions at increased capacity in response to the baby boomer student influx. These 
favorable terms of employment included abbreviated probationary periods for tenure 
(three years, compared with the typical six today), as well as entirely teaching-related 
criteria for tenure and promotion (no publication necessary). In the next phase, as the 
boomer student population stabilized and departed, a “Brahmin” order of faculty emerged 
from a clogged PhD market. As standing faculties were able to become more selective in 
hiring new colleagues, they followed cues from state governments and university 
administrators—many of whom came from research university backgrounds—and they 
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added publication criteria to the hiring process. Finally, Finnegan relates that by the 
1980s universities could still afford to be highly selective in hiring, but departmental 
cultures had become much more complex and politicized around values of teaching and 
research. This last group of faculty in Finnegan’s study, “proteans,” had to be strong in 
both research and teaching.  
More recently, Wolf-Wendell and Ward (2005) have concurred with Finnegan’s 
(1993) findings that tenure-track faculty life in comprehensive universities often reflects 
a high degree of mission tension. Wolf-Wendell and Ward studied female assistant 
professors with young children, in an array of public and private comprehensive 
university settings. While some of the universities where participants were employed 
were found to have affirmed their historic commitments to teaching over research, the 
authors discovered, “It is fair to say that these campuses, as a category (i.e., 
comprehensives) were grappling with who they are and where they were headed as an 
institution” (p. 3).  
Finnegan’s (1993) saga, as well as Wolf-Wendell and Ward’s (2005) findings, are 
both consistent with Youn and Price’s (2009) findings on the evolution of promotion and 
tenure rules in comprehensive universities in the 1980s and 1990s; they find promotion 
and tenure rules constituted “contagion” from research universities, which can be 
attributed to faculty and administrative hires from research universities in those years 
bringing research preferences into teaching institutions. Youn and Price use National 
Study of Postsecondary Faculty (NSOPF) data to show: a) a majority of comprehensive 
university faculty thought teaching ought to be the primary criterion for tenure as late as 
1997; yet b) 60.5 percent of comprehensive university faculty agreed it was tough to get 
28 
 
tenure without publishing by 1997, whereas only 19 percent had agreed in 1969 (see pp. 
215-216). More recently, as part of her qualitative study of faculty vitality in three state 
comprehensive universities, DeFelippo (2013) found: 
All faculty [participants] unanimously chose to work in a public comprehensive 
university because they wanted to spend more time teaching than doing research.  
They saw meaning and value in what they do, despite teaching’s lack of status 
and prestige, as described in the literature (Henderson, 2007). Twenty-one faculty 
participants, or 70% said that two of the most important aspects of their work are 
their students and their love of teaching (p. 156-157). 
Yet, DeFelippo (2013) also found her participants led busy work-lives, putting in long 
hours on diverse activities, including research. For nearly half of the faculty participants 
in DeFelippo’s study, the location of the university in proximity to family, or to an alma 
mater where they had maintained ties, played an important role in keeping them 
motivated and productive. 
While relatively modest in size, the literature on comprehensive universities says 
a good deal about the complex nature of faculty work there. What the research on 
comprehensive universities and faculty work in those contexts misses is referent points 
on the work uses of part-time and non-tenure track faculty. Part-time and non-tenure 
track hiring has risen dramatically in comprehensive university settings in recent years 
(American Federation of Teachers, 2009). Presumably, these individuals have been 
charged with similar student-focused work as their full-time and tenure-line colleagues, 
consistent with the teaching focus of the comprehensive sector. Yet, they may also be 
engaged in other faculty work, such as research, community engagement, and 
29 
 
administration of various programs and projects. It is not clear how decisions are being 
made that construct the academic workforces we now see in comprehensive universities. 
Changing Faculty, Changing Outcomes 
The purpose of this section is to review the changing character of faculty work 
and the effects of key changes, particularly the increasing reliance on part-time and non-
tenure track faculty appointments, on undergraduate teaching. Undergraduate teaching is 
the focal point of this review, because it plays a central role in the academic work of 
comprehensive university faculty. I begin by presenting a broad view of faculty 
responsibilities as related to tenure-line appointments, and I conclude by narrowing focus 
to the responsibilities and associated outcomes related to contingent appointments. 
Tenure-track responsibilities.  
A good deal of scholarship contributes to understandings of how faculty produce 
and contribute to the many things universities do. These products, or more accurately 
services, start with faculty members’ traditional responsibilities for the instructional and 
research activities of the university, plus internal service, or committee work that aids in 
formal university decision making. The American Association of University professors 
(AAUP), the American Council on Education (ACE), and the Association of Governing 
Boards of Universities and Colleges (AGB) adopted a joint statement in 1966 that 
describes these expectations: 
The faculty has primary responsibility for such fundamental areas as curriculum, 
subject matter and methods of instruction, research, faculty status, and those 
aspects of student life which relate to the educational process. On these matters 
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the power of review or final decision lodged in the governing board or delegated 
by it to the president should be exercised adversely only in exceptional 
circumstances, and for reasons communicated to the faculty. It is desirable that 
the faculty should, following such communication, have opportunity for further 
consideration and further transmittal of its views to the president or board 
(American Association of University Professors, 2010, p. 139). 
Scholars have challenged the comprehensiveness of this tripartite work structure with 
arguments that it does not include a fourth area of faculty responsibility, which is external 
service, or community engagement (e.g., Boyer, 1990; O’Meara, Lounder, & Sisson, 
2013). Many universities’ founding stories and mission statements encourage public 
outreach, and that work is presumably also a faculty responsibility. 
Additionally, faculty have increasingly become responsible for generating 
revenue. Slaughter and Leslie’s (1997) and subsequently Slaughter and Rhoades’ (2004) 
groundbreaking work on “academic capitalism,” demonstrates how universities7 have 
come to covet externally funded research (i.e., grants from government agencies and 
from charitable foundations), corporate partnerships, and patents and copyrights. In fact, 
many faculty are now appointed, tenured, and promoted not only on the quality of their 
research and teaching and committee work, but whether they have received grants from 
certain agencies (thus showing promise for future funding), or what dollar amount they 
have so far obtained via external grants. Slaughter and Leslie (1997) summarize the 
implications of this reality for faculty members who perhaps find themselves 
unexpectedly relied upon to generate substantial revenue for the university: 
                                                 
7 This assertion is primarily being made with regard to institutions of higher education with major research 
missions (i.e., research and comprehensive universities). 
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In terms of practical implications, we hope that the concept of academic 
capitalism will enable faculty, other academic personnel, and administrators to 
make sense of their daily lives. When faculty find themselves spending increasing 
amounts of time in pursuit of external funds or external relationships that might 
yield more students, contracts, or partnership arrangements, thus increasing unit 
revenue, the concept of academic capitalism may help them put their activities in 
a meaningful context (p. 210). 
Whether one views such uses of faculty time as harmful, as necessary, or as an 
opportunity, it is by now apparent to most who have spent time in university contexts that 
a fifth major responsibility, academic fundraising, now falls under the purview of tenure-
line faculty. 
In terms of faculty contracts and expectations, these five faculty responsibilities—
research, teaching, internal service, external service, revenue generation—do not apply in 
equal measure, nor are they distributed evenly within individual departments, let alone 
colleges, universities, or geopolitical boundaries. These responsibilities necessarily 
compete for faculty attention. When institutions try to increase faculty productivity, they 
often succeed in pitting these roles against one another (O’Meara, Terosky, & Neumann, 
2008). The notion that faculty can be equally engaged in each of these five roles, and do 
them all well, is questionable. And any perceived shortcoming in one area may ultimately 
color the observer’s entire opinion of a tenure-line faculty member’s productivity and the 
degree to which they are upholding their work responsibilities. Despite assessments that 
tenure-line faculty work in “the absence of a boss” (Rosovsky, 19908, p. 163), the 
                                                 
8 Rosovsky limits the applicability of this viewpoint to “tenured professors at, say, America’s top fifty to 
one hundred institutions” (p. 163). 
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literature on comprehensive university faculty work suggests that faculty in that sector 
respond to pressure from a variety of sources to uphold the full gamut of academic 
responsibilities—including steadfast commitment to undergraduate education. 
Part-time and contingent faculty responsibilities.  
If Finnegan’s (1993) historic analysis of the development of faculty hiring criteria 
had extended beyond the academic boomers, the Brahmin, and the proteans, and into the 
2000s, then her analysis may have included discussion of the evolution of faculty hiring 
away from full-time and tenure-line positions altogether. The multifaceted notion of 
faculty work Finnegan’s protean group embodied is being deconstructed, or “unbundled” 
(Schuster & Finkelstein, 2006). In other words, more and more university faculty 
members are hired not to carry out the complex work of being a self-supporting scholar-
teacher, who is committed to both the campus community and the public; rather, they are 
hired to be a teacher for a course, for the duration of one semester, or as a full-time, non-
tenure track faculty member (FTNTT) to teach several courses on an academic year 
contract. In fact, AAUP analysis (Curtis & Thornton, 2013) shows part-time, non-tenure 
track (PTNTT) instructional faculty numbers, by headcount, have now grown to over 60 
percent of the national total9, whereas tenure-line faculty have fallen below 25 percent. 
 Several scholars have studied the impacts of this shift for undergraduate teaching. 
The collective results suggest that on the group level part-time—and to a lesser extent 
full-time—non-tenure track faculty instruction does not serve students as well as tenure-
line faculty instruction. On measures of: student-faculty interaction time (Benjamin, 
1998; Umbach, 2007), use of active and collaborative pedagogies associated with strong 
                                                 
9 This count includes graduate student instructors, which comprise nearly 20 percent of the national total. 
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learning outcomes (Umbach, 2007), frequency of instructor-student interactions 
(Umbach, 2007), retention rates (Bettinger & Long 2006; Harrington & Schibik 2004; 
Jaeger & Hintz, 2008), transfer rates between two- and four-year institutions (Eagan & 
Jaeger, 2009), and drop-out and graduation rates (Ehrenberg & Zhang, 2005; Jaeger & 
Eagan, 2011; Jaeger & Eagan, 2009), scholarship suggests negative effects of instruction 
by part-time and contingent faculty when compared to tenure-line counterparts. 
Determining the exact meaning of these data in terms of both costs and benefits is where 
the literature falls short. 
 Student-faculty interaction time and effective pedagogies.  
Studies show that both the quantity and quality of student-faculty interaction time 
is lowest nationally with regard to PTNTT faculty and optimal with regard to tenure-line 
faculty. Benjamin’s (1998) examination of U.S. Department of Education data finds that 
nationally declining student-faculty interaction time reflected a decrease in the ratio of 
tenure-line faculty relative to a growing student population (the difference being made up 
by contingent faculty). Umbach’s (2007) analysis of Faculty Survey of Student 
Engagement (FSSE) data finds, similarly, that part-time faculty interact less with students 
in and out of class. Umbach’s analysis also reveals much about the quality of in-class 
interactions, saying: “part-time faculty use active and collaborative techniques less 
frequently (-.07 of a standard deviation) than tenured and tenure-track faculty and they 
challenge their students significantly less and spent significantly less time preparing for 
class than their more permanent peers” (p. 102). Part-time and non-tenure track faculty 
may, as a national group, disadvantage student learning by both interacting with students 
less and by less frequently employing the most effective pedagogies. 
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 Retention, transfer, and graduation rates.  
Studies also show that, in comparison with tenure-line faculty, the national 
undergraduate pipeline is leaky when instructors are employed on part-time and 
contingent appointments. These leaks have been shown to occur throughout the course of 
undergraduate education. Bettinger and Long’s (2006) study of student retention in public 
four-year institutions in Ohio finds that “In their first semester, taking courses from full-
time faculty members appears to be important for retention” (p. 68). Harrington and 
Schibik’s (2004) quantitative case study of student retention by PTNTT faculty 
instruction was actually completed in a comprehensive university setting. Their findings 
concur with Bettinger and Long (2006) and describe the effect of heavy exposure to 
PTNTT teaching in the first semester as follows: 
Table 6 reveals that a student who is exposed to between 50% and 75% part-time 
faculty in their first semester has 1.29 times higher odds of not being retained than 
students whose exposure is between 0 and 25% (the reference group). 
Additionally, students whose exposure is between 75% and 100% part-time 
faculty in their first semester have 1.47 times higher odds of not being retained 
than the reference group (p. 5). 
Jaeger and Hintz (2008) report similar findings in their study of retention between year 
one and year two of undergraduate study in a research university. Clearly, heavy 
exposure to PTNTT instructors early on in a student’s undergraduate career can pose 
unique challenges to degree completion. These findings are particularly troubling when 
one considers PTNTT faculty, including graduate students, are frequently employed to 
teach large, introductory undergraduate courses (Eagan & Jaeger, 2008). 
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 In terms of graduation and transfer rates, heavy exposure to PTNTT instruction 
may also be related to community college drop-out behavior, or otherwise reduced 
likelihood of 2-year students’ eventual pursuit of a four-year degree. Jaeger & Eagan’s 
(2009) study of student transcripts from 107 California community colleges finds “a 
significant yet modest negative effect on completing an associate’s degree” (p. 186) in 
relation to amount of PTNTT instructional exposure. Data from the same study (Eagan & 
Jaeger, 2009) also reveal a significant, negative relationship between degree of exposure 
to PTNTT instruction and likelihood of transfer to a four-year school: 
Indeed, for every 10% increase in students’ exposure to part-time faculty 
instruction, students tended to become almost 2% less likely to transfer. Although 
the strength of this association may seem small, the average student in this sample 
had almost 40% of his or her academic credits with part-time faculty members, 
which translates into being, on average, about 8% less likely to transfer compared 
to peers who had no exposure to part-time faculty members. Additionally, 
students who had all of their credits taught by part-time faculty were nearly 20% 
less likely to transfer than their peers who had only full-time faculty instruction 
(p. 180). 
Comprehensive universities serve the largest portion of associate’s degree holders 
transferring to four-year institutions, at about 50 percent (Shapiro et al., 2013). The 
transfer effect of PTNTT exposure on community college students suggests particular 
harm to transfer enrollments in comprehensive universities. More importantly (for 
students), to the extent that some comprehensive university contexts resemble community 
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college contexts in the first two years of study, comprehensive universities may also be 
concerned about student retention after heavy exposure to PTNTT instruction. 
 Jaeger and Eagan (2011) also conducted a study comparing the effects of PTNTT, 
FTNTT, and graduate instruction on student retention in one state system’s four-year 
colleges and universities10. Among the findings, the authors note students in the 
comprehensive universities had the highest average exposure to PTNTT instruction. This 
fact serves to emphasize the importance of the study’s system-level findings: 
Exposure to [part-time] contingent faculty significantly reduced students’ 
probabilities of being retained, as a 10% increase in exposure to this type of 
faculty resulted in a 7% decrease in students’ probability of retention. Similarly, a 
10% increase in exposure to graduate student instruction and full-time, nontenure-
track faculty instruction reduced students’ probability of retention by 2% and 3%, 
respectively (p. 526). 
These findings are consistent with findings in Ehrenberg and Zhang’s (2006) analysis of 
College Board data, which elucidates differences by institutional control and Carnegie 
type. Ehrenberg and Zhang found that when other factors are held constant, non-tenure 
track instruction of both the part-time and full-time variety had negative effects on 
graduation rates across control and Carnegie type. In general, the effects were stronger 
for publicly controlled colleges and universities, and the authors singled out public 
comprehensives as the locus of highest magnitude effects: “Other factors held constant, a 
10 percent increase in the percentage of part-time faculty is associated with a reduction in 
the graduation rate of 3 percent, whereas an increase in the proportion of full-time faculty 
not on tenure-track lines is associated with a reduction in the graduation rate of 4.4 
                                                 
10 They could only include six of them in the final analysis, due to data availability. 
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percent at these institutions” (p. 41). These findings offer substantial firepower for those 
seeking to turn back the clock on the growth in contingent appointments. 
It must be said that none of the studies I have reviewed linking contingent faculty 
instruction to unfavorable student outcomes looks at individual instructors, or even 
individual programs, departments, or colleges. None of these analyses has argued that 
contingent faculty are unmotivated or ill-equipped to be good teachers, and none has 
argued that the institutions employing them cannot make better use of them. Likewise, 
none of these analyses has named 100 percent tenure-line staffing as being a goal to 
strive toward for any college or university; although several scholars (see Gappa, Austin, 
& Trice, 2007; or Green, 2007) offer strong arguments that there are advantages (e.g., 
time of class offering, real world experience) to the use of some amount of contingent 
instructional labor. Additionally, while much of this scholarship agrees that negative 
effects of increased reliance on PTNTT and FTNTT instruction exist, discrepancies, 
particularly with regard to the relative value in FTNTT instruction are also present. For 
instance, Umbach’s (2007) analysis shows that the negative effects of FTNTT instruction 
on student-faculty interaction and effective pedagogies are far less than those associated 
with PTNTT instruction. However, Ehrenberg and Zhang (2006) found that, particularly 
in public comprehensive universities, the negative effects of FTNTT instruction are about 
50% greater than those of PTNTT instruction.  
Additionally, none of the nation- or system-wide studies addressing the effects of 
contingent faculty instruction on student outcomes includes analysis of alternative 
academic staffing. In fact, a recent econometric case study of Northwestern University 
counters findings from larger studies by concluding, “Our findings suggest that non-
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tenure track faculty at Northwestern not only induce students to take more classes in a 
given subject than do tenure line professors, but also lead the students to do better in 
subsequent coursework than do their tenure track/tenured colleagues” (Figlio et al., 2013, 
p. 15). An elite research university like Northwestern should not be confused with 
comprehensive universities, and of course the study itself acknowledges several 
limitations; however, the case study at Northwestern serves to illustrate the still-
developing character of the literature on instructional effects of contingent faculty 
staffing. With several limitations understood, the research I have reviewed suggests that 
in many cases universities would do well to examine their academic staffing policies and 
practices and affirm alignment between faculty hiring and institutional goals. 
Conclusion.  
 For the purpose of this study I am concerned with non-tenure track instructional 
faculty hiring processes, an understanding of which may benefit from comparison and 
contrast across appointment type (i.e., tenure status, part-time and full-time status)11, and 
I am interested in this phenomenon specifically in those four-year university settings 
where faculty growth has outstripped all others over the past decade and a half—
comprehensive institutions. Tenure-line faculty work is complex in nature, even in 
teaching-centric colleges and universities, like comprehensives. By contrast, contingent 
faculty work tends to be straight-forward in its teaching focus, especially in 
comprehensive institutions, though the character of contingent appointments also carry 
                                                 
11 It is important to recall prior to concluding that faculty effectiveness and productivity hinge on a great 
many more environmental and personal variables than appointment type (for example, see Bland et al.’s 
2006 study of faculty productivity in research universities). However, appointment type is key among them, 
because it gets to the heart of faculty work expectations and because it is a variable experiencing a drastic, 
unidirectional change over a remarkable period of time. 
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risks to the instructional mission. Studies on the effects of increasing student exposure to 
contingent instruction, especially in comprehensive institutions and early in 
undergraduate careers, reveal negative effects on key student outcomes, such as: student-
faculty interaction time, the use of effective pedagogies, retention rates, transfer rates 
between two- and four-year institutions, and drop-out and graduation rates. In this 
section, I provided evidence that faculty hiring decisions carry great import with regard to 
key student outcomes, with some specificity to the comprehensive university sector. In 
the previous section, I explained how the contributions of this sector make it worthy of 
special consideration. In the next section, I review literature on decision making in 
organizations, which is uniquely useful to my examination of decision processes affecting 
faculty hiring processes in unionized comprehensive universities. 
Decision Making Theory 
The purpose of this section is to introduce key theoretical concepts that support 
the generation of analytic findings from the data. Contemporary grounded theorists will 
recognize this section in terms of its contributions to sensitizing concepts (Charmaz, 
2003; Denzin, 1971; Dey, 2007; Kelle, 2007). That is to say, the review of this heavily 
theoretical literature is intended to reflect a breadth of preparatory understanding, many 
parts of which became applicable during data analysis. However, it does not constitute a 
discrete theoretical model or conceptual framework, which might support a deductive 
approach to inquiry.  
Decision making is a rich and complex area of theoretical literature of itself, 
which derives from a broader, even more deeply established field of study typically 
known as organizational behavior.  While many authors have touched upon decision 
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making in the course of larger volumes addressing organizational behavior more 
comprehensively, March’s (1994) A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen 
is uniquely helpful in that it isolates decision making theory and discusses that material as 
its primary interest. Thus, I order the discussion of concepts in this section roughly as 
March does in his book, and I strategically call upon additional authors and theorists in 
order to marshal a full review of relevant concepts12. I begin by introducing two 
prominent modes of individual decision making: rational choice and rule following. I 
then build upon the principles underlying individual decision making to discuss decisions 
made by multiple actors, or groups (both team-oriented and political), as well as 
decisions that are distinctive for the unclear intentions of those making them—ambiguous 
decisions. Following discussion of each type of decision making, I illustrate what such 
processes may look like in practice using a short vignette about a fictional department 
chair of archaeology, Dr. Jones13. Finally, I conclude the section by addressing important 
limitations to the application of decision making theory to the understanding of hiring 
decisions made in real time. 
Rational choice. 
 The concept of rational choice is centered in a positivist world view. That is to 
say, decision makers who employ rational choice act consistently with a philosophy that 
                                                 
12 It is important to acknowledge much of March’s (1994) writing, and indeed much of the literature on 
decision making overall, stems from research and observations of for-profit firms and nonprofit firms 
outside of higher education. In addition to punctuating many of the concepts I review with relevant 
literature and examples from higher education, I will seek to follow in the footsteps of other scholars of 
universities who have demonstrated success in translating ideas about other types of firms to become 
relevant to nonprofit higher education. 
13 The character of Indiana Jones, among others, is borrowed from popular film and is cited and referenced 
appropriately. I claim no credit for the creation of any such characters, though the vignettes I provide are 




truth takes a singular form and is best confirmed through scientific inquiry (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985; Phillips & Burbules, 2000); one best answer exists in relation to any 
question, and perfect knowledge of all relevant information will consistently reveal that 
answer. March (1994) explains the central point of skepticism for this unbending 
philosophy in terms germane to this study: “Pure rationality strains credulity as a 
description of how decisions actually happen” (p. 5). A strictly rational explication of a 
decision process, regardless of how well-reasoned it appears to be, will always be subject 
to skepticism precisely because decisions are made by people. The human condition 
renders perfect knowledge of virtually any situation impossible. Thus, as one can observe 
in everyday conversation, people tend to explain their behavior in terms of alternatives 
and consequences (the trappings of rationality) in retrospect, but these endemic 
explanations are not accurate in depicting a great deal of human behavior.  
Positivism is, however, still relevant today. A more sophisticated view 
accommodates the basic principles of the positivist perspective, but with acknowledged 
limitations. This more moderate corollary is known as post-positivism, with a main 
difference being a recognition that collection of complete information is at least 
impractical, perhaps even impossible (Crotty, 1998). This is often the case when 
examining psycho-social phenomena, such as decisions. Yet, post-positivist thinkers tend 
to approach problems with the mindset that relevant information can be collected, 
understood, and utilized at a level of approximate totality for most intents and purposes. 
As a result, they believe a single, best solution to virtually any problem exists and ought 
to represent an achievable goal. 
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 People who employ a rational choice approach to decision making follow post-
positivist principles. They gather as much relevant information as they can, they seek to 
understand it as well as they can, and they identify a single best decision. March (1994) 
explains that rational choice decisions adhere to a logic of consequence, which asks four 
basic questions (p. 2-3): 
1. The question of alternatives: What actions are possible? 
2. The question of expectations: What future consequences might follow from 
each alternative? How likely is each possible consequence, assuming that 
alternative is chosen? 
3. The question of preferences: How valuable (to the decision maker) are the 
consequences associated with each of the alternatives? 
4. The question of the decision rule: How is a choice to be made among the 
alternatives in terms of the values of their consequences? 
Decision makers acknowledge the imperfect nature of the information underlying a 
rational choice approach (i.e., incomplete knowledge of possible alternatives, imperfect 
assessments regarding magnitude, likelihood, value, and relative value among 
consequences). In other words, these decision makers understand that decisions involve 
risk. 
 Risks involved in rational choice decisions point out the limited, or bounded 
nature of rationality, which include: 1) problems of attention, 2) problems of memory, 3) 
problems of comprehension, and 4) problems of communication (March, 1994). 
Problems of attention include the limitations imposed by too many relevant pieces of 
information and the challenge of synthesizing all of them into one ultimate and final 
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choice. Problems of memory are two-fold. First, human and organizational accumulation 
and maintenance (record-keeping and historical accuracy) of relevant information are 
limited; second, the applicability of previously relevant, previously accurate information 
to contemporary problems tends to become increasingly limited as time passes. Problems 
of comprehension include making erroneous conclusions, or alternatively failing to infer 
effectively, despite using relevant and accurate information. Finally, problems of 
communication include limitations with regard to: capacity (reduction of information for 
practical use), specialization (effective use and weight of information across expertise), 
platform (linguistic and cultural barriers), and competency (individual ability).  
 Methods used by rational choice decision makers to manage the risks associated 
with their preferred approach include: 1) editing, 2) decomposition, 3) heuristics, and 4) 
framing (March, 1994). Editing augments rational choice processes by simplifying and 
abbreviating the gathering of information, or perhaps even ruling out some possible 
choices prior to comparison with what the decision maker views as the most likely final 
options. In Eckel’s (2002) study of academic program closure decisions, campus leaders 
engaged in editing. They circumscribed the set of acceptable outcomes in terms of 
university programs recommended for closure.  
Decomposition allows decision makers to solve larger problems by solving 
component smaller problems (March, 1994). For instance, if a college faces a decline in 
enrollment, then decision makers may make multiple contributing decisions rather than 
addressing the problem comprehensively. Examples might include changing marketing 
strategy, reducing selectivity, and improving course offerings. These tactics would be 
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implemented in a loose sequence across multiple offices, rather than as a centrally 
orchestrated response.  
Heuristics refers to abbreviations of inference processes. In the interest of time, 
decision makers often categorize a situation at hand as the same type of situation in 
which a decision has occurred before, and thus they may cut the interpretive process short 
in favor of selecting a similar (or different) choice as that which was selected previously. 
March (1994) points out a particular tendency for decision makers to employ heuristics as 
a crutch in projecting expected consequences, which famously elude certainty. By 
reflecting on the consequences of previous, similar decisions decision makers often feel 
more confident in such projections. “No need to reinvent the wheel” would be an apt 
workplace proverb that suggests the application of heuristics to a decision. Adams, 
Kellogg, and Schroeder (1976) found several instances of heuristics in their multi-site 
descriptive study of decision making on college campuses. Among them, the authors 
found: complex planning processes were unwanted; and data-based planning was limited 
not by the availability of data but by reluctance to use it. Adams et al. (1976) essentially 
found that decisions overused heuristics and thus undermined the exercise of rational 
choice in decisions that might otherwise be well-suited to a logic of consequence, such 
as: academic program review, faculty position allocation, institutional goal setting, 
faculty performance evaluation, and budgeting. However, heuristics are not necessarily 
undesirable as a decision tool. Decision makers may argue persuasively that accurately 
recognizing similarities between a situation at hand and past situations can lead to 
predictable (low-risk) decision consequences, while saving time.  
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Finally, framing a problem involves decision makers focusing attention on certain 
pieces of information, to which they attribute greater value, or advantaging certain 
choices, which they view as more sophisticated, prior to a full review. Framing can occur 
consciously and subconsciously. As one example of framing from the literature, Glazer, 
Steckel, and Winer (1992) simulated business decisions among MBA students with 
different amount of information. They discovered that in some circumstances too much 
data served to distract decision makers. Students believed the more data they 
incorporated into their decisions the stronger those decisions would be; however, those 
with the greatest amount of data became myopic about the variables for which they had 
data. Students with the greatest amount of data discounted the variables for which they 
lacked data, and thus the authors concluded the students with excess data were 
predisposed to provide solutions that suited the available information, not the problem 
itself. In this case, the authors tampered with students’ abilities to frame the problem for 
themselves as part of the simulation design, but one can see how maintaining a strong 
sense of the problem might have allowed responsive solutions to be developed more 
efficiently. 
 Decision rules: maximize versus satisfice.  
Decision makers often embrace tactics of risk management without thinking about 
them in such terms. However, an understanding of the risks involved in rational choice 
approaches and common risk management tactics collectively underlie the view of 
rationality as limited, or bounded. As such, selection of a single optimal choice as a 
decision objective can be seen as impractical, even by decision makers who hold a post-
positivist world view. Those who temper their aspirations for ideal decision results in 
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favor of more practical decision processes embrace a decision rule to “satisfice” rather 
than maximize the results of their choices (March, 1992; March & Simon, 1958). To 
decide by satisfice means to “choose the first option that is good enough” (Bolman & 
Deal, 2008, p. 27). Rather than accumulating as much information as possible and 
assessing and comparing all alternatives, consequences, and preferences, rational choice 
decision makers will often independently set criteria for a satisfactory choice, strive to 
identify a choice meeting those criteria as quickly as possible, and select the first choice 
that does. For example, the project director at a metropolitan community college, who is 
charged with seeking a location for expansion (branch campus venture within the city), 
may set criteria for that location along the following lines: 1) rent must cost less than X 
amount, 2) space must be accessible to student population Y, and 3) crime statistics for 
the area must fall below level Z. The unstated criterion in this example, as in many 
decision making situations, is that a quick decision is also desirable. Perhaps suitable 
locations for the branch campus are in high demand, or perhaps she feels strongly that the 
sooner she settles on a location, the sooner she will begin to see success (e.g., students, 
revenue). Maybe the project director is simply impatient to make an entrepreneurial mark 
on the college or the city. There are many reasons why a quick decision could be 
desirable. Now, let us suppose the director schedules visits to five locations, and the third 
location is the first of them to meet her criteria. In accordance with a satisfice approach 
she then ceases to search for additional locations, even canceling the final two 
appointments. The director is uncertain whether another location is available that 
performs against her criteria better, yet she forgoes an exhaustive process. A melding of 
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the terms satisfy and suffice, to satisfice in decision making is to intentionally aim for a 
sufficient choice (though potentially suboptimal) by satisfying predetermined criteria.  
By contrast, consider the same example of the project director searching for a 
location for a community college branch campus but with slightly different criteria: 1) 
rent must cost as little as possible, 2) the space must be as close as possible to student 
population Y, and 3) the space must be within the district having the lowest crime 
statistics. The project director understands that these criteria are difficult to satisfy, 
especially when taken together, but she will not be pleased until she has researched all 
available options and assured herself that she has selected the very best location. As a 
result, her search stretches on a great deal longer than that of the project director who 
decided by a process of satisfice. Seeking the optimal choice by a compare and contrast 
process of elimination is not typically the quickest or most efficient way to make a 
decision, but it maximizes the value of the final determination above all other possible 
conclusions.  
With these concepts in mind, I turn to the first vignette, in which I introduce the 
main characters and scene and play out the first of four plausible fictions that illustrate 
decision making that leads to growth in PTNTT faculty employment. 
Dr. Jones makes a rational choice.  
Dr. Henry Jones, Jr. is University Endowed Chair of Archaeology in a department 
of eight full-time faculty members, at the University of California Hollywood (UCH). He 
has had an exceptional career researching ancient civilizations. Several years ago he was 
convinced by an old friend at UCH to cut back on his expeditions, fill the open chair post, 
and lead the reputational elevation of UCH’s bachelor’s and master’s programs in 
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Archaeology. If all goes well, perhaps someone of his stature in the field could even find 
a way to house a doctoral program at UCH and ultimately achieve national distinction for 
the department. 
Dr. Jones’ colleagues consist of: trusted friend and Undergraduate Program 
Director, Dr. Marion Ravenwood (the tenured associate professor who was instrumental 
in convincing him to take the department chair post); three additional male tenured 
professors, Drs. Spielberg (previous department chair), Lucas (Master’s Program 
Director), and Scorsese; and three full-time, non-tenure track instructors on annual 
contracts that have been renewed for the better part of a decade in each case, Drs. Croft 
(female), Gates (male), and O’Connell (male). The department has also frequently hired a 
number of part-time faculty on per-course instructional contracts. Dr. Spielberg 
mentioned something about this being the normative way to staff introductory 
undergraduate courses, but Dr. Jones did not come to UCH to continue the status quo. He 
is committed to a deliberative, efficacious agenda of program enhancement, and he plans 
to leave no stone unturned in identifying opportunities to develop excellence. One 
component of that effort will have to involve closer look at existing instructional staffing 
strategies and potential alternatives. 
The main problem, in short, is time. Dr. Jones only arrived at UCH in early June. 
It’s now nearly July, and much of his time is taken up trying to organize budget 
information to wrap up the end of the current fiscal year and begin the next. The faculty, 
including part-time and full-time NTT members, have a collective bargaining agreement, 
which means he cannot push off contracting Archaeology 101 instructors any later than 
mid-July. Besides that, he’s just been informed that Dr. Scorsese picked up an obscure 
49 
 
virus during his summer dig and faces a recovery of several months before he will be able 
to return to the classroom (there are no grants to fund faculty sick time, so he will have to 
scrape together some emergency cash somewhere). The dean is constantly in his ear 
about something or other, students have already begun emailing with questions about his 
own classes, and he has several publishing and conference submission deadlines to meet 
before the summer is out. He has not even had time to unpack the boxes in his office. 
Dr. Jones is a rational thinker; he favors pursuing predictable outcomes in 
decision making, and he sees resolution to the staffing problem he faces as a mere matter 
of information gathering. Students often remember his advice, “Seventy percent of 
archaeology is done in the library” (Lucas, et al. 1989). While Dr. Jones does not have 
the opportunity to conduct a full literature review before rendering a decision, he does 
gather the following experiential insights about staffing the open courses from Dr. 
Spielberg: 
1. Part-time instructors are one of three categorical alternatives: full-time 
instructors and tenure-line faculty being the other two. 
2. Expectations for outcomes from the part-time faculty solution satisfy the 
most pressing concerns: they are the most affordable option to carry out 
essential teaching work; they have not performed remarkably poorly in the 
past; they do not require a burdensome hiring process. 
3. Alternatives will require more time and expense on every level, though 
they would bring additional benefit to the department (e.g., research 
reputation, greater capacity for managing the committee service and 
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advising loads, and quite possibly a stronger pipeline of students 
continuing beyond Archaeology 101). 
Dr. Jones would have been more comfortable knowing the precise costs and 
benefits of hiring part-timers versus each of the alternatives. However, he is out of time, 
and he has reasonable expectations that part-time instructors will suffice. Perhaps at some 
point he will revisit the problem, but at least for the coming academic year he decides to 
move forward with the hiring of part-time instructors for the open introductory courses. 
In reaching this decision, Dr. Jones has taken a rational choice approach. He 
gathered what information he could, acknowledged limitations, and evaluated prospective 
decision outcomes stemming from three broad staffing choices. Ultimately, he has 
selected the option that most readily satisfied his basic criteria for a solution, although he 
did not know if it represented the very best option of the three; he satisificed. He remains 
concerned about a few potential problems related to this approach. He recognizes some, 
such as a problem of attention—the ability to synthesize information related to the 
disparate goals of affordability, performance, and ease of hiring into a single decision. He 
suspects others, such as problems of memory; he has no idea what sort of data his 
predecessor gathered, whether his analysis is sound, or whether his conclusions apply as 
well today as they did years ago. Yet others, such as problems of comprehension, Dr. 
Jones has not really considered—the notion that his conclusions are wrong, even if his 
information is right. He has, nonetheless, tried to make an informed decision about what 




 In sum, one of two basic approaches to decision making is known as rational 
choice. People who employ this approach, whether intentionally or innately, demonstrate 
a proclivity toward a positivist world view, which maintains that one best choice is a 
desirable and achievable result of the process. What follows is to one degree or another a 
gathering of situation-specific information, which includes an identification of alternative 
choices, assessment of associated consequences for each, conclusion regarding the 
preference of each consequence, and a final selection of the choice. Final selection of the 
choice concludes the decision process and can be accomplished using either of two 
decision rules: maximize or satisfice.  
 I now attend to an alternative mode of decision making: rule following. 
Rule following. 
 The second basic approach to decision making, the complement of rational 
choice, is known as rule following. March (1994) describes rule following: 
When individuals and organizations fulfill identities, they follow rules or 
procedures that they see as appropriate to the situation in which they find 
themselves. Neither preferences as they are normally conceived nor expectations 
of future consequences enter directly into the calculus (p. 57). 
One example of fulfilling an identity might be when a liberal arts college president feels 
she is in many ways a moral leader within the campus community and ought to 
demonstrate the principles her college endorses (e.g., mission, strategic plan, marketing 
materials, etc.). One day she is approached with a request to join the Amethyst Initiative, 
which is an organization of college presidents that pushes the U.S. government to 
reassess current alcohol safety laws and consider a new strategy of behavioral risk 
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reduction, in part by lowering the legal drinking age. She must make a decision. Other 
college presidents have sought to weigh the alternatives and assess the likely 
consequences in a rational approach to their decisions on this issue. She, however, feels 
that she has little choice; she must lead by example given the situation at hand and the 
role she embodies. As a result, although she knows the decision is bound to be considered 
by many to be deviant, she decides to join the initiative. Her role, as she saw it in that 
situation, directed her to a decision rule: do what is right, even when doing so could paint 
her college as lax on substance use by minors. Ironically, the difficulty, or politically 
risky nature of that decision, has actually made her more likely to pursue it. A rational 
choice approach would plausibly have directed her away from such a controversial 
choice. However, the situation presented an opportunity for her to fulfill her identity as a 
moral leader14, and she followed a decision making rule that capitalized on that 
opportunity. 
 Decision makers who follow a rule-based approach to decision making embrace a 
constructivist world view. Constructivism posits that multiple truths are valid and 
applicable in any one situation (Creswell, 2007). Thus, identifying one objective best 
choice in a decision situation is antithetical. Rather, constructivism holds that the 
information a person takes in is only one piece of the decision; the interpretation of that 
information to infer an appropriate way forward is subjective and depends as much upon 
the individual as the information. In other words, people employing a constructivist 
approach to decision making are less interested in revealing the optimal decision as 
                                                 
14 Of course, an equally viable alternative to this example could easily be conceived of a college president 
deciding not to join the Amethyst Initiative as the result of moral leadership. This example is not intended 
as an endorsement of the Amethyst Initiative, nor should it be interpreted as an assessment of the morality 
of its signatories. 
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dictated by a particular set of circumstances. Instead, they are primarily interested in 
determining what is expected of them given those circumstances. 
 Unlike the rational choice approach, which is grounded in a logic of consequence, 
decision makers who employ a rule following approach proceed using a logic of 
appropriateness (March, 1994).  As such, decision makers produce a decision by virtue of 
answering three questions (March, 1994, p. 58): 
1. The question of recognition: What kind of situation is this? 
2. The question of identity: What kind of person am I? Or what kind of 
organization is this?  
3. The question of rules: What does a person such as I, or an organization such 
as this, do in a situation such as this? 
Decision makers employing a rule following approach may or may not produce overt 
answers applicable to each of these questions the same way a person involved in a 
rational choice decision might readily respond to their corollary questions (see p. 42). 
Identity and role, at least at the level of the individual, are often tied to a person’s visceral 
and subjective understandings of self. 
People embody roles, complete with expectations (i.e., rules guiding behavior), in 
any number of social settings. Consider the setting-related role shifts involved when a 
given person goes from home to school, or from church to work. Consider the 
interpersonal role differences embodied by father versus brother, or management versus 
labor. Different people embody different roles, and they also embody multiple roles in 
accordance with multiple social contexts. March (1994) states: 
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To say that individuals and organizations follow rules and identities, however, is 
not to say that their behavior is always easily predicted. Rule-based behavior is 
freighted with uncertainty. Situations, identities, and rules can all be ambiguous. 
Decision makers use processes of recognition to classify situations; they use 
processes of self-awareness to clarify identities; they use processes of search and 
recall to match appropriate rules to situations and identities. The processes are 
easily recognized as standard instruments of intelligent human behavior. They 
require thought, judgment, imagination, and care. They are processes of reasoned 
action, but they are quite different from the processes of rational analysis (p. 61). 
In other words, identity-based roles and the rules they entail can be deeply insightful for 
explaining behavior. However, individuals’ conceptions of role primacy, or rule 
relevance, are subjective and changeable by situation.  
One advantage to rule following as a decision approach is that it is sometimes a 
very efficient way to know how to act. Rule following allows a person to decide whether 
to put her young grandchild down for a nap in the afternoon, or whether to order dessert 
at a lunch meeting. If a person had to analyze data, or assemble a pro-con list for every 
small decision in a day, the effect on their capacity to accomplish even mundane tasks 
would be crippling. In university contexts, Bess & Dee (2008) discuss the concept of rule 
following in terms of “decisions as personality manifestations” (p. 634), which implies 
that decision makers can come intuitively to decisions just because of who they are. 
People do not always overtly try to make their personalities manifest in the decisions they 
make, and in fact they seek to put as little effort as possible into some decisions, and yet 
those decisions may still reveal something about the decision maker.  
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In his seminal case study of faculty and administrator roles in decision making on 
a liberal arts college campus, Gouldner (1957; 1958) made several important findings 
that may shed light on roles and rule-following in decision making. First, Gouldner 
coined the terms locals and cosmopolitans, those faculty most integrated into internal 
college referent groups and those most dedicated to external referent groups, respectively. 
He ultimately broke these two broad categories down further, into six sub-types: the 
dedicated, the true bureaucrat, the homeguard, the elders, the outsiders, and the empire 
builders. Among others, for instance, Gouldner found that two kinds of locals typically 
approached decisions from differing perspectives. The dedicated were those who deeply 
believed in the dominant ideology of the college, while the true bureaucrats were equally 
committed to the college (thus, also locals) but regulated pursuit of organizational goals 
through formal policy. Each referent group seemed to know how to act in most decision 
areas with little added effort. Social references served to improve the efficiency with 
which they took part in decisions, even though they often found themselves on opposite 
sides of an issue. 
On the other hand, rule following conceivably does much less to resolve 
ambiguity surrounding decisions when the decision maker’s most relevant role is unclear. 
Swenk’s (1999) study of failures underlying a 15 year strategic planning process15 
provides an example of role conflict among members of a faculty committee charged 
with instituting a strategic plan. Analysis showed that the role of the faculty member as a 
professional came into conflict with the role of a committee member as an agent of the 
administration. The conflict remained unresolved, and it ultimately slowed the decision 
                                                 
15 Many times strategic plans do not even operate for a full decade before being revised, so 15 years of 
developing such a plan is remarkably excessive. 
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process to a standstill. The ambiguousness of role dominance inhibits the efficiency with 
which people adopt rules to guide their decisions (Swenk, 1999). 
People deal with role, and thus rule, ambiguity in at least four ways (March, 1994, 
p. 70): 1) experiential learning, 2) categorization, 3) recency, and 4) the social context of 
others. People learn from past experiences, and they embrace roles that have produced 
favorable experiences in prior, similar circumstances (March, 1994). People also tend to 
reproduce a few favorite, or frequent identities and as a result often see the 
appropriateness of a certain role to a growing range of situations; they categorize 
situations to fit preferred roles (March, 1994). For instance, a person who has embraced 
the role of food nutrition expert within the context of family and among work colleagues 
may attempt to find a role for themselves in regard to school nutrition on their parent 
teacher association. People also respond to recency, which is to say if a person has spent 
the day questioning authority at the office, their mindset may predispose them to take an 
argumentative stance on a parking ticket that evening (March, 1994). Finally, social 
context impacts role understanding two ways. First, if one identifies positively with a 
particular group, then she may reasonably be expected to behave in a way commensurate 
with her role as a member of that group (consider style uniformity among teenagers in 
social cliques) (March, 1994). Second, though, she will seek a differentiated role within 
that group (March, 1994). For instance, consider the common case of siblings who are 
close in age, equally integrated into the family, and enjoy many of the same activities, but 
who describe their roles differently (e.g., the funny one, the quiet one, the book worm, 
the soccer star, etc.). Several of these methods of dealing with role ambiguity may be at 
play in the common case of an assistant professor (pre-tenure), for example, who is 
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confident in the classroom but unsure of herself in departmental evaluation and tenure 
preparation settings. Her decisions in each context may reflect the roles she has learned to 
inhabit. 
Rule violation.  
A number of elements can reduce the effectiveness with which identity-based 
rules determine decisions. Ambiguity, complexity, ignorance, and inconsistency all 
challenge the predictive value of rule following approaches to decision making (March, 
1994). These issues collectively create a propensity for rule violation, or decisions that 
appear incongruent with relevant roles. March (1994) states:  
Most of the time behavior follows the rules. At the same time, it is hard to 
imagine a social system without violations of rules. Rules are overlooked or 
ignored. Decision makers do things they are not supposed to do, and they fail to 
do things that they are supposed to do (p. 74). 
Rules are not always clear; sometimes they can be ambiguous and thus difficult to 
follow with consistency. For instance, say the provost of a university is interested in 
cutting costs and envisions college-level reorganization as an important tool in reducing 
expenses. The dean and department heads in a particular college may have already 
experienced allocation reductions from the provost in the past and may already have 
made difficult changes in response; many of these changes may appear to be redundant 
with those attributable to the reorganization the provost envisions (e.g., reducing 
departmental staff, stocking fewer office supplies, sharing fewer pieces of equipment, 
etc.). The provost remains determined to pursue the reorganization strategy. The dean and 
department heads now find themselves in a situation that produces some role ambiguity. 
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Many of them see important roles for themselves in maximizing the flow of revenue to 
their college and department, such as allocations from the provost. Thus, they want to 
please the provost. At the same time, they see important roles for themselves in 
maximizing the research and teaching productivity of the college and department. They 
know that engaging in a reorganization effort of the kind the provost envisions is likely to 
distract many faculty members from the primary activities on their job descriptions and 
do so with minimal additional cost savings in the end. Thus, the dean and department 
heads enter an uncomfortable dance with the provost, both acquiescing to the mandate of 
reorganization and protecting faculty productivity in teaching and research. Neither rule 
can be followed consistently, and an air of ambiguity hangs over the process throughout. 
At times rules are upheld, and at other times those same rules are violated. 
In keeping with this example of a top-down cost-cutting initiative by a university 
provost, let us say this new initiative is really only one of an accumulating string of 
allocation reductions to colleges over many years. In the meantime, college faculty have 
in some cases been able to offset some of these reductions through the acquisition of 
external research grants. The next time a provost attempts to hold funding hostage, the 
dean and department heads may demonstrate a rule adjustment that reveals a role change; 
they may be more willing to push back against the provost and protect faculty research 
time. Rules can change. March (1994) states:  
The logic of appropriateness is a logic attached to an evolving conception of 
propriety. […] Identities endure, with individuals learning and pursuing the rules 
of behavior consistent with the roles, but the rules themselves change through a 
mixture of analysis, negotiation, learning, selection, and diffusion (p. 77). 
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 Rule changes through experiential learning, along the lines of the example of 
provostial funding allocation, can also serve to illustrate what March and Olsen (1975) 
call the Experiential Learning Cycle (Figure 1). 







This simple model becomes far more complex when considering observed outcomes 
represent only a portion of total outcomes, and total outcomes represent only a portion of 
potential outcomes to a given decision. According to March (1994), this observational 
limitation flows into an interpretive one, so that learning from past decisions 
experientially is a “noisy” endeavor. An array of psycho-social challenges inhibits 
excellent interpretation of events and the evaluation of experience. Additionally, the 
experiential learning cycle does not always fully occur, and rules do not change with 
every decision. As an example, perhaps these obstacles to learning by experience underlie 
the observed willingness of many experienced university administrators to pursue a string 
of management techniques whose names have gained successive popularity. Birnbaum 
(2000) found management “fads” were cyclic in that they followed on the heels of trendy 
corporate management corollaries; they were adopted swiftly with expectations of quick 







widely apparent that they were not as promised. At some point, another fad would come 
along to fill the vacuum, and so the cycle would continue.  
 A more nuanced extension of the learning cycle presents decision contexts as an 
ecology of learning. The interpretation of outcomes on one decision not only refines the 
originating decision rule but potentially multiple other rules the decision maker deems 
proximate. March (1994) expounds upon implications beyond the decision maker: 
For example, as a decision maker learns a new set of lessons from experience, the 
learning of one lesson interacts with the learning of other sets of lessons by the 
same decision maker. Learning in one part of an organization interacts with 
learning in other parts. Learning in one organization interacts with learning in 
other organizations (pp. 95-96). 
As such decision making ecologies develop, they expose decision makers to new 
challenges. For instance, competency traps occur when decision makers begin to prefer 
decision rules as a result of repeated use with positive outcomes (and also comfort in 
evaluating and refining such rules). Alternatively, the lessons decision makers learn do 
not stem only from their own decisions but from others’ as well, and the social influence 
of decision learning can be exceptionally powerful (March, 1994). For instance, Janis’ 
(1971) account of the Kennedy administration’s decision making in the run-up to the Bay 
of Pigs shows how a well-equipped group of individuals (Presidential cabinet) can 
perform dysfunctionally due to the norms and roles of each in relation to the others. The 
ecology led to groupthink, according to Janis, or a failure to question one another during 
decision making, which prevented key learning and portended disaster.  
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Dr. Jones follows identity rules.  
Dr. Jones’ students often recall his advice, “If you want to be a good 
archaeologist, you gotta get out of the library!” (Kennedy et al., 2008). This sentiment 
sums up Dr. Jones’ approach to many problems. He really counts himself more an 
adventurer than an archaeologist, and many of his decisions are based much less upon 
hard data and scrupulous analysis than upon instinct. 
As it relates to the problem of staffing Archaeology 101 classes for the coming 
semester, Dr. Jones does not take long in deciding how to proceed. The basic problem he 
faces as a new department chair is how to dispatch clerical challenges so as to allow 
himself the time and resources necessary to the task of raising departmental reputation. 
This is the charge he was given upon appointment, and frankly, no one hires a scholar of 
his magnitude to fuss over data related to freshman classes. His role in this department is 
primarily that of a reputation builder. 
Conceivably, spending too little time and resources on introductory instruction 
could lead to a decline in reputation among UCH undergraduates, but Dr. Jones believes 
the greater risk lies in spending too much time and resources in such a low-risk area. 
External reputation among leading archaeologists is what matters, and introductory 
coursework has little to do with that. The comparatively larger concern for Dr. Jones is 
that as a close friend of Dr. Ravenwood, who helped him take the department 
chairmanship, he needs to support her toward success as Undergraduate Program Chair.  
The potential for conflict between fulfilling his role as department chair and 
fulfilling his role as a close friend and colleague to Dr. Ravenwood gives Dr. Jones some 
pause. In the end, though, he is confident that raising the external reputation of the 
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department will greatly benefit all of its faculty, including Dr. Ravenwood. The most 
appropriate way forward is for him to delegate the hiring of part-time instructors for 
introductory courses to Dr. Ravenwood so that he can concentrate on supporting grant 
activity for more research and field work, getting the tenure-line faculty out of the 
classroom and writing, and getting master’s students placed into prominent Ph.D. 
programs. 
Dr. Jones has decided to do what he feels is right in using part-time faculty, based 
upon his self-image as a reformer. He seems potentially at risk for violating a rule related 
to his role of close friend to Dr. Ravenwood in the process, but his role as a reputation-
enhancing department chair has taken greater salience in the decision. He is a new 
department chair at UCH, but he has applied some experiential learning in that he feels he 
has been successful enhancing the reputation of each department in which he has ever 
worked; this conclusion suggests he was hired with the expectation of improving 
reputation at UCH. Additionally, the social context of the department is such that all the 
full-time faculty members seem excited about his prospects for leading the reputational 
ascent of UCH’s archaeology programs. Given these parameters, he considers his 
categorization of the Archaeology 101 staffing problem as a reputational distraction to be 
well-founded. He is confident that the decision he has made to use part-time instructors—
as well as the efficiency of the decision process itself—aligns well with his role. 
 In sum, one way to describe the difference between rational choice decisions and 
rule following decisions might be to observe the basic questions each approach seeks to 
answer. Whereas rational choice decisions seek to determine which decision is best, rule 
following decisions seek to determine which decision is right. March (1994) argues that 
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both the logic of consequence and the logic of appropriateness “picture human beings and 
human institutions as having a relatively high order of reasoning” (p. 101). In fact, he 
asserts: 
In arguments between theorists of consequential choice and theorists of rule 
following, each group sees the other’s perspective as a special case of its own. For 
theorists of consequential choice, rules are constraints derived from rational 
action at a higher level. For theorists of rule following, consequential choice is 
simply one of many possible rules that may be evoked and followed when 
deemed appropriate (pp. 101-102).  
The most important point about rational choice decisions versus rule following decisions 
is not that one reliably yields better outcomes, nor that one is a subsidiary of the other, 
but rather that each set of theories provides a rich pool of information on attendant 
pitfalls and advantages. Similarly, an understanding of the two basic approaches to 
decision making forms the basis upon which one may examine more complex concepts in 
the decision making literature. I begin that discussion by addressing multiple actor, or 
collaborative, decision making, which encompasses two types: team decisions and 
political decisions. 
Multiple actor decision making. 
 One way in which decisions are often more complex in practice than in the basic 
theories of choice and appropriateness is that decisions are not always made by a single 
person. People can make decisions cooperatively, and they can also make them through 




Teams of collaborators frequently make decisions together. Additionally, while in 
some cases collaborators hold quite similar preferences and identities, they may seek to 
downplay internal group differences for the purpose of contrasting themselves with other 
groups. Collaborators may settle differences among them prior to collaboration. Yet, 
many decision making groups cannot be easily reconciled with the same basic theories 
that apply to single actors (March, 1994). The primary challenge to decision making in a 
collaborative setting is inconsistencies within the team: different preferences or differing 
salient identities in relation to the situation at hand16. 
These internal inconsistencies can sometimes be removed. For instance, 
Tuckman’s (1965) work on group development posits that immediately after a team 
forms, members of the group often undergo a “storming” phase. This is the point at 
which team members’ ideas compete for selection, problems to be solved and decisions 
to be made are settled upon, and team members’ social status in relation to one another 
remain unclear. Some teams never make it out of the storming phase, and as a result they 
produce little in the way of any decision. Teams that do succeed in moving through the 
storming phase will necessarily remove the inconsistencies among them that threaten 
their collaboration. Teams that get stuck, however, produce the alternative outcome: 
indecision, or nondecision. Bess and Dee (2008) assert, “[University] decision makers are 
powerful not only when they make a decision (e.g., invest in biology or nursing) but also 
when they fail to make decisions that would remedy problems encountered by the less 
                                                 
16 This concern should not be confused with the problems facing the Kennedy cabinet, as related by Janis 
(1972), which I have discussed. That group was consistent to a fault. A productive consistency on a 
decision making team allows for constructive internal disagreement, but it relies upon a strong alignment of 
collaborators with the other members of the team. Here I discuss internal inconsistencies in terms of threats 
to such alignment. 
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powerful […]” (p. 652-653). In their study of universities in postindustrial environments 
(i.e., scarce resources), Cameron and Tschirhart (1992) find that department heads and 
other administrators are most comfortable making routine decisions and may be reticent 
to expand their domains to include new decision making. This implies nondecision can 
become common and major problems can go unaddressed until they reach crisis stage. 
Thus, addressing interpersonal inconsistencies, as uncomfortable as that might be, can be 
formative. Yet, indecision represents a decision process and related outcomes. 
It is also important to note that interpersonal inconsistencies, of the kind discussed 
thus far, comprise only one threat to collaborative decision making. Intrapersonal 
inconsistencies can be just as disruptive. For example, one challenge to collaboration 
occurs when a team member’s perception of salient identity, or of their outcome 
preferences, changes in the course of collaboration. Perception can change as a result of 
both human error and social learning (March, 1994). One team member’s souring may be 
the difference between a high-functioning decision making unit and one that proves 
unable to produce a decision at all.  
 March (1994) notes one way to mitigate inconsistencies in collaborative decision 
making environments is to make use of hierarchical organization. Hierarchies incent team 
members to embrace roles and accept preferences that are formative to decision processes 
insomuch as they position individuals for promotion. The incentive of advancement up 
the hierarchy can also result in the conformity of decision outcomes; those evaluating 
team performance often occupy positions of authority, such as authority to promote team 
members. Team members may often adopt the roles they perceive as most salient to such 
authorities, or adopt the preferences they believe the pertinent authority holds. 
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Collaborative decisions in hierarchical environments tend to reinforce the career ladder as 
a result of this conformity (March, 1994). In my discussion of Youn and Price’s (2009) 
study of the evolution of tenure and promotion rules in comprehensive universities, 
earlier in this chapter, I related the authors’ finding that tenure and promotion rules 
represented a form of organizational contagion. This is an excellent example of how even 
famously independent-thinking tenured faculty members can demonstrate conformity to 
hierarchies. In Youn and Price’s study, university leaders had been hired from among 
successful faculty in research universities, and when they carried over their high research 
values the indigenous faculty members of comprehensive institutions were (on the group 
level) given to follow the leaders. 
While hierarchies often incent conformity to the perceived desires of those in 
positions of authority, members of teams also attempt to distinguish themselves from 
fellow group members (March, 1994). Promotion opportunities are necessarily fewer as 
one ascends within the hierarchy, which makes promotion a zero-sum game. Thus, March 
(1994) notes that collaboration becomes a form of competition between the successful 
and the ambitious. In the context of teams, those who occupy positions of authority can 
either imbue team decisions with endorsements that benefit other team members, or else 
they can resist the decisions and as a result position other team members to appear 
nonconformist via contrast. Likewise, team members who are ambitious to climb the 
hierarchy can either join with those who can help them to do so, and thus seek to curry 
favor, or they can fight authority and seek to supplant those above them. In either case, 




Ceci, Williams, and Mueller-Johnson (2006) found that faculty on the tenure track 
often respond to the promotion hierarchy incentives with conformist behavior. In their 
study of faculty academic freedom, they discovered that attainment of tenure (usually 
accompanied by promotion to associate professor) did not much increase manifestations 
of academic freedom, such as insisting on teaching a course without changes 
recommended by senior faculty, or willingness to be a whistle-blower. Instead, it appears 
many faculty do not behave in non-conformist ways until they have achieved the highest 
faculty rank, of full professor. Having made a successful career of conflict avoidance in 
collaborative decisions, one can imagine scenarios in which collaborative decisions on 
faculty hiring follow the path of least resistance—one commensurate with tradition. 
As all of these challenges demonstrate, an important precursor to productivity in 
collaborative decision making is consistency (interpersonal and intrapersonal). 
Consistency can be enhanced in several ways by those assembling and managing teams. 
In situations where hierarchical relationships and a logic of rationality provide the setting, 
alignment of incentives can raise consistency levels and improve the cooperative team 
dynamic (March, 1994). One way to do that is with threats, although coercion has limited 
applicability and effectiveness in many contexts (French & Raven, 1959). Contracts can 
be another useful mechanism, by which expectations are drawn up and fulfilled to hold 
team members accountable. An important limitation to the contract method of 
consistency enhancement regards the necessity of explicit agreements to be thorough, 
verifiable, and enforceable. Finally, long-term relationships among team members can be 
highly effective in terms of building team consistency. If a team member knows there is a 
good chance she will need to work with a fellow team member in the future (or even 
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someone from the same office or department), then she has an incentive to maintain a 
reputation as a constructive team member. The closer these horizontal relationships 
become, the more career advancement goals across team members may come into 
alignment and spur collaboration. 
Long-term relationships among team members naturally tend to align their 
incentives, much as in hierarchical settings. However, the incentive calls less upon an 
individual’s desire for career advancement and more upon the identity of the individual 
as a member of a collective effort. Consistency is desirable for its own sake, as a signal of 
buy-in to organizational culture. As Schein (1993) notes, organizational culture is a 
complex phenomenon of itself and tends to resist intervention. Thus, at best relationship-
building is a long-term strategy for consistency development in settings with strong 
cultures. Some shorter-term opportunities may be available. First, to the extent the make-
up of the team can be managed in order to align identities and roles, consistency can be 
improved; however, this tactic also creates a propensity for producing homogenous teams 
and thus myopic decisions. Likewise, team-building can sometimes produce similar 
benefits to team consistency as longer-term relationship building. Finally, to the extent 
team members assume leadership roles that allow them to either allocate attention in 
ways that reward certain identities and roles over others, or alternatively allow them to 
interpret the contributions of team members strategically, those individuals can aid team 
consistency (March, 1994).  
Thus far, I have discussed collaborative decisions in terms of groups of 
individuals who seek to work harmoniously. Collaborative decisions are not always team-
oriented, however. They can also occur as the result of conflict. These are political 
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decisions, and while political collaborations often produce decisions effectively they also 
tend to be changeable, as distinct from harmonious. 
Political decisions.  
Political decisions take shape as a result of force and compromise. Force models 
explain decisions in terms of which faction exerts the greatest power over its opponents. 
Exchange models, or the formation of compromises, explain decisions in terms of 
alliance-building and bargaining among factions. Both varieties of decision making are 
likely to occur within organizational settings in which politicking imbues many facets of 
operation and is widely accepted as normal and constructive. 
 In terms of rationality and rule following, force models define power as the ability 
to either get what the group wants or fulfill the group’s identity, respectively (March, 
1994). In practice, power eludes measurement. March (1994) offers at least four 
compelling reasons for this complexity (paraphrased from p. 143): 
1. Power is both positional and behavioral; it is both static and dynamic. One can 
be said to occupy a position of power, to be powerful, or to have power. One 
can also build power, become more powerful, or come into power. Tautology 
becomes an impediment to evaluating it. 
2. Power is domain specific. In other words, power changes in relation to setting. 
The President of the United States, often considered the single most powerful 
person involved in global politics, must sometimes bend to the power of 
others, for instance in spousal and parental settings. 
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3. Power is not exercised consistently or reliably by those who have it. Just 
because a person could achieve a certain outcome by sheer force does not 
mean they will choose to do so. 
4. Power can change with use. The role of risk in force is such that power can be 
won or lost depending upon the outcome of applications of it. It can be 
accumulated or depleted, and it can change qualitatively so that it pertains to 
broader or more constrained settings and conditions. 
Exchange models of power, by contrast, pertain to the ability of a faction to 
impose favorably on decisions as a result of three bargaining elements (March 1994; 
paraphrased from pp. 149-150): 
1. Control over resources, or having what others want. 
2. Control over preferences and identities, or making others want what one has. 
3. Control over rules, or asserting oneself to affect modes of interactions 
between factions. 
The give and take of power these bargaining elements facilitate is typically undertaken 
through processes of coalition-building, when factions combine forces to mutual benefit. 
 Goals of factions acting rationally and factions following rules are different in 
important ways. Those advocating rational choice decisions seek to build alliances that 
not only win against opposing factions but also maximize the winnings. For instance, a 
group of academic mothers seeking a new parental leave policy in a university may seek 
support from many other campus groups; however, they may think twice about working 
with academic fathers if, for example, it becomes clear they may make lesser gains if 
limited university resources are to be spread over more people. On the other hand, if the 
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same group of academic mothers was to pursue a rule-following decision, then they 
might be more likely to embrace a group of academic fathers. Rule followers seek 
distributions of political winnings, or spoils, that are normative and legitimate (March, 
1994). These concepts relate to perceptions of fairness. Exchange models position 
coalitions in stark terms, as either rational or rule following, but in fact coalitions often 
outlast individual decisions and contribute to multiple gains over time. Individual 
decisions may reflect rationality or rule following, but the coalitions themselves consist 
of more complex and changeable relationships among factions. 
Dr. Jones does not decide alone.  
Dr. Jones is both a member of a team and a political agent. His department 
functions as a team, on which his role is generally that of a leader, and that is certainly 
the case regarding the decision to be made on staffing Archaeology 101. The hierarchy 
throughout the rest of the department is sometimes difficult for him to understand, but the 
appointment type of each faculty member has something to do with it. The FTNTT 
faculty tend to give even-handed opinions, generally deferring or demurring on topics 
other than pedagogy or course assignments. The tenured faculty speak their opinions with 
little restraint. This is especially true of the full professors. Dr. Spielberg, for instance, 
seems to be most interested in making sure Dr. Jones does not implement too much 
change too quickly. Dr. Spielberg put in years of service as department chair, and perhaps 
he believes it would reflect badly upon his leadership for the department to change course 
too enthusiastically. Not only does he consistently preach caution, but he has a habit of 
grinning and speaking slightly pedantically whenever Dr. Jones discovers a problem. He 
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did this recently, much to Dr. Jones’ annoyance, when Dr. Jones asked the team for help 
in determining what to do about staffing the introductory classes. 
Dr. Lucas is a long-time colleague of Dr. Spielberg. They came up through the 
faculty ranks together and have a good relationship. Dr. Lucas tends to be cautious about 
change. In his mind, the department would indeed benefit from reputational 
enhancement, but this is mostly a marketing proposition. To him, the department already 
runs quite efficiently and effectively. At the same time, he heads the master’s program, a 
point of pride, and he engages in the staffing conversation by way of considering possible 
master’s program opportunities. Dr. Lucas was perpetually absent from departmental 
meetings even prior to his illness. Dr. Ravenwood is devoted both to Dr. Jones and to her 
role as Undergraduate Program Chair. She advocates for herself, but she poses her 
opinions in the most flattering ways possible for her senior colleagues. What she would 
really like is for the department to hire at least one new tenure-track assistant professor, 
which they have not done since hiring her over eight years ago. She continues to feel 
junior, even as she bears an impressive amount of the department’s operational burden, 
and she would feel fulfilled by the opportunity to mentor a new scholar. The team 
decision dynamics result in a consensus-building process, which in turn results in the 
adoption of Dr. Spielberg’s “tried and true” method of staffing the introductory courses 
with part-time instructors. For their parts, Drs. Jones and Ravenwood express interest in 
revisiting the conversation in the future. 
Whatever the internal disagreements on the team, the department, at least thus far, 
has presented a united front externally. Part of the reason for such discipline, for which 
faculty teams are not renowned, may actually be external. That is, disagreements among 
73 
 
the team pale in comparison to their agreement that the Department of Archaeology 
ought to receive a larger slice of college-level appropriations. After all, the dean also 
brought Dr. Jones on board with the imperative for reputation enhancement, and this 
implies some willingness to fund the work Dr. Jones was hired to do. However, the 
current dean comes out of a competitor department and is clearly partial to it when it 
comes to resource allocation. As a result of successive funding conversations, Dr. Jones 
now finds himself on the point of pitching a comprehensive plan for the reputational 
enhancement of his department. What began with an intention to circle back to the 
introductory course staffing next year has somehow developed into a commitment to 
keep instructional costs low for the foreseeable future, in order to make strategic 
investments in other areas. The notion that Dr. Jones is being strategic about his budget 
requests appeals to the dean. The department that has enjoyed favorite child status has not 
made such strategic efforts in the past, much to the dean’s regret in allocation decisions at 
the university level.  
Additionally, Dr. Jones’ renown touches the provost at UCH, and he is hopeful 
that he may offer her something that will prompt her to intercede with the dean, or at least 
express excitement over the future of his department. She happens to be a Spanish 
linguist by training, and he is sure he can get some artifacts from that old Incan dig 
housed at UCH, if she was to support funding increases for the archaeology department. 
 With regard to the team aspects of the Archaeology 101 staffing decision, it is not 
clear that the department has grappled with its internal inconsistencies head-on. For now, 
the team seems content to rely on its complex hierarchy of appointment types and levels 
of promotion. On the political side, Dr. Jones has sought to pursue an exchange model 
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approach to securing a larger portion of college resources on behalf of the department. 
Dr. Jones seeks greater investment in archaeology on two fronts. First, he offers to 
strengthen the dean’s position in advocating for the college. Second, he offers something 
he believes the provost will find personally compelling. In the course of negotiations, he 
has also had to adjust his interest in revisiting the part-time staffing plan in the near term. 
He has not sought an alliance with the competing department, and in fact he has not 
identified that possibility as a real option. He believes departmental funding is more or 
less a zero-sum game, which makes the favorite child department a political opponent. 
However, he does not believe he has a powerful position from which to pursue his agenda 
by force. 
 To summarize, decisions often involve multiple actors. Teams involve collections 
of individuals that either resolve disagreements among themselves or set them aside in 
order to work together. Team members seek to enact distinct roles in relation to one 
another, but they speak externally with one voice. Political decisions are made through 
either a force or an exchange proposition. They involve sizing up opponents to determine 
whether to use overwhelming power or negotiation tactics to achieve desired ends. 
Alliances can be built to enhance one’s capacity for defeating the opposition. In the next 
section, I attend to decision making of a kind that occurs in a fundamentally different way 
from rational choice, rule following, and both kinds of multiple actor decision making: 




The role of ambiguity and ambiguous decisions. 
 Thus far, all of the decision models reviewed have relied on some sense of 
procedural order. March (1994) notes three concepts of order underlying these forms of 
decision making, which are often questionable in practice. These concepts are: a) reality 
is universal, and human behavior tends to evince agreement and consistency among 
multiple people; b) understandings of cause and effect guide decisions; and c) decision 
outcomes, or consequences, reflect the intent of decision makers. In observing decisions 
researchers have found exceptions to applications of these concepts in abundance. These 
exceptions to the rules, or elements of ambiguity, illustrate the shortcomings of ordered 
decision making, such as prevalent biases. They also suggest that the manner in which 
many decisions actually occur is much more difficult to either control or intentionally 
navigate than those committed to any form of logic or process would like to think. 
Problems of order.  
One problem with orderly concepts of decision making is that they tend to be 
undermined by an array of biases, especially with regard to interpretations of history. 
Here are several, briefly stated (paraphrased from March, 1994, pp. 180-192): 
 Decision makers often interpret history not objectively but rather so as to 
reconcile it with pre-existing beliefs. This is especially so when looking back 
upon successes, for which decision makers are eager to take credit (this leads 
them to discount information that may contradict prior beliefs). 
 Decision makers learn excessively from things that happen and not enough from 
those that could have happened.  
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 Decision makers overemphasize the role of human action, regardless of evidence 
of intent or mistake. 
 Individuals may hold multiple, seemingly incongruent interpretations of history at 
the same time. 
 Interpretations of behavior tend toward polar extremes, whether imbued with 
positive or pejorative meaning. For instance, bold decisions (positive), or foolish 
ones (pejorative term for the same interpretation) tend to be understood by virtue 
of their stark contrast to counterpart careful decisions (positive), or timid ones 
(pejorative). Another example would be independent/arrogant decisions versus 
consultative/indecisive ones. Each interpretation is made through a lens of black 
and white assessment of success; gray area understandings defy conclusive 
interpretation. This dualism limits the effectiveness of decisions based on such 
interpretations. 
 Tautologies abound as interpretive tools, but such understandings of behavior 
inhibit decision making rather than enabling it. For instance, the concept of 
culture explains behavior in terms of its consistency with group values and 
traditions, but culture is typically defined by observations of group values and 
traditions. Tautologies have seemingly high explanatory value, but they have 
demonstrably low predictive value, and this poses a problem for intentional 
decision making. 
 Assumptions that preference (i.e., rationality) and identity (i.e., roles and rules) 




A number of problems undermine the concept of decision making as an ordered process. 
Thus, practical analyses of these processes should take note of the proclivity of decision 
makers themselves toward known biases that can affect interpretation. March’s (1994) 
discussion of these biases in consistent with Weick’s (1993) well-known concept of 
sensemaking in organizations: “The basic idea of sensemaking is that reality is an 
ongoing accomplishment that emerges from efforts to create order and make 
retrospective sense of what occurs” (p. 635). In many decisions, order is an interpretive, 
retrospective conception. 
Decision making in ambiguous environments.  
Universities, particularly large ones, accommodate the pursuit of a multitude of 
goals by employing an array of actors in a range of roles. Certainly this statement is true 
when one considers the incredible variety of courses, programs, and degrees that are 
often offered by a single university. For this reason, Clark Kerr (2001) famously coined 
the turn of phrase “multiversity” to better describe the enormous number of aims and 
activities occurring in modern universities. Underlying the term multiversity is a 
suggestion that the diversity of that work is also disparate, uncoordinated, or incoherent. 
Occasionally, attention will be brought to disharmonious goals within the same 
university, as is the case when universities have been on the cutting edge of climate 
change research and green building technologies, even as they have continued to invest 
large amounts of endowment funds in profitable nonrenewable energy companies (see 
Kiley, 2013). 
 Weick (1976) calls organizations, or systems, that accommodate pursuit of 
unrelated or ill-coordinated goals “loosely coupled.” That is, relationships among units 
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tend to be irregular or unpredictable. Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) attend to this 
relational ambiguity when they describe such settings with the oxymoron “organized 
anarchies.” In observing these organizations, they also famously propose a conceptual 
model for much of the decision making that occurs there: the garbage can model. 
 The garbage can model of decision making (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972) posits 
that in certain organizational environments, such as those that are loosely coupled, 
decisions can be made in any of three ways. In the first case, decisions can occur when a 
choice resolves a problem. Problem resolution as a decision path is less common in 
anarchical environments than in structural ones, with the difference being that the 
association of problems to resolution choices is not accomplished through logic but 
through serendipity (i.e., problem salience, choice salience, and the correct participants to 
attach them come together harmoniously in the garbage can). In the second case, as 
choices become more salient (i.e., they rise above other garbage) and are not immediately 
attached to problems, then those choices are adopted relatively quickly and easily as a 
matter of oversight. In the third and final case, as the problem and choice contents of 
garbage cans shift, problems can become attached to alternative choices (the authors 
describe the departure of problems from choices as flight). If choices become less 
burdened by problems, and decision makers remain interested in making such choices, 
then decision makers will elect to pursue those choices. It is important to note that Cohen 
and March (1974) wrote extensively and persuasively to the point that universities tend to 
be excellent case studies in organized anarchy. 
 The framing of decision making in anarchic contexts as serendipitous, or 
unintentional, is problematic for those trying to understand how individuals influence 
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such decisions. March (1994) explains that people can behave in any of three archetypal 
ways as decision makers in anarchic environments. Reformers resist the anarchy and set 
themselves to the task of restoring order. Pragmatists recognize the non-logical 
characteristics of the process, but they seek to use the garbage can path to their own ends 
rather than try to change it. Finally, enthusiasts embrace the garbage can as useful.  
 Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) describe the environments in which garbage can 
decision making proliferates as follows: 
The organization operates on the basis of a variety of inconsistent and ill-defined 
preferences. It can be described better as a loose collection of ideas than as a 
coherent structure; it discovers preferences through action more than it acts on the 
basis of preferences. (p. 1). 
March (1994) explains that decisions in these environments may not be the result of 
meaning-making (i.e., rationality, or rules) so much as they represent an effort to produce 
meaning (send messages). As a result, decisions shape and reinforce what Schein (1993) 
describes as organizational culture (also see Tierney, 2008 for greater explication of the 
role of culture in an array of universities contexts). They tell stories and provide guiding 
symbols for how people should behave. 
Faculty senates may be one of the most important examples of decision making 
garbage cans in the context of universities. Birnbaum (1989) argues that senates are 
subject to at least three major types of criticism: 
1. They function poorly as bureaucracies, because they are inefficient when 
considering problems and solutions, generating new rules, or 
implementing new processes. 
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2. They function poorly as political entities because they are more oligarchic 
than representative. 
3. They function poorly as communitarian bodies because they are as likely 
to exacerbate conflicts as to enhance harmony. 
However, among a wide array of latent, symbolic functions Birnbaum explains faculty 
senates can be particularly useful as a repository (i.e., garbage can) for distracting 
problems, solutions, and people. He argues that senates can act uniquely well in putting 
these decision odds and ends into an organizational “deep freeze” (p. 432) to keep them 
from cluttering other decisions around campus. In other words, when faculty senates take 
on issues they can have the positive side-effect of reducing burdens on other decision 
makers to deal with such issues.  
 Of course, Birnbaum’s (1989) deep freeze intimates the nature of the garbage can 
as a waste receptacle, not as an instrument of production. He intimates the issues that go 
in may never actually be returned or resolved, and yet anecdotally we know that faculty 
senates periodically do complete projects and produce resolutions or recommendations. 
In fact, in 2013 the University of Maryland, College Park received attention for the final 
report of its apparently unique Task Force on Non-Tenure-Track Faculty (Schmidt, 
2013). The task force, jointly charged by the faculty senate and the provost, highlighted 
the reliance of the university on non-tenure track faculty labor and recommended adjunct 
pay be better aligned with work and that greater opportunities for career advancement be 
provided. A matter involving thousands of stakeholders was taken up and resulted in high 
level action. However, as Schmidt (2013) reported (and to Birnbaum’s point), neither the 
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senate nor the provost appears ready (immediately, at least) to aggressively pursue the 
recommendations in the report. 
Dr. Jones makes a de facto decision.  
The UCH state budget has remained steady this year, which is the same as saying 
it has declined. As is perpetually the case, state funding to UCH has not kept pace with 
inflation, while the cost of operations at UCH has outpaced inflation. Yet more of the 
cost of doing business must be recouped through other university ventures, and the flow 
of funds from the provost, through the dean, to archaeology continues to dwindle. 
 Dr. Jones engages with a number of other people on a variety of topics in the 
course of fulfilling his department chair duties. Key departmental colleague, Dr. 
Ravenwood is eager for the undergraduate program, which she chairs, to grow in size and 
scope. She has long believed this would be a positive development, and whether or not 
she consciously acknowledges it she has at various times prescribed growth as a solution 
to multiple challenges facing the department. First, she proposed to expand the faculty in 
order to serve a greater number of UCH undergraduates. Early in her career the 
department had to turn away students to abide by its policy that classes should not exceed 
25 students. This problem was alleviated primarily by raising the limits on class size. 
Later, about the time she became program chair, she supported the department’s plan to 
deal with state funding problems by placing greater emphasis on acquiring external grant 
funding. She realized this would have the positive side effect of bringing additional 
teaching faculty on board to backfill the courses being bought out by grant funds. The 
value in that proposition seemed self-evident at the time, and since others were in 
agreement with the prescribed move toward the pursuit of more grants, no one saw the 
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need to nit-pick their colleagues’ motives. Finally, within the first two years of expanding 
part-time faculty ranks, Dr. Ravenwood realized fewer students who took classes taught 
by part-time faculty were continuing on to major in archaeology than those taught by full-
time instructors. Naturally, she began to beat the drum for increasing full-time faculty 
ranks. Alas, Dr. Spielberg, who was then the department chair, instead encouraged Dr. 
Ravenwood to standardize introductory syllabi and assessment methods, to improve 
outcomes across the board while holding costs down. Dr. Jones is largely unaware of this 
history as Dr. Ravenwood lobbies him to expand the full-time faculty for the purpose of 
reputation-building. 
 In Dr. Jones’ mind, the Department of Archaeology’s usage of part-time faculty 
has been ad-hoc thus far, and while it does little to directly enhance the reputation of the 
department, it is an important part of the mix that allows the tenure-track faculty to do 
more reputation-enhancing research. By limiting the time spent with undergraduates in 
and out of the classroom, Dr. Jones is hopeful Drs. Spielberg, Lucas, Scorsese, and 
Ravenwood can maximize publication, presentation, and prestigious grant writing 
activities. Further, the dean has explicitly said he likes the idea of using part-time 
instruction more strategically, toward cost savings. In fact, Dr. Jones is beginning to 
believe increasing reliance on part-time instruction is an important part of increasing the 
research reputation of the department. The more he considers that idea, the more he 
realizes he has always felt this way. He genuinely believes that although this is not the 
solution Dr. Ravenwood at first envisioned to the reputation-building problem, she 
should logically be on board with his plan. After all, she is a close colleague, and she 
championed his recruitment for department chair. 
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 This illustration demonstrates the ambiguous nature of decision making in an 
environment concerned with multiple goals, such as cost containment, reputation 
building, academic freedom, and effective pedagogy. In organized anarchies, solutions 
and problems exist independent of one another and often persist beyond the contexts in 
which they were originally raised. The participation in decisions by different players, at 
different times, can produce dramatically different results in terms of which problems are 
deemed salient and which solutions are paired with them. This is not only a non-rational 
process of decision making but an illogical and unordered process. It is very nearly 
decision by accident. To bring this point home and the vignette full circle, I suggest to the 
reader that it is much more plausible that Dr. Ravenwood deals with her frustrated hope 
for change not by angrily protesting those higher on the academic hierarchy, including a 
good friend, but rather that she allows herself to believe what is necessary in order to 
continue her work. 
 To summarize, decisions often involve disorder. Decision makers, or participants 
in decisions, come together and depart processes in ways that are not logically devised or 
coordinated; and they associate problems and choices in ways that not only appear 
illogical but shifting. Decisions in these contexts occur as the result of a mixture of intent 
and serendipity (resolution, oversight, or flight). These decisions have the added 
characteristic of being imbued with symbolism, or story, and as a result they produce 
meaning for the organization to a greater extent than they flow from meaning. In the final 
section of decision making literature review, which now follows, I discuss the challenges 
of prescribing approaches to making good decisions; here, we leave discussion of 




 No doubt the reader has by now identified a favorite mode of decision making—
one that is particularly fascinating, or one that appeals to their sensibilities. An abiding 
problem with the study of decisions, though, is that they are easier to describe than they 
are to evaluate and improve. March (1994) explains the intentional construction of 
decision making as decision engineering, and he notes an array of problems facing those 
who seek to engineer decisions. 
 The first problem in discerning decision intelligence is that, depending on the 
evaluator or on the decision, intelligence can be defined in terms of either the decision 
making process or its outcome. For example, in his multi-site case study of academic 
program closure, Eckel (2002) examined the extent to which decision rules about which 
programs to close or to support revealed rational decision making processes. He found: 
Although quality, a frequently articulated decision rule, did not surface directly, 
evidence suggests that it was invoked as a filtering mechanism. For example, 
informants at [two sites] said that although the institution used a process to 
identify programs for closure, a list of possible targets were known prior to 
starting the process” (p. 254). 
In other words, decision rules were formed in ways that made the selection of programs 
for closure concomitant with preexisting expectations. Administrators, who were 
primarily responsible for initiating and coordinating the program closure decisions Eckel 
studied, appear to have been more focused on the intelligence of decision outcomes and 
less so on decision processes. They had a strong idea of what a good decision would look 
like in terms of the list of programs to close, and they tailored decision rules to arrive at 
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closure lists approximating those they had already developed. March (1994) refers to this 
phenomenon when he describes the problem of some processes creating rather than 
restraining decision maker preferences and identities.  
In addition to the process versus outcomes conundrum, other problems include 
(March, 1994): challenges of comparing decisions over time and across decision makers, 
tendencies to look too closely at elements of decisions and not overall decisions, and 
understanding adaptive inefficiencies of decisions (e.g., lag time, the sequential nature of 
decisions, the impact of information flow on outcomes, etc.). March (1994) also notes a 
series of human and structural biases and restrictions that inhibit strong understandings of 
either the future (projecting decision outcomes) or the past (informing logic). 
In the face of these myriad problems, however, March (1994) suggests several 
checks decision makers can employ in pursuit of decision intelligence (paraphrased from 
p. 262-263): 
1. Treat self as hypothesis: Decision makers can question their identity, role, 
preferences, and therefore decision rules. 
2. Treat intuition as real: Intuition is hard to understand, but acknowledging 
one’s intuitive preferences or roles can help inform their utility or 
appropriateness to a decision. 
3. Treat hypocrisy as transition: Feelings of inconsistency can be 
uncomfortable, but interpreting them negatively as a result of that 




4. Treat memory as enemy: Decision makers can rely on historic records in 
ways that may counteract flawed memory or oversimplified interpretations 
of past occurrences. 
5. Treat experience as a theory: Decision makers can attempt to avoid 
competency traps and problems related to misapplications of routine 
decision making by questioning the value of experience to each decision. 
These tips and tricks are by no means a cure-all for the problems endemic to assessing 
decision intelligence, and while they are simple in theory they are challenging in practice. 
But they also suggest that it is not entirely impractical to examine decisions in terms of 
their intelligence. 
Dr. Jones arrives at the same outcome.  
In the course of four vignettes, we have seen Dr. Jones decide to hire part-time 
faculty to teach his introductory archaeology courses as a result of four very different 
decision making paths. For those who gauge decision intelligence by outcome, such as 
faculty advocates or anti-tenure crusaders, the most appealing analysis will lead to one of 
two stances, respectively: 1) the decision was counterproductive, and the process in each 
of the four vignettes was flawed; or 2) the decision was productive, and the process in 
each of the four vignettes worked well. On the other hand, those who gauge decision 
intelligence by process will have a potentially more nuanced perspective and one that 
likely eludes defensibility along measures other than innate personal preference. 
In conclusion, I reject the presumption that faculty hiring off the tenure track and 
on a part-time basis is, as a rule, good or bad. I am skeptical, however, that the decision 
processes that have led to the revolution in academic appointments is reflective of some 
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of the academy’s most deeply steeped principles and traditions. Thus, adjunctification, as 
it has come to be known, may reflect important cultural and structural inconsistency and 
organizational dissonance, and the confirmation or disconfirmation of that possibility 
carries immense import for many university functions in coming years. The runaway 
nature of PTNTT labor over several decades suggests that a logic of consequence—
informed, reasoned choice on the basis of outcomes preferences—has not been of central 
importance in determining decision making processes that have yielded PTNTT growth. 
At the same time, the problems of disparity in instructional outcomes, the stratification of 
the faculty, and the reduction in capacity for faculty governance cumulatively suggest 
that neither has a logic of appropriateness been of central importance. Indeed, in the 
context of a highly diverse field of several thousand postsecondary institutions of 
American higher education the strong, sustained nature of PTNTT growth suggests that 
either similar decisions have been taking place for a very long time (i.e., have become 
highly routine), or these decisions have long tended to be avoided (i.e., lack order). If 
either the routine or the anarchic assessment is substantially evident, then university 
leaders who espouse values consistent with reasoned argument, excellence, or social 
justice (principles that are arguably of near universal appeal across the academy) would 
presumably be dissatisfied with the decision intelligence they have demonstrated from a 
decision process perspective. 
Conclusion. 
 In this chapter, I began by reviewing literature on comprehensive colleges and 
universities, and in doing so I provided evidence of their importance in terms of 
conferring the considerable benefits of baccalaureate education on a diverse range of 
88 
 
students. I then reviewed the phenomenon of interest, the decades-long shift in faculty 
appointment types; I placed particular emphasis on instructional relationships and student 
outcomes attributable to faculty appointment type, because teaching is historically the 
primary concern of faculty in comprehensive institutions. Finally, I reviewed theories of 
decision making, by which I sought to evince my sensitivity to potentially useful 
concepts in the tradition of grounded theory research. In the next chapter, I detail the 




Chapter Three: Methods 
Research Design 
This chapter lays out the research design for this study of faculty hiring processes 
occurring in unionized comprehensive universities. I begin with comments on the 
epistemological underpinnings of my approach. I proceed by introducing grounded 
theory methodologies and situate this study within the tradition of methodologists Corbin 
and Strauss (2008). Finally, I discuss selected methods according to Creswell’s (2009) 
recommended four part structure: (1) participants, (2) instruments, (3) procedures, and (4) 
limitations and delimitations. To review, my research question is: What are the decision 
making processes by which comprehensive universities produce non-tenure track 
instructional staffs? Supporting questions include: 
1. Who is involved in making these decisions? 
a. What constitutes involvement? 
b. What differentiates formal from informal participants? 
c. Under which circumstances do people enter or exit the process? 
d. What are the goals of the participants? 
2. What information is used in making these decisions? 
a. Which empirical data are used? How are they used, and who uses 
them? 
b. What anecdotal, theoretical, or other information is used? How is it 
used, and who uses it? 
3. How do the components of the decision making process fit together? 
a. What are the elements of the decision making process? 
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b. How are the components of the process related? 
Epistemological Foundations 
 The term epistemology refers to an orienting philosophy regarding the nature of 
knowledge (Schwandt, 2007). Researchers adhere to a variety of assumptive claims 
regarding the nature of knowledge when designing studies. In other words, they select or 
favor any of an array of competing philosophies (Creswell, 2007; Glesne, 2006). These 
assumptions are important to acknowledge, because as Schwandt (2007) states, 
“Epistemologies provide much of the justification for particular methodologies (i.e., the 
aim, function, and assumptions of method)” (p. 88). Not all researchers examine or 
acknowledge their epistemological assumptions. As I will show, understanding the 
significance of this study is reliant upon understanding of the epistemology I employ. 
In plain terms, I agree with the epistemological adage, “Perception is reality.” 
People acquire knowledge through their personal interactions with others and within the 
contexts of their environments. The understandings (i.e., knowledge) that people develop 
are the result of unique, personal experiences, sequences, and perspectives, which give 
way to diverse interpretations of even shared experiences. For example, one could ask 
three people, “What color is the sky?” Person one may reply, “Blue, of course.” Person 
two might look at the sunset and state, “There are several colors in it right now.” The 
third may be color-blind and respond, “I’m told it’s blue.” Each of these responses is not 
simply categorically different but could be interpreted in several different ways. For 
instance, “I’m told it’s blue,” is a categorically different answer than, “Blue, of course;” 
however, making sense of the respective modifiers requires deeper interpretation. “Of 
course,” for example, may refer to the respondent’s estimation of the question as silly, 
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quizzical, or a waste of time. It may, alternatively, be a patronizing phrase aimed at the 
researcher, or it may refer to the course of events by which the sky appears blue. 
Understanding such data relies not only on the verity and accuracy of the source but on 
the researcher’s capability and proclivity for interpretation. The assumptions of 
knowledge underlying this study include the notion that both deductively and inductively 
derived information are necessary for strong understanding. 
This philosophy is consistent with constructivist epistemology, which “assumes 
people construct selves, society, and reality through interaction” (Charmaz, 2005, p. 189). 
That is to say, a propensity exists even among those observing and experiencing the same 
events to understand them differently, and those differences (even if they appear at first 
to be small) can be important. The understandings people construct can be important 
because knowledge informs behavior; different knowledge informs different behaviors. 
 As I have noted, existing literature discussing the change in faculty appointment 
types describes a robust shift very well. At the same time, data-based understandings of 
the hiring processes that contribute to this shift are thin. One reason for our lack of 
understanding may be that the explanations are complex. It seems plausible to suggest 
that a constructivist understanding, one that is sensitive to organization-level and person-
level nuances in data, could contribute new and insightful context to knowledge on the 
shift in faculty appointments.  
Grounded Theory Methodology 
Defining grounded theory. 
 In The Sage Dictionary of Qualitative Inquiry (2007), Schwandt defines 
“grounded theory methodology” as follows: 
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This term is often used in a nonspecific way to refer to any approach to 
developing theoretical ideas (concepts, models, formal theories) that begins with 
data. But grounded theory methodology is a specific, highly developed, rigorous 
set of procedures for producing formal, substantive theory of social phenomena. 
This approach to the analysis of qualitative data simultaneously employs 
techniques of induction, deduction, and verification to develop theory. Experience 
with data generates insights, hypotheses, and generative questions that are 
pursued through further data generation. As tentative answers to questions are 
developed and concepts are constructed, these constructions are verified through 
further data collection (p. 131). 
Scholars widely acknowledge the work of Glaser and Strauss, culminating in their book 
The Discovery of Grounded Theory (1967) as the seminal work on the methodology 
(Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2007). Since that time 
what constitutes grounded theory methodology and what should constitute it has been the 
subject of much debate. In fact, Denzin (2007) posits seven different epistemological 
varieties of grounded theory methodology: positivist, postpositivist, constructivist, 
objectivist, postmodern, situational, and computer assisted. In delineating grounded 
theory methodology, some researchers delve into claims over the methods of qualitative 
data collection and analysis that traditionally embody the underlying philosophy. While 
helpful in identifying grounded theory research when presented in a publication, this 
effort falls short as a methodological guide to conducting original studies.  
One component of the methodology that appears agreeable to most grounded 
theorists, regardless of epistemological leanings, is the central concern that a priori, or 
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preexisting notions regarding research phenomena should be considered, or controlled, 
such that inductive conclusions can be made through evidence in the data. Grounded 
theory founders, Glazer and Strauss famously fell out with each other over how to deal 
with preexisting knowledge in rendering data-based analysis. Glazer preferred an 
approach to analysis similar to that of Husserlian phenomenology, which requires 
acknowledging and setting aside one’s interpretive biases toward perfectly inductive 
analysis; whereas Strauss and his later writing partner, Corbin viewed grounded theory as 
a more interpretive method requiring a careful pairing of both inductive and deductive 
analysis (Charmaz, 2006; Creswell, 2007). Methodologists Denzin and Lincoln (1971), 
whose approach I adopted through my examination of decision making theory in chapter 
two, openly advocated the application of “sensitizing information” to grounded theory 
analysis. That is to say, they saw little value in knowing absolutely nothing (or ignoring 
what one knows) about a phenomenon and substantial value in careful consideration of a 
researcher’s existing knowledge. Charmaz (2006) has more recently become one 
advocate for a deeply constructivist approach to grounded theory, in which the 
imperfections of the researcher’s interpretations of the data are both inevitable and 
valuable to the formation of useful theory. 
My epistemological leanings toward constructivism are central to my conception 
of this study and the gap I have identified in the literature. Additionally, I have taken the 
practical step of familiarizing myself with existing literature on decision making, so that 
the imperfections of my analysis are not attributable to conceptual ignorance. I call 
heavily upon Corbin and Strauss’ (2008) espoused procedures for conducting grounded 
theory analysis, which they argue both recognize the interpretive role of the researcher 
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and yet results in the generation of knowledge, or findings, that stand a good chance at 
being widely useful. 
Perhaps equally as important to grounded theory methodology as the necessity of 
considering a priori information is the notion that grounded theory methodology yields 
theory as a result. Such agreement is complicated, though, by scholars’ diverse uses of 
“theory,” as Schwandt (2007) suggests above. As Charmaz (2006) explains: 
If you peruse articles whose authors claim allegiance to grounded theory to see 
how they construe a finished grounded theory, you might find such varied views 
as: 1) an empirical generalization, 2) a category, 3) a predisposition, 4) an 
explication of a process, 5) a relationship between variables, 6) an explanation, 7) 
an abstract understanding, and 8) a description (p. 133). 
In this study, I assert that grounded theory is an explanatory methodology aimed at 
revealing not only analytic categories of data but the relationships among them. This 
definition is in keeping with Corbin and Strauss’ (2008), which holds: 
If theory building is indeed the research goal, then findings should be presented as 
a set of interrelated concepts, not just a listing of themes. It is the overall unifying 
explanatory scheme that that raises findings to the level of theory. The 
subconcepts with all their properties and dimensions provide the detail (104). 
The explanatory property of theory requires that a set of loose themes, propositions, or 
hypotheses be integrated within a unifying structure. Often this structure is presented as a 
visual accompaniment (a model) to the narrative of the theory itself (Corbin & Strauss, 
2008) because the multiple properties and conditional relationships among the component 
concepts create complexity. The goal of the grounded theory tradition I embrace here is 
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not to simply describe the components of a phenomenon but to explain their interactive 
nature (e.g., A affects B, which affects C, D, and/or E in X, Y, and Z ways).  
By Corbin and Strauss’ (2008) definition of its outcomes (an integrated theory), 
grounded theory methodology is particularly well suited to process-oriented, or action-
oriented, research phenomena (Charmaz, 2006; Creswell, 2007; Strauss & Corbin, 2008). 
As a result of the methodology’s amenability to the discovery of processes some types of 
research questions are also particularly well suited to the methodology. Creswell (2007) 
states: 
The research questions that the inquirer asks of participants will focus on 
understanding how individuals experience the process and identifying the steps in 
the process (What was the process? How did it unfold?). After initially exploring 
these issues, the researcher then returns to the participants and asks more detailed 
questions… such as: What was central to the process? (the core phenomenon); 
What influenced or caused this phenomenon to occur? (causal conditions); What 
strategies were employed during the process (strategies); What effect occurred? 
(consequences) (p. 66). 
Grounded theory methodology is appropriate to my research questions because of their 
focus on process. 
 Beyond appropriateness, some may ask whether a grounded theory approach is 
necessary. In other words, beyond looking at grounded theory’s methodological 
proclivity toward certain types of research questions it makes sense to ask whether the 
generation of new theory on a given phenomenon would contribute meaningfully to 
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existing scholarship. For instance, do theories on this subject exist already, and if so, how 
are they inadequate to the task of answering the research questions?  
By way of answer, it is incumbent upon me to provide some insights as to the 
nature of grounded theories and the sort of outcomes grounded theorists seek to achieve 
with grounded theory studies. I have reviewed several theoretical rationales that have 
been suggested as possible formal theories that may explain aspects of the shift in faculty 
appointments across multiple sectors of American higher education, but none explains 
how faculty hiring decisions occur at local levels. Charmaz (2006) differentiates 
substantive theory from formal theory as follows: 
Most grounded theories are substantive theories, because they address delimited 
problems in specific substantive areas […]. The logic of grounded theory can 
reach across substantive areas and into the realm of formal theory, which means 
generating abstract concepts and specifying relationships between them to 
understand problems in multiple substantive areas (p. 8). 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) describe three levels of theory, in order of decreasing 
delimitation: substantive, mid-range, and formal. These are conceptually similar to 
Charmaz’s (2006) position on the subject. The general idea is that a single grounded 
theory study is best suited to the production of substantive theory. It serves well to 
generate integrated analytic insights at a level that is local to the phenomenon of interest. 
Collectively, many grounded theory studies can serve to generate higher order theory 
(Glaser, 2007). This study may ultimately lead to further studies, which may then 
contribute to higher level theory explaining faculty hiring across university type, for 
instance. One may even imagine such mid-level theory then contributing to formal 
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theories of something as comparatively esoteric as collaborative partner selection17, for 
instance. However, this study will independently yield substantive theory, which is to say 
my highest hope for its findings are that they are deeply insightful within the 
delimitations I lay out toward the end of this chapter. 
Inductive reasoning. 
 Analytically, one element of grounded theory that sets it apart from many 
alternative approaches to empirical research is its incorporation of inductive reasoning. 
Whereas most other research methodologies rely on existing theory to deduce 
informative questions about phenomena, grounded theorists attempt to generate original 
points of inquiry “from the ground up” (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). In the 
words of Glaser and Strauss (1967), conclusions emerge directly from the data. Charmaz 
(2006) and Corbin and Strauss (2008) point out that grounded theory also relies on 
deduction and abduction for certain aspects of theory generation, but the prominent role 
of inductive reasoning throughout the process is a hallmark of grounded theory research. 
 Grounded theory is an iterative process. Consider the metaphor of a block of 
marble to be chiseled into a statue. Like the artist’s hazy early vision the researcher has 
an initial, exploratory question. The artist selects a piece of stone he or she believes 
adequate to the task of revealing the figure. So, too, does the researcher select the site and 
the initial participants. As the artist begins to rough out the stone and learn more about 
the course the grain follows, certain tools and strategies appear beneficial. Like the artist, 
the researcher tests the research tools, including those early analytic possibilities. Thus, 
                                                 
17 Since university faculty work is merely one of many professions in which hires are made, in part, based 
on the outlook for collaboration, perhaps research findings about hiring for collaboration across multiple 
professions could inform a higher level of theory. This is just a hypothetical example for the purpose of 
contrasting mid-level theory with substantive theory. 
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while multiple steps are required in order to analyze data in a manner consistent with 
grounded theory methodology, the sequence of the steps is not unidirectional.  
Theoretical sampling. 
Stemming from inductive data analysis, another of the distinguishing design 
features of grounded theory is theoretical sampling. Corbin & Strauss (2008) refer to 
theoretical sampling as “concept driven” (p. 145), further elaborating that, “The process 
for theoretical sampling are simple: the researcher follows the analytic trail” (p. 146). In 
other words, the researcher learns information from early data, responds to unexpected 
discoveries by asking more questions, seeks out additional sources to fill in gaps, and 
continues until the point of theoretical saturation. Theoretical saturation is reached when 
“no new properties” of the grounded theory the researcher is producing emerges 
(Charmaz, 2006; Morse, 2007).  
Analytic memos and constant comparison analysis. 
 Another procedure that is of central importance to grounded theory research 
design involves the writing and refinement of extensive analytic memos. Charmaz (2006) 
offers a brief summary of the central role memos play in data analysis:  
Memos provide ways to compare data, to explore ideas about the codes, and to 
direct further data gathering. As you work with your data and codes, you become 
progressively more analytic in how you treat them, and thus you raise certain 
codes to conceptual categories (p. 12). 
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Memo-writing is a vehicle, then, for three critical components of grounded theory data 
analysis. In the first place, it facilitates an iterative analytic process. Analytic “leads18” 
(Charmaz, 2006, p. 115) from early data can be made explicit through memo-writing and 
subsequently compared and contrasted with leads emerging from later data. In the second 
place, memos serve as a repository for research notes that may become more refined over 
time, as analysis continues and understanding accumulates about the phenomenon of 
interest. Finally, memos reveal as much about gaps in the analysis as they do strong 
points. As a result, they form an excellent tool for focusing second- and third-level data 
collection to strengthen findings. 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) provide dozens of analytic memos from Corbin’s study 
of Vietnam War soldiers’ experiences, which illustrate the centrality of memo writing 
concurrent with data analysis. This is known in grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin 
& Strauss, 2008; Lempert, 2007), as well as in qualitative research more broadly 
(Merriam, 1998), as a constant comparison method of analysis. In grounded theory, 
constant comparison procedures dovetail with the writing of analytic memos, because 
early leads form an important comparison point for later data analysis. As a result, leads 
posited in early memos will often be elaborated upon in future iterations of those memos. 
Lempert (2007) crystallizes this unique aspect of memo writing in the grounded theory 
tradition neatly: “Memos, especially early ones, are speculative, and they may lack 
coherence and connection to one another” (p. 247). Lempert (2007) goes on to admonish 
                                                 
18 Charmaz (2006) uses the term “lead’ in a way that draws parallels to popular film and television 
depictions of journalists, or detectives. In the case of grounded theory analysis, a lead is a tip, or a clue. The 
main difference is that clues in social science research are to be found in the data, rather than in criminal 
evidence, or from journalistic sources. A lead is a point of analysis that that suggests further exploration 
could yield new insights. Thus, an analytic lead is something to be followed up on by the researcher. 
Charmaz (2006) poses the utility of leads as analytic footholds: “Be open to what is happening in the field 
and be willing to grapple with it. When you get stuck, go back and recode earlier data and see if you define 
new leads” (p. 115). 
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grounded theorists to at various times take a break from memo writing, “But then come 
back and re-read all of the memos. Treat them like data. Write memos on the memos” (p. 
258). This encompassing level of analysis is meant to aid in the integration of loose 
concepts into a cohesive theory. 
Coding. 
I have discussed analytic memos from a conceptual perspective, but grounded 
theory research design requires a discrete progression of steps in order to produce the 
analysis recorded in memos. Grounded theory analysis consists of three levels of coding: 
open, axial, and selective (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008). In discussing the 
coding process as a sequence of steps, it is important to note that the process does not 
flow in a tidy fashion from one stage of coding to the next for the entire study 
simultaneously. As I have discussed, data collection and analysis occur concurrently in 
grounded theory. This portends that different points of analysis will be refined at 
differing paces.  
Open coding.  
The most basic level of coding involves line by line coding of data—in the case of 
this study, interview transcripts. Jones, Torres, and Arminio (2006) explain, “Each word, 
phrase, or sentence is categorized and coded as a concept. Concept names are selected to 
accurately reflect and describe what the data conveyed” (p. 44). The authors go on to 
explain that the number of codes produced through open coding depends on the number 
of participants and amount of data collected; however, open coding can lead to a large 
number of disparate codes, as the premise of this stage of analysis is to stay as close to 
the data as possible. Charmaz (2006) argues that when using grounded theory design to 
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explicate processes, researchers do well to pay special attention to the coding of gerunds 
(action words, which denote process; gerunds are words that have the suffix –ing). One 
method of remaining close to the data throughout the study, which begins in open coding, 
is the use of in vivo codes, which is to say employing the words of a participant in the 
name of a code (Charmaz, 2006). Open coding represents the lowest level of abstraction, 
from raw data into codes. 
Axial coding.  
The middle step in grounded theory coding consists of forming concepts, or 
categories, out of codes. Analytic memos form the basis for explaining the relationships 
among codes, and as more codes are produced, the memos will reflect adjustments to 
concepts. Charmaz (2006) offers good insight into the concurrent nature of data 
collection and analysis at the middle phase (p. 58): 
Some respondents or events will make explicit what was implicit in earlier 
statements or events. An ‘Aha! Now I understand,’ experience may prompt [the 
researcher] to study [their] earlier data afresh. Then, [the researcher] may return to 
earlier respondents and explore topics that had been glossed over, or that may 
have been too implicit to discern initially or unstated. 
Thus, at the point of axial coding, grounded theorists not only engage in what other 
qualitative disciplines may know as pattern matching (see Yin, 2003), but they both 
expand their sample and return to early participants for clarification on emerging 
patterns. These emerging patterns constitute the analytic categories the researcher may 
select for inclusion in the final theory. 
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Selective coding.  
Selective coding consists of abstracting the categories produced through axial 
coding into a cohesive theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Holton, 2007). Achieving the 
integration of all relevant categories into an encompassing analysis first requires an 
understanding of the analytic ties that bind the categories. Grounded theorists employ the 
concept of the “core category” (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Holton, 2007). Holton (2007) 
explains the significance of the core category as follows (p. 279): 
As the researcher proceeds with constant comparison, a core category begins to 
emerge. This core variable can be any kind of theoretical code: a process, a 
typology, a continuum, a range, dimensions, conditions, consequences, and so 
forth. Its primary function is to integrate the theory and render it dense and 
saturated. In appearing to explain how the main concern is continually processed 
or resolved, the core becomes the focus of further selective data collection and 
coding efforts. 
In other words, the core category is not simply a larger analytic category, under which all 
previous categories are subsumed; it is the emergent analytic framework for 
understanding the relationships among the categories. Often, the core category can be 
illustrated using a visual model that explains the relationships among categories 
(Creswell, 2007).  
Summary. 
 I have described grounded theory methodology as a discipline of qualitative 
research with several distinguishing features. For example, analysis over the course of a 
grounded theory study takes the shape of inductive and deductive analysis feeding from 
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each other, but the approach is unique from many other qualitative approaches in that it 
begins with, and relies upon, induction. Additionally, data collection and analysis are 
concurrent, not sequential, so that findings can be refined and a strong chain of evidence 
can be cultivated. Finally, grounded theory design requires a particular, three-level 
coding process that should ultimately lead to theory abstraction. As a result, grounded 
theory analysis goes beyond a descriptive listing of analytic categories, or themes; it 
provides interpretive insight as to how the various components of a phenomenon interact. 
Methods 
Creswell (2009) advocates the explanation of methods in the following order: (1) 
participants, (2) instruments, (3) procedures, and (4) limitations and delimitations. I find 
that organization to be instructive here. 
Participant selection. 
 I present my participant selection strategy in the mode of Marshall and Rossman 
(2006), by addressing: events, settings, actors, and artifacts.  
Events.  
The event with which I am concerned is faculty hiring, because scholars have 
observed major change in faculty hiring but cannot well explain how that change has 
taken place using data. I have elaborated upon this rationale in chapter one. 
Settings.  
The settings with which I am concerned are comprehensive universities, the sector 
of American higher education where the shift in faculty labor is currently most dynamic; 
as a result of this status, comprehensive universities are also potentially data-rich 
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environments. The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching’s size and 
setting classifications provided a good tool for ensuring the sample of settings I selected 
was diverse. I have located my study among three universities: two public, and one 
private. Because building rapport with study participants is important to the process of 
eliciting rich data (see the following subsection on “Actors”), I made one site visit to each 
university, to interview participants in person19. I conducted additional interviews over 
the phone. A sample of three universities was manageable for site visit purposes. Yet, 
among three universities I was also able to build elements of setting diversity into my 
data (e.g., control, size, and setting; see Table 1, p. 126).  
Actors.  
My selection of interview participants (i.e., “actors;” Marshall & Rossman, 2006) 
began with those with central and formal roles in faculty hiring, such as provosts, deans, 
and department chairs, and union leaders. I interviewed department chairs in humanities 
(7), sciences (6), and professional and social science fields (3) alongside twelve personnel 
in dean’s office, provost’s office, and president roles (many of whom are also situated in 
disciplinary backgrounds and roles). I proceeded to both expand my sample and select 
participants for additional interviews based on previously collected data. Over the course 
of the study, I identified and invited 49 potential participants. Seven of them declined to 
participate, three accepted initially but later failed to follow through in scheduling 
interviews, and eleven did not respond at all to multiple attempts at contact. This left me 
with a success rate of 57 percent in participant recruitment, or 28 participants. Those who 
declined to participate offered a variety of reasons for declining, such as: a) they were 
                                                 
19 A return visit was made to one site for an additional high-level interview. 
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“not the right person,” or another person would be a better source of information (2); b) 
being too new to their role to offer insight (1); c) being too busy (1); d) unable to meet in 
person and unwilling to speak by phone (1); e) recently retired (1); and e) no reason (1).  
Gaining access to data-rich participants can pose substantial challenges in 
qualitative research. Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) touch upon the access issue in at 
least two ways that influenced my approach. First, a researcher has to gain a desired level 
of interaction with participants. Hammersley and Atkinson encourage researchers to 
consider their intended position along a continuum of contact, between observer (distal, 
low-contact) and participant (proximal, high-contact). Not knowing how faculty hiring 
decisions occur in advance of this study, I was poorly situated to observe these decisions 
longitudinally, let alone participate in them. However, I took steps to ensure access to 
data-rich participants, and I interacted with them through individual interviews. I laid the 
groundwork for this access in two ways. Initially, I requested and received assurances of 
introductions to actors involved in faculty hiring from key personnel in Washington, DC 
membership organizations. The Director of Research and Public Policy at the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP) provided introductions to private 
comprehensive university department chairs and union leaders; and the Vice President for 
Academic Leadership and Change at the American Association of State Colleges and 
Universities (AASCU) provided introductions to nine senior academic affairs staff 
members in public comprehensives, who independently expressed interest in participating 
in this study during a pilot focus group, in July, 2013. 
The second important issue raised by Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) is how to 
gain access in terms of eliciting honest and thoughtful participation. I treated my AAUP 
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and AASCU connections as “gatekeepers” (p. 34) by building rapport with them and 
doing all I could to ensure they heartily encouraged study participation among groups of 
interest. I did the same with each participant throughout data collection, and in fact this 
process of building rapport had begun with the participants in the pilot focus group (all 
expressed interest in participating in the full study and in recommending additional data-
rich sources). Patton (2002) refers to this ongoing selection process as “snowball or chain 
sampling,” (p. 237) adding: 
This is an approach for locating information-rich key informants or critical cases. 
The process begins by asking well-situated people: “Who knows a lot about___? 
Whom should I talk to?” By asking a number of people who else to talk with, the 
snowball gets bigger and bigger as you accumulate new information-rich cases” 
(p. 237). 
Chain sampling is of excellent use in grounded theory research, in which sampling occurs 
piecemeal over the course of data collection. Grounded theory researchers learn from 
data analysis and from recommendations of participants themselves as to who holds 
valuable information. 
Artifacts.  
As I have intimated, I used individual interviews of the 28 participants as my 
primary data collection tool. At the first level of data collection, I strove to conduct in-
person interviews. At the second level, I employed telephone and email inquiry. 
Key documents constituted additional data, or artifacts, for this study. Finnegan’s 
(1993) multi-site case study of comprehensive universities suggests that histories and 
organizational sagas can provide important context for organizational behavior, and I 
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sought out these documents (many university websites provide brief historical accounts) 
for context in data analysis. Policy documents, such as faculty handbooks, and union 
contracts also constituted important data sources. 
Instruments. 
In qualitative research the researcher is the instrument. Certain mechanisms 
mitigate the fallibility of a human instrument, as described below (Creswell, 2007). 
Nonetheless, informed subjectivity is a central characteristic of qualitative data analysis 
(Charmaz, 2006). Charmaz (2006) takes an explicitly constructivist position in arguing 
informed subjectivity is a critical strength in grounded theory research, and she explains 
by discussing one of her own studies (p. 17): 
My guiding interests led to bringing concepts such as self-concept, identity, and 
duration into the study. But that was only the start. I used those concepts as points 
of departure to form interview questions, to look at data, to listen to interviewees, 
and to think analytically about the data. Guiding interests, sensitizing concepts, 
and disciplinary perspectives often provide us with such points of departure for 
developing, not limiting, our ideas. Then we develop scientific concepts by 
studying the data and examining our ideas through successive levels of analysis. 
In short, this study is an interpretive one, in keeping with the constructivist tradition of 
grounded theory and other approaches to qualitative research. 
 Pinpointing at the outset which sensitizing concepts may prove most relevant to 
analysis was in some ways an exercise in futility. For example, some aspect of my 
identity, say hypothetically that of an American football fan, might have proven helpful 
to my understanding of an interview participant’s metaphor invoking the importance of 
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pass-blocking on third and long. While sports metaphors are somewhat common in 
explanatory discussions, one does not logically set out to better understand football 
strategy in preparation for a study of university faculty. Some elements of a researcher’s 
sensitiveness to relevant concepts is either difficult to predict or downright serendipitous. 
On the other hand, Denzin and Lincoln (1971) compellingly suggest that a researcher can 
hope to improve her sensitivity to relevant ideas for fuller inquiry and analysis through 
preparatory reviews of existing literature. Within chapter two, I selected decision making 
literature for this very purpose. This effort did not allow me to predetermine which 
concepts would be most relevant to my study from within that literature; I expected to 
employ some of them substantially, others less so, and many of them not at all. However, 
my review of these sensitizing concepts mitigated the possibility of failure to build upon 
existing knowledge in producing findings. 
Procedures. 
I invited individuals for interviews based on follow-up discussions with provosts 
stemming from my pilot study (public). I also located one gatekeeper at a private 
university that met my setting criteria through a recommendation and introduction by my 
contact at the AAUP.  
The procedure the interviews followed includes: a) conducting the initial 
interview (in person where possible; via telephone as necessary)20, b) requesting follow-
up interviews as analysis of initial interviews revealed the need for additional data; c) 
asking interview participants for recommendations of possible additional participants for 
invite (sometimes called “snowball or chain sampling;” see Patton, 2002); and d) 
                                                 
20 See Appendix A for initial interview protocol. 
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requesting key documents that impact faculty hiring processes as participants refer to 
them. Additional participant and follow-up interviews took place by telephone and email 
according to the participant’s preferences. 
The very first participants consisted of the gatekeepers themselves. Early 
participants built on their recommendations for further interview participants at the 
college and department levels in two ways. First, I selected at least three departments as 
settings for further research based upon the recommendations (disciplinary diversity 
being of importance), as well as several individuals within each. Second, I independently 
invited several individuals for participation from among those not recommended by the 
gatekeeper (either active or passive non-recommendation was acceptable). I sought out 
participants in departments within each of three academic areas: STEM (science, 
technology, engineering, and mathematics), arts and humanities, and social sciences and 
professions. This structure allowed multiple comparison points within and across 
universities to aid analysis. 
Data analysis.  
The primary data for analysis was individual interview transcripts. The procedure 
for analyzing the transcripts followed the progressive, three phase grounded theory 
method presented earlier in this chapter: 1) open coding; 2) axial coding; and 3) selective 
coding. I employed these analytic techniques toward the goal of presenting findings in 
explanatory visual models. Additionally, I took steps to ensure my analysis and findings 
were rigorous, in keeping with the standards of strong qualitative research. I borrow three 
terms from Yin’s (2003) discussion of rigor in case study design to frame my discussion 
of the steps I took: internal validity, external validity, and reliability. 
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Internal validity.  
Yin (2003) defines internal validity as addressing the “threat” of spurious effects 
(p. 36). That is to say, the analytic conclusions the researcher makes (in this case, with 
regard to the nature of patterns, or cause and effect relationships among concepts) should 
be tested against alternative explanations and justified thoroughly and demonstrably. In 
this study, the thought process that led me from raw data to theory was meticulously 
documented through analytic memos (Charmaz, 2006; Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Lempert, 
2007). Besides offering great facility to the writing process, these memos comprise a 
strong audit trail.  
Further, I conducted member checks with my most information rich participants. 
This ensured that I understood and interpreted their statements well. Morse (2007) 
advocates a particularly strong method of member checking for grounded theory studies. 
That is, as a potential final step to analysis participants should be presented with a 
summary of findings. They should be charged with informing the researcher as to 
whether they see their own experiences in the grounded theory. If they do not, then the 
researcher must investigate why and potentially collect additional data to inform more 
thorough analysis. 
Finally, I will sought to triangulate and confirm findings at every opportunity. 
This included verifying accounts: between participants, across interview and document 
data, and through follow-up with the same participant. This method of improving internal 
validity is consistent with Merriam’s (1998) recommendations. 
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External validity.  
Yin (2003) describes external validity as addressing “the problem of knowing 
whether a study’s findings are generalizable beyond the immediate case study.” The fact 
that I do not position this study as a case study only emphasizes the importance of 
producing analysis that extends beyond the boundaries of any of my three sites. Merriam 
(1998) recommends improving external validity by providing “thick” contextual 
description of case settings that will help the reader better understand whether and to 
what degree findings are transferable (p. 211). My analysis comments upon the settings 
and environments inhabited by my participants. Additionally, the memos I generated over 
the course of the study provided an excellent starting point for producing thick 
descriptions of analytic categories. Merriam (1998) has further suggested that the 
purposeful nature of my sampling design, paired with the ability to test analyses across 
multiple settings, would also ultimately aid in improving external reliability. 
Reliability.  
Yin (2003) explains the importance of designing for good analytic reliability as 
follows: “The objective is to be sure that if a later investigator followed the same 
procedures as described by an earlier investigator and conducted the same case study all 
over again, the later investigator should arrive at the same findings and conclusions” (p. 
37). This explanation is not entirely in keeping with the constructivist notion that 
researcher individuality has a positive, differentiating effect on analysis. However, the 
point remains that, in grounded theory as well as case design, readers should be able to 
rely upon any researcher’s findings as being accurate and thorough efforts toward 
backing up analytic claims with evidence. Yin (2003) goes on to crystallize the concept 
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of reliability in the dictum: “The general way of approaching the reliability problem is to 
make as many steps as operational as possible and to conduct research as if someone 
were always looking over your shoulder” (p. 38). 
I took several steps to increase the reliability of my findings, some of which were 
aided by virtue of grounded theory design. I present raw data within my analysis, 
including interview and document quotations, as well as my own raw interview notes and 
analytic memos. This way the reader may assess for herself whether my conclusions are 
logical. Additionally, by employing a constant comparative method of analysis I 
positioned myself to include disconfirming data in my analysis and to discuss the manner 
in which it shaped my conclusions over the course of the study. 
The brunt of the data for analysis in this study consisted of interview transcripts. 
The procedure for analyzing the transcripts is prescriptive in grounded theory, and it 
entails moving successively from line by line coding, through construction of loose 
conceptual categories, into an integration of those categories into a cohesive, interpretive 
whole. In pursuing this end, it was incumbent upon me to do all I could to produce 
rigorous analysis. That is to say, I needed to make every effort to ensure the analysis 
would be based in data and took all data into account (internal validity), that the findings 
would be as useful as possible to readers (external validity), and that readers could 
depend on the findings as being well-justified (reliability). 
Limitations and delimitations. 
 This study is limited, or subject to imperfections, and by design it abides by 
delimitations, or boundaries in the scope of the study that are helpful to the generation of 




This study relies upon subjective and interpretive methods, both for the generation 
of its findings on behalf of the researcher and for the transferability of its findings on 
behalf of its readers. Constructivists, such as Charmaz (2006), posit this is actually a 
strength, because different researchers bring unique insights to data analysis. Subjectivity 
is also a double-edged sword in qualitative research, in that it places additional 
responsibility on the researcher to provide evidence of findings and to acknowledge, as I 
now do, that researcher subjectivity also suggests elements of analysis may be missed or 
underdeveloped.  
Additionally, many individuals and universities will not share sufficient positional 
or environmental context with those from which I draw participants for findings to be 
easily or broadly transferable to them. This is unavoidable, but with future studies this 
limitation may be better addressed. 
Finally, this study may be limited by the contemporaneous effects of a down 
economy and should be confirmed in better economic times, either through repetitions of 
the grounded theory design or through confirmatory case studies (e.g., have these 
universities laid off adjuncts according to the “budgetary flexibility” rationale for their 
hire, have they hired more of them due to their lower cost, or do appointment types 
appear to be somewhat in line with pre-recession levels?). Participants may be able to 
offer some insight by reflecting on pre-recession experiences. However, such 




This study is solely dedicated to developing an original substantive theory 
instructional faculty hiring processes within unionized comprehensive universities. Later 
studies may employ quantitative techniques to refine the theory; and additional 
qualitative approaches, such as case study, may test the applicability of the theory in 
different university contexts. 
Conclusion 
This chapter described the research design for the proposed study of non-tenure 
track instructional faculty hiring processes in comprehensive universities. I began with 
comments on the epistemological underpinnings of my approach. I proceeded by 
introducing key methodological concepts in the tradition of grounded theory research. 
Finally, I discussed my proposed methods for conducting this study. Chapter four 
presents the study’s findings. 
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Chapter Four: Descriptive Findings 
 This chapter details the key findings of this study. It begins with an overview of 
the three data collection sites, and proceeds to provide descriptive analysis of faculty 
hiring processes (e.g., what occurs, who is involved, and how they are involved).  
University Settings 
This study explored instructional faculty hiring processes within three 
comprehensive universities. Understanding the distinct contexts of this study’s three 
university settings will necessarily inform the reader’s use of this study in other settings. 
Participants and participating universities have been afforded anonymity, and as part of 
that provision both the participants and universities have been assigned pseudonyms. The 
universities have been named: Little Big Town University, Industry State College, and 
Bright Lights University. Together they form a group that both shares important 
similarities and also represents key elements of difference in a field of diverse 
comprehensive universities. 
One driver of site selection was consideration of population, both at the level of 
geographic location and in terms of university size. Since one straightforward element of 
interest in decisions around faculty hiring may be the supply of qualified instructors, 
consideration of local population as a proxy indicator of available labor force offered 
analytic value. Logically, a larger population of educated professionals may enhance the 
number of available people with advanced degrees for recruitment as instructors. 
Therefore, the local population size of each university site is notably different in this 
study. University size is also likely to influence the hiring structures and practices. For 
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example, a 20,000 student university likely hires more faculty than a 2,000 student 
university. This sort of difference would have made it more difficult to understand which 
differences in faculty hiring practices were based on scale versus other factors. For this 
reason, selected sites were of a similar, medium total enrollment size (at least 3,000 
students and fewer than 10,000 students by U.S. Department of Education standards).  
Perhaps as a consequence of selecting for similar institutional size, the form of 
organizational charts turned out to be normative across the three institutions. At the top 
was the university chief academic officer21 (hereafter, provost) and possibly an associate 
provost; in the middle was a college, school, or institute dean22 and possibly an associate 
dean; and at the base of the organizational chart was the department chair and possibly an 
associate chair. One of the sites was in the process of implementing a new dean structure 
for the first time during data collection. This institution had previously relied on an 
associate provost to play the role effected by deans in the other institutions’ hiring 
processes, but that had changed by the time the study was completed. In each of the three 
universities, I studied hiring practices within four units headed by deans (hereafter, 
“colleges”)23. 
One key difference in the hiring structures among the sites was the role of the 
chief executive (hereafter, president). In one of the sites, the president delegated hiring 
oversight responsibilities to the provost. In another, the president provided guidance to 
the central administration (deans and provost) as to the role of faculty hiring in pursuit of 
                                                 
21 Titles for this position varied (e.g., Chief Academic Officer, Provost, Vice President for Academic 
Affairs) 
22 One university was partway through the process of implementing a dean system; that was a shift away 
from having the provost and/or the provost’s designee work directly with each department chair on campus. 
23 The scope of responsibility differed among the deans according to the mission and historic college 




the university strategic plan. In the third, the president made a practice of personally 
interviewing most full-time faculty recommended for hiring by the provost, but not part-
time hires.  
Another key element to site selection involved an attempt to control at least one 
major expected structural component in faculty hiring processes: union status. All three 
universities in this study had faculty collective bargaining units, though none of the three 
sites had very similar union structures. One site had only one union representing all 
faculty; each of the others had multiple unions representing different faculty designations 
(full-time, part-time, and sometimes additional designations; at one site part-time and 
full-time faculty were organized by the same union and simply belonged to different 
collective bargaining units, whereas in the others different unions were affiliated with the 
different units). The American Association of University Professors (AAUP), National 
Education Association (NEA), and American Federation of Teachers (AFT) were each 
affiliated with at least one of the collective bargaining units relevant to these sites.  
Conceivably, faculty collective bargaining could impact faculty hiring decisions 
in both direct and indirect ways. For instance, as sectors of a university’s faculty unionize 
and bargain more effectively, administrators and boards might hypothetically consider 
strategies to employ fewer union-eligible faculty (direct impact on hiring). Likewise, this 
rationale implies consideration of a strategy of greater employment of non-unionized, or 
comparatively weak-bargaining segments of the faculty—what is known colloquially as 
union busting (indirect impact on hiring). These two approaches are not mutually 
exclusive. In one setting participants shared historical perspectives that both union 
aversion and union busting had been undertaken simultaneously under a prior 
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administration. Since faculty unionization, particularly among contingent faculty 
members, is growing (Flaherty, 2013), looking at faculty hiring practices within 
unionized campuses may provide substantive and lasting insights. Therefore, this study 
focused on three university sites that included collective bargaining with faculty. 
Finally, a mix of public and independent university sites was selected in order to 
compare realities of faculty hiring processes in universities with different finance models 
and oversight structures. As with the faculty union context, I draw attention to particular 
areas of relevance and impact regarding control (public or independent) within the 
analysis. Readers will need to consider for themselves the degree to which the three 
universities, in whole or in part, comprise a sample that can offer insights regarding other 
universities’ faculty hiring processes. While acknowledging this important difference, in 
many ways readers interested in public university contexts may also learn from analysis 
of independent universities and vice versa. For instance, with minor variations, all three 
sites shared a basic three-tiered structure of faculty employment: full-time tenure track24 
(TT); full-time non-tenure track (FTNTT); and part-time non-tenure track25 (PTNTT).  
Little Big Town University. 
 Little Big Town University is a public institution whose main campus is set in a 
city of more than 50,000 in the Eastern United States. While not even one of the 500 
largest cities in the country, it is a vibrant hub within its largely rural state setting. Little 
Big Town draws its history back to the late 1800s, when one of its campuses was founded 
as a normal school. Over nearly 150 years, the state acquired, merged, and expanded the 
university to incorporate what are now several campuses in short driving distance under 
                                                 
24 All sites employed standard policies of a six year probationary period. 
25 None of the sites had opportunities to pursue a tenure track career as a part-time faculty member. 
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the same banner. The university’s history branches off in myriad ways, involving junior 
colleges, preparatory schools, seminaries, independent colleges, state colleges, and a 
bevy of closings, openings, reopenings, and renamings along the way. The university is 
situated within a state university system that collectively answers to a governing board 
appointed by the governor. The university has no local board26.  
Little Big Town serves about 9,000 students27, approximately 80 percent of whom 
are undergraduates. Total in-state, on-campus student expenses for 2013-201428 were 
reported as just over $24,000, with out-of-state, on-campus total expenses approximately 
$36,000. About 90 percent of students receive some financial aid, with just over one-third 
of students receiving federal Pell grants. About 40 percent of undergraduates attend on a 
part-time basis, and fully one-third of students are of nontraditional age29. The university 
admitted more than 80 percent of all undergraduate applicants for the 2013-2014 
academic year. The university employs just under 400 total instructional faculty 
members, only about 15 percent of whom are reported as part-time faculty (all except two 
being instructional). It is important to note that the Department of Education’s Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) relies on institutions to report part-time 
and full-time employment using their own definitions, so comparisons of part-time and 
full-time non-tenure track faculty may not be perfect across institutions. Over 100 
graduate students are employed at the university, but only about 5 percent of them hold 
instructional positions (mostly research). Of the full-time faculty, nearly 75 percent are 
                                                 
26 Data regarding state governance structures retrieved from the Public Higher Education Boards Database 
of the Association of Governing Boards of Colleges and Universities (AGB) Ingram Center for Public 
Trusteeship and Governance: http://agb.org/ingram-center-public-trusteeship-and-governance  
27 Data cited throughout this section from Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), 
unless otherwise stated, for consistency. 
28 IPEDS reports this number for full-time beginning undergraduate students. 
29 Reported in IPEDS as age “25 and over.” 
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tenured or on the tenure track (TT); of TT faculty, nearly 90 percent have received 
tenure. 
The Little Big Town University mission statement affirms the university is 
committed to high quality education at both the undergraduate and graduate levels. The 
mission statement specifically mentions important values of civic engagement and 
environmental conscientiousness. The mission statement relays the relevance of Little 
Big Town’s work at the state, national, and world levels. Student access and affordability 
are listed as important priorities.  
At the time of this study, Little Big Town’s finances could be characterized as 
troubled. State appropriations had either decreased or remained flat for the previous five 
years, and enrollments had fallen. Tuition increases had not been an available strategy to 
close budget gaps, a majority of university reserve funds had been spent, and as a result a 
number of staff and faculty positions had been eliminated. Multiple program closures had 
been proposed, and the university had invested in distance learning initiatives as a 
potential future source of revenue. The president of the university stepped down as this 
study was being conducted, after only two years on the job. The previous president held 
the position for less than five years. 
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Industry State College. 
 Industry State College is a public institution set in a city of less than 50,000 in the 
Eastern United States. The local economy grew up around manufacturing and public 
utilities in the twentieth century and in many ways holds to that identity today. The City 
of Industry (another pseudonym) has a single public high school of approximately 1,000 
students, which offers an array of opportunities for technical and occupational education 
alongside the traditional academic core. Industry is the third largest city in its county and 
has less than half the footprint of Little Big Town’s city, in square miles. Industry State 
draws its history back to the opening of a state normal school in the late 1800s. Unlike 
Little Big Town, Industry State has never encompassed more than one campus. It 
expanded to embrace a mission of providing baccalaureate degrees in education in the 
first half of the twentieth century, and subsequently graduate programs in education, 
before embracing other disciplines. The campus has grown substantially over the course 
of more than a century without acquiring or merging with other schools, colleges, or 
universities. Industry State College is governed by both a local governing board and a 
state coordinating board, each of which is populated by gubernatorial appointment. 
Industry State serves about 7,000 students, approximately 60 percent of whom are 
undergraduates. Total in-state, on-campus student expenses for 2013-2014 were reported 
as just over $20,000, with out-of-state, on-campus total expenses at approximately 
$27,000. About 90 percent of students receive some financial aid, with less than one-third 
of students receiving federal Pell grants. About 20 percent of undergraduates attend on a 
part-time basis, and less than 20 percent are of nontraditional age. The university 
admitted more than 70 percent of all undergraduate applicants for the 2013-2014 
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academic year. The university employs just under 400 total instructional faculty 
members, just over 50 percent of whom are reported as part-time faculty; no graduate 
labor was reported. Of the full-time faculty, more than 95 percent were tenured or on the 
tenure track (TT); of TT faculty, about 70 percent had received tenure. 
The mission statement at Industry State University highlights instruction foremost 
among the university’s endeavors, inclusive of traditional liberal arts coursework and 
professional programs. The mission also denotes a guiding value of civic responsibility, 
and it positions the university’s services in relation to the region and the state.  
At the time of this study, Industry State’s finances could be characterized as 
moderately strong. The state had made small increases in appropriations over each of the 
previous five years, tuition and fees had increased two to three percent for each of the 
past several years, and revenue-generating evening programs were considered productive. 
A sense of modest optimism was in the air, as the campus was underway on highly 
visible new capital projects. Importantly for this study, participants widely agreed that 
faculty lines had been secure for a number of years; the provost’s office could be counted 
on to fill full-time openings with full-time faculty hires in cases of faculty departure or 
retirement. Vacant tenured positions were subject to strategic review regarding possible 
movement among departments, but none of the participants could think of a recent case 
in which a department had not been allowed to fill a tenured opening. 
Bright Lights University. 
 Bright Lights University is an independent institution located in the heart of one 
of the 25 largest cities in the U.S. Its campus consists of space in multiple tall buildings 
(some greater than ten stories), closely distributed among downtown office buildings, 
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restaurants, and entertainment venues. Bright Lights, much like Little Big Town and 
Industry State Universities, draws its history back to the late 1800s, when it was founded 
to instruct students in a specialized curriculum that would ultimately become integrated 
with a focus on the arts and liberal arts. The development of the university has entailed a 
series of mission updates and expansions and early name changes. The university also 
purchased and sold buildings to move and expand within the city on multiple occasions. 
However, the history of the university does not include mergers and acquisitions with 
other institutions. 
Bright Lights serves about 5,000 students, approximately 80 percent of whom are 
undergraduates. Comprehensive expenses for 2013-2014 on-campus students exceeded 
$50,000. About 75 percent of students receive some financial aid, though only about 15 
percent receive federal Pell grants. Only about 10 percent of undergraduates attend on a 
part-time basis, and less than five percent are of nontraditional age. The university is 
selective, admitting less than half of all undergraduate applicants for the 2013-2014 
academic year. The university employs just over 400 total instructional faculty members, 
about 56 percent of whom are reported as part-time faculty (PTNTT); if graduate student 
instructors are included in the definition of part-time faculty, then the percentage of the 
instructional faculty represented by part-timers rises to 65 percent. Of the full-time 
faculty, 65 percent were tenured or on the tenure track (TT); of TT faculty, nearly 80 
percent had received tenure.  
The mission statement of Bright Lights University highlights its instructional role 
to serve both graduate and undergraduate students. It also emphasizes a guiding value of 
innovation. Notably, the mission statement seems to emphasize the professional areas for 
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which the university is known more than the liberal arts. The mission statement does not 
specify Bright Lights’ role in relation to the region, as do the mission statements of the 
two public universities in this study. 
At the time of this study, Bright Lights University was on the cusp of undertaking 
an ambitious initiative of full-time faculty expansion. The plan includes the addition of 
dozens of new faculty lines over the next several years. Department chairs believed the 
hires would include primarily, if not totally, tenure track faculty. While deans 
equivocated a bit on that promise, all deans shared the explicit goal of hiring more tenure 
track faculty. This planned growth was emblematic of financial confidence, but the 
particular focus on tenure-track faculty growth was also instructive of a recent historic 
context that positioned the initiative as a corrective measure. The previous administration 
had undertaken a faculty employment strategy apparently intended to be deleterious to 
faculty collective bargaining. Under that regime, the full-time, non-tenure track (FTNTT) 
faculty, which was not unionized, was expanded substantially.  
Summary 
 Little Big Town, Industry State, and Bright Lights University constitute a diverse 
group of research sites, with some of their differences, such as geographic location and 
control intended by design. Little Big Town is a state university that is set in a small city 
in an otherwise rural region; Industry State is also a public university but is set in a 
considerably smaller population center (although one might characterize it as a suburb of 
a metropolitan area); and Bright Lights University, an independent university, is the 
epitome of an urban institution. Another important difference among the three lies in their 
distinct historic missions. Little Big Town is the product of frequent organizational 
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revision over the course of many decades and has a comparatively expansive mission 
statement (e.g., high quality instruction, affordability, civic and environmental 
conscientiousness, and service to state, national, and global needs). Industry State is the 
product of fewer dynamic transformations by comparison, and its mission was at least 
more constrained in that a heavier emphasis was placed on service to the region in its 
mission statement. Bright Lights University has grown into a comprehensive university 
while touting its longstanding reputation as a professional school from its early days, and 
its mission might be characterized as the most focused as a result (e.g., innovation, 
adherence to historic professional focus alongside the liberal arts). Finally, financial 
situations differed substantially. Little Big Town University is enduring particularly 
challenging times, having reduced faculty positions through both full-time retirements 
and reductions in part-time rehires (see Table 1). Industry State has maintained steady 
enrollments and appropriations with regular, if modest, increases in tuition and state 
funds. Bright Lights University is entering an ambitious enrollment growth phase, which 
participants linked to a major faculty expansion plan. 
 Despite these notable differences, each of these universities also shares important 
similarities. Each is committed to education at the baccalaureate and master’s level, each 
offers a mix of liberal arts and professional curricular components, and each of the 
universities describes itself first and foremost in terms of its instructional mission. 
Therefore, while the three sites’ environments are diverse in many ways, the work and 
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 This section begins by describing the different types of faculty appointments 
found among the research sites. It then proceeds to map the hiring process onto the 
organizational chart and describe the roles carried out by the various personnel involved 
in faculty hiring.  
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 Types of faculty appointments. 
 Among the three study sites I found three major structural types of faculty, from a 
hiring perspective: part time non-tenure track (PTNTT), full time non-tenure track 
(FTNTT), and tenure track (TT). Part time tenure track positions were not available in 
any of the three settings in this study. Each of the three appointment types I found also 
encompassed subcategories that are important to describe. 
 Part time non-tenure track appointments. 
 One important consideration at the outset is what it means to be a part-time 
faculty member and how the appropriateness of that nomenclature is assessed. As noted 
earlier, IPEDS, the Department of Education (DOE) database that observes full-time and 
part-time status, leaves the parameters of that distinction entirely in the hands of the 
reporting institution. During the data collection phase of this study, the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) issued guidance on how to count per-course faculty hours toward eligibility 
for university health plans under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(colloquially known as the Affordable Care Act, or the ACA) (Affordable Care Act alert, 
2014). The IRS guidance provides a much more holistic picture of contingent faculty 
labor than credit-hour assessments alone. However, any future application of that 
guidance to DOE data remains speculative.  
 In the absence of more sophisticated instruction on full-time, part-time data 
reporting from the DOE, it is unclear exactly how the administrators responsible for 
collecting and reporting this data made such assessments, and the degree to which 
reported data on part-time status (and thus full-time status off the tenure track) is 
equivalent and comparable across university sites. Because the study sites are all 
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unionized, however, the union policies and faculty handbook policies may provide at 
least some insight as to what could be considered a normative application of the part-time 
faculty designation. 
 Only one of the university sites’ faculty union contracts and faculty handbooks 
clearly distinguished part-time and full-time instructional faculty in a manner besides 
using those self-evident terms. The one that made such a distinction explained it solely in 
terms of credit hours, which is to say classroom hours. Twelve credit hours of instruction 
(which typically amounts to teaching four three-credit courses in a single semester) was 
considered full-time, whereas a courseload of between one and 11 credit hours was 
considered part-time. Hours spent preparing courses, preparing for class, evaluating 
student work, holding office hours or otherwise speaking with students outside of class, 
attending mandatory meetings, and other work are not counted in this estimate of time 
worked. In practice, all three universities reserved the term part-time for use in 
referencing instructors on per-course contracts. 
 Describing the groups in each study site to whom the part-time faculty label 
adheres is a problematic exercise for multiple reasons. First, the U.S. Department of 
Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) does not report 
data on either the academic disciplines in which individual institutions employ part-time 
faculty or the course levels they are hired to teach. Additionally, part-time faculty data, 
like all other IPEDS data, are reported for the fall semester only, and this snapshot may or 
may not provide a good indication of part-time faculty employment throughout the full 
academic year. Finally, in attempting to compare race and ethnicity data across 
institutions one may notice substantial differences in the “Race Unknown” population. In 
129 
 
Little Big Town University this group represented over 20 percent of the whole, whereas 
in Industry State University not a single faculty member was reported with unknown 
race. With these caveats in mind, data on the three study sites do allow some insights as 
to the character of the part-time instructional faculties in the fall 2013 semester (the most 
recent available). 
 Bright Lights University’s part-time instructional workforce in the fall of 2013 
consisted of a roughly even 50 percent women, whereas Little Big Town (55 percent) and 
Industry State (57 percent) relied more heavily on women part-time instructors. Given the 
understanding that the reported population of White faculty is potentially understated in 
some cases, one can conclude that approximately 75 percent or more of part-time 
instructors at Little Big Town were White, with Bright Lights (85 percent or more) and 
Industry State (95 percent) coming in confidently higher. Challenges noted above 
precluded analysis of whether part-time faculty of color were overrepresented within one 
gender category or the other. 
Three distinctions should be made within the category of PTNTT faculty 
appointments: non-regular, regular, and separate program part time appointments. 
 Non-regular versus regular part-time. 
 Non-regular part-time faculty, known in at least one setting as “occasional,” are 
instructors of least status. Like other part-timers, they are hired on a per-course, per 
semester basis. However, they are distinct from regular part-time faculty by the lesser 
continuity and duration of their service. In some settings, union contracts delineate 
rewards for part-time faculty who have achieved seniority (e.g., retention of courses; 
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regular course loads; prohibitions of non-renewal if the department also appoints non-
regular faculty). Joan, a department chair at Little Big Town explains the difference in 
her university: 
At the very bottom of this [hierarchy] are the occasional part-timers, and these are 
people who are hired with one, maybe two courses, if they’re lucky, once in a 
while and depending on need. These are often either very, very young PhDs who 
are writing the dissertation, or very, very old scholars who are ready to retire or 
already retired and are trying to add a bit more [income]. Then, the level above 
here is the regular part-timers, and these are part-timers that are protected by the 
union contract. Because, if you taught as a part-timer a certain type of course, you 
should be given the first chance to teach the same course in the future. So, these 
are part-timers, generally, who teach at least one class per semester if not two. It 
doesn’t mean they’re very rich because of that, but they’re guaranteed a certain 
amount of money pretty much every semester.   
In practical terms, hiring officers across research sites, typically department chairs 
and assistant chairs, also expressed strong preference for renewal of part-time faculty 
instructors over reopening the hiring process. For example, Ted, an associate dean, 
explained the reward structure for part-time faculty there: 
Well, surprisingly, a lot of our part-time labor force has been here as almost like a 
tenure thing.  We’ve had a lot of part-timers who’ve been here for a very long 
time and so we’ve had to try […] to keep hiring part-timers even when there is not 
necessarily in a moment need to do so […]. At this university, we’re able to fund 
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part-timers either through a college, or we have a unit that needs online 
instructors. So, I’ll often try to pressure a unit to put a course in an online format. 
Will, a department chair at Bright Lights University made his similar preferences clear: 
There’s a contract that the part-time faculty [negotiated] six years ago? Something 
like that. So we have some requirements: we’re required to offer some faculty 
sections based on their length of service, the number of credits that they’ve taught 
here and whether or not they taught the previous semester. So some, I would say 
[20 percent of them] we’re required to offer a section to in any given semester. 
[…] Which is, from a department chair’s point of view, it’s fine with me, because 
we know them. We know that they do a great job. So we’re happy to have, you 
know, it hasn’t been a burden to have that requirement. 
The notion of developing and maintaining a reliable pool of part-time faculty was 
especially important to department-level administrators, whose time was most heavily 
taxed by the part-time faculty hiring process. Faculty unions simply codified 
longstanding departmental practice in creating seniority clauses for part-time faculty. 
Related to part-time seniority, department chairs across research sites went further 
in bemoaning both the lack of professional development and community building that 
they had been able to accomplish with their part-time faculty. For example, Will noted, 
“We hire 8 to 10 new adjuncts a year, I’d say, here [at Bright Lights]. So the issue is, how 
do you mentor them? How do you, you know, some of them don’t have teaching 
experience. And that’s what I’m really concerned with.” Rob, a former associate chair 
shared a similar view: 
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At least in my unit, the burden is not only in vetting [part-time faculty], but 
actually, hopefully, getting them to the point where they can be effective teachers. 
You know, we typically don’t have any trouble finding somebody with the 
knowledge or the skill base, but they do not have the experience to—you know, if 
you remember back taking classes, you obviously sat there as a student, not as a 
faculty to the syllabi and the grading and the objectives. You never thought a 
whole lot about them, other than the faculty member presented it. […] We need to 
make sure [new part-time faculty] do not get in trouble while they’re in the 
middle of the course, because often the recovery becomes extraordinarily difficult 
to do. 
Chairs viewed the relative lack of professional development opportunities, even locally, 
for part-time faculty as inhibitory factors affecting pedagogic effectiveness and stability 
in part-time workforces.  
Exceptions to the comparative lack of professional development and community 
building for adjunct faculty typically stemmed from special initiatives and accreditation 
requirements. For instance, Tony, a department chair in education at Industry State 
explained: 
So for instance, the special ed program just went almost all online. They worked 
for two years with their adjuncts to build courses online—with the full-timers—to 
implement, and their part-time people are all doing online and face-to-face. But 
it’s been a community. They have special professional development opportunities 
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for the adjuncts. So when we have [National Council for Accreditation of Teacher 
Education] or any visits like that, the adjuncts are part of us. 
While accreditors in some professions may have effectively incorporated part-time 
instructors into their standards and trainings, others have shown explicit concern that 
part-timers account for too much of a given department’s instruction. As Howard, a 
department chair in engineering at Little Big Town explained, this presents a conundrum: 
We were recently quite surprised, or lucky, in finding two or three adjuncts for our 
Electrical Engineering program that have the necessary skills. They’re all faculty 
from other institutions, mostly retired. And so, we have part-time adjunct support 
that almost doubles the number of hours that our faculty’s providing. When you 
get this number of 50 percent last semester, last year, we were actually delivering 
eleven courses with adjuncts and twelve by regular faculty. When the accreditor 
looked at this number, he indicated that that was a grave problem for us. […] A 
deficiency—I think more than one deficiency are actually grounds for not 
granting accreditation to a program. 
Chairs found themselves in a tough situation, in that they both wanted to invest more 
time, effort, and resources in cultivating an increasingly effective cadre of part-time 
instructors. However, there were clear disincentives, such as accreditation standards, for 
growing the part-time workforce. Part-time faculty were also not able to serve in 
committee, advising, and other important roles that full-time faculty could. 
 Alternatively, the cost of part-time faculty was widely acknowledged to be low. 
Joan, a department chair in the college of arts and sciences at Little Big Town explained: 
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And by the way part timers are not really expensive, and they always make 
money for the university. Always.  So, it’s not even a financial reason [if the 
department chair is denied a request to hire part-time faculty member].  No matter 
what—whatever the dean wants to say—it’s not really a financial reason. 
Joan’s statement says as much about the political climate as the financial one at Little Big 
Town University. Even if the chair and the dean disagree about whether the benefits of 
some small faculty wage savings outweighs the costs, both sides would readily 
acknowledge the budgetary fact that part-time faculty compensation can be offset by the 
revenue from relatively few students. 
 Separate program part-time. 
 All three of the research sites also employed part-time faculty to execute separate 
educational enterprises. For example, Little Big Town University offered a year-round 
online education program, which administrators viewed as both a service to degree 
completion rates, as well as a smart market-based initiative (function as a revenue 
center). The online program had no standing faculty, and it employed an executive 
director (and a small staff; non-academic) in lieu of a dean. The executive director 
coordinated with deans in order to build an approved, complementary curriculum that the 
traditional academy had come to view largely as a mutually beneficial relationship. 
During a time of deep budget cuts and faculty retrenchment, the online program offered a 
second chance for departments and colleges that no longer had the instructional capacity 




We used to allow [the full-time faculty] to teach overloads, which gives them 
extra money in teaching online and then in this case, units that need part-time 
instruction [get help] by pushing [their costs] over there. It brings more courses 
and makes more available courses for this [non-traditional student] population.  
So one of the strange things in terms of process is that [in the colleges] we have 
budgets but they aren’t at all related to any revenue that we bring in. So, we’ve 
been cutting part-time faculty and a lot of our faculties, and why are you doing 
this? It’s actually harming revenue. But the only thing we control really [and that 
our performance] can be measured upon is not revenue but only cost. In our 
online unit, they’re actually run a little bit different.  […] We’re still in control 
academically of what they put up in our college, so they can’t just go out and hire 
part-time faculty on their own.  They have to ask us if it’s okay to put these 
classes up in the college and then also work with the departmental units, but they 
have a little bit more flexibility over their budget, in part because they are 
responsible not only for their cost but their revenue. And so, we get budget cuts; 
they get revenue targets. It’s a little bit different in terms of what the incentive 
structure is, but we work pretty collaboratively with them. 
At Industry State University, both a commitment to public service (e.g., teacher 
training, nursing, etc.) and the market-based pursuit of revenue contributed to robust 
evening and off-site programs. Unlike the online program at Little Big Town, Industry 
State’s nontraditional programs were largely overseen by the standing faculty, although 
they were rarely staffed by them (i.e., mostly part-time faculty). At least part of the 
reasoning behind the integration of the evening programs under the auspices of the 
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standing faculty was also regulatory. The disciplinary accrediting bodies for these 
professional programs enforced strict standards. As a result of this regulation, 
administrators at multiple levels valued the service of the standing faculty to evening 
programs. The distance to instruction sites, such as schools and health centers, as well as 
the challenges of reconciling schedules were inhibiting factors for standing faculty 
moonlighting as part time instructors in evening programs.  
In summary, part-time faculty appointments took any of three basic forms across 
the study sites. Occasional, or part-time faculty members without seniority, had no 
reasonable expectation of work at the university from semester to semester. Regular part-
time faculty constituted a core pool of part-time labor upon which department chairs 
continually relied for instruction, and in return for that reliability faculty unions were able 
to bargain for some additional rights. Finally, separate program part-time faculty were 
sometimes full-time and tenure track faculty members moonlighting in summer or 
evening programs as part-time instructors, though in other cases they were not. These 
programs constituted an administratively separate unit in all of the universities, and the 
degree to which they consulted or relied upon the traditional academic departments 
varied considerably. 
 Full-time non-tenure track appointments. 
 Full-time non-tenure track appointments comprised the appointment type that was 
least translatable across study sites. In two study sites, Bright Lights University and Little 
Big Town University, mid-level administrators (e.g., associate deans, deans, and 
associate provosts) enjoyed wide latitude to construct FTNTT job titles, responsibilities, 
and pay. At Industry State University, by contrast, a faculty union contract severely 
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restricted the use of full-time faculty off the tenure track. In the sites where these 
positions were common, an array of clinical, Visiting-Professor-of-, and -In-Residence 
job titles had proliferated over time. As one dean, Matt, noted, FTNTT salaries on his 
campus were the only ones not subject to collectively bargained pay steps (based on 
seniority and promotion) and were thus a point of both organizational flexibility and 
personal consternation:  
[FTNTT] faculty [pay] is completely unsystematic right now, and I’d say we’re 
trying to figure out how to systematize it better, because I always have [FTNTT] 
faculty members in my office, often saying, “I’d like a raise. I’d like my salary 
adjusted.” […] I’m constantly negotiating with these people, and mostly just 
saying, “I can’t do anything for you,” which makes me feel bad, and them feel not 
so great. So, I have to try to pull off this tricky thing of saying, “We’re really 
happy you’re here. We really value your contribution, I cannot pay you.” 
Matt went on to explain he usually has five or six of these difficult conversations each 
year, typically coming “in a wave” in June, as FTNTT faculty contracts are renewed. By 
comparison, he found FTNTT pay irregularity posed a unique challenge to him in two 
ways, as opposed to collectively bargained faculty pay. First, it resulted in a small but 
important imposition on his time during the final month of the fiscal year. Second, and in 
his mind more importantly, it consistently harmed both the faculty members’ morale and 
his own.  
Differences in FTNTT appointments hinged on three points: duration of term, 
renewability, and job responsibilities. Will, a department chair at Bright Lights 
University explained the role of the least status FTNTT faculty in his university: 
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We do have one small class of faculty who are full-time, non-tenure track, one 
year only—limited term. And they cannot be renewed. Those folks we pull from 
our [part-time] ranks, okay? So we have two faculty members who were [part-
time], to whom we’ve offered full-time positions. And we’re happy for them. 
Problem is, now they’re going to go back to [part-time status]. But it gives them 
full-time experience and gives them better benefits and stuff, at least for that year. 
It is important to note that hiring FTNTT faculty on a one-year basis was a controversial 
issue, as it could easily turn into an exploitative relationship between the university and 
faculty. Industry State University had a faculty union that had successfully opposed such 
hires beyond a two-year duration, because at that point, they argued, the position would 
be proven either sufficiently valuable to maintain or expendable. Brent, an associate 
provost explained the underlying principles of FTNTT faculty there:  
Other than [clinical faculty whose responsibilities have to do with student 
supervision in the workplace rather than classroom instruction], all of our full-
time faculty are the same. They come in at the same terms, they have the same 
requirements, same teaching loads, same responsibilities, etc. 
The clinical faculty at Bright Lights University were one example of least status FTNTT 
faculty. Another included both the clinical faculty and the rare one-year renewable 
faculty members at Industry State.  
There was also a class of one-year renewable FTNTT faculty at Little Big Town 
University, which was closely managed by deans and provosts because of the “just 
cause” rights the faculty union had successfully bargained into the contract. Just cause 
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faculty were those who had been hired on one-year, renewable contracts for six 
consecutive years. After six consecutive years, the contract said, the faculty member had 
de facto proven themselves indispensable, and they would be provided job protections 
that were only less robust than tenure protections in that in situations of financial 
exigency the just cause faculty members would be laid off before the tenure track faculty. 
The just cause policy may have derived from American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP) advocacy against the growth in FTNTT positions across the nation in 
the 1970s and 1980s. The AAUP’s report, On Full-Time Non-Tenure Track Appointments 
(see Kreiser, 2006) makes clear the group’s position that full-time faculty should, at the 
conclusion of a probationary period, not have lesser job protections than tenure line 
faculty. The just cause policy would seem to support that principle. In practice, as Joan, a 
department chair at Little Big Town noted, just cause functioned differently: 
[Just cause faculty are] definitely treated as every other tenured faculty [member], 
because they’re here for life, unless their contract gets retrenched. In that case it’s 
a broader discussion within the members of the department, because if someone is 
in a one-year contract that has been repeated, once you get to year number four, 
generally there is a stronger discussion around [rehiring]. And very often no 
matter what the [department’s] recommendation is, the administration will simply 
stop the contract period at year number four, because they know that the time is 
almost up for the person to become just cause. And so after four years, for 
instance, the person will not be hired because the contract is over, and then two 
years later we start over [rehiring for] one year, one year, one year, one year, one 
year, until they are at four or five, and that’s it. So, there is this game played with 
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these people, and that’s why very few of them are just cause, because they 
generally became just cause like 20 years ago, when there wasn’t this focus about 
cutting down on the budget.  
In one way or another, across all three study sites, one-year renewable FTNTT faculty 
lines had become a problematic manner of hiring. 
 The preponderance of FTNTT faculty at Bright Lights and Industry State 
Universities were employed under renewable three-year contracts. As opposed to the one-
year, non-renewable hires, these positions were structured similarly to tenure track 
positions, with some key differences. First, these positions were filled through 
considerable search processes. In fact, while the policy requirements for national searches 
for these positions were often waived through a dean’s office, the timelines for 
advertising, searching, and selecting among candidates for faculty search committees 
ranged from roughly three months (a summer search) to a year. 
 A second difference between the three-year contract and tenure track faculty 
regarded their job responsibilities. Tenure track faculty were responsible for producing 
some kind of scholarly work in addition to teaching and instruction (e.g., scholarly 
articles, academic books, art, films, performances, etc.), whereas most of the FTNTT 
faculty would be evaluated entirely based upon their teaching evaluations and service 
productivity (sometimes including—at least in one study site—service on appointment, 
promotion, and tenure committees). This general description of FTNTT responsibilities 
seems intuitive enough, but as Ryan, a dean at Bright Lights University explained, the 
fungible nature when one gets into the details of the agreements with this group really 
shows it represents a uniquely diverse, flexible amalgam of people: 
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[Many of the] full time faculty members without tenure that in our program are 
Artist-in-Residence of some sort, and I think the idea of having artists in residence 
is that you’ve got somebody who has an active professional career as a writer. So, 
we have writers in residence—or as a film maker, or as a playwright, or as a 
theater director, and the idea is to have people who are working in those 
professions in a significant way come in and share their experience with the 
students. They do that for several years, and then they go back to being working 
professionals. I think that’s how it’s supposed to work, but it doesn’t work that 
way here. So, we hire these folks often through regular job searches, so regular 
academic job searches, which we would [use to] hire for a tenure track faculty 
member, which I think, sets a whole range of particular expectations, and then 
those people just become regular, principally teaching faculty. So, we’re not 
expecting them to do the same kind of scholarly or creative work that they would 
do if they were a tenure track faculty member. Part of the reason we hired them is 
because they have this active professional life, so there’s this strange 
contradiction there. And then, they become, kind of, regular teaching faculty 
members, and they get treated differently in different departments. In some they 
do service; in some they vote on departmental matters; in some they don’t. I 
mean, it’s a mess. Then we have this whole other group called Distinguished 
Artist-in-Residence or Distinguished Writers-in-Residence. Those folks are kind 
of people in the top of their field, like really well recognized writers, and really 
well recognized artists who teach maybe one class a year, or two classes a year, 
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and they provide, kind of, marketing for our institution, and that’s a whole other 
category.  
The flexibility of the renewable three-year appointments made them attractive in different 
ways to multiple audiences. Department chairs, deans, and provosts could craft a role to 
meet their needs, and they could find creative ways to make a role appealing to high 
profile individuals looking for a nuanced set of responsibilities. 
 Tenure track appointments. 
 Tenure track hiring across all three study sites followed longstanding norms in 
American higher education. That is, following a probationary period of six years 
(possibly accumulated across multiple universities), academic departments would have 
the opportunity to evaluate and possibly grant substantial life-long job protections to 
faculty on the tenure track. Tenure was typically accompanied by a promotion, from 
assistant professor to associate professor, and eventually a second promotion could be 
possible, from associate professor to professor. The job protections conferred by tenure 
include rights of due process that prevent the release of faculty members at the will of the 
president for reasons other than financial exigency. These job protections, alongside 
disciplinary norms, resulted in tenure track faculty positions being viewed as of core 
importance. Tenure track appointments were implicitly the standard against which other 
faculty appointment types are compared by participants in all three study sites. Table 2, 
on page 143 describes the full array of faculty appointment types. 
Three overarching types of faculty appointments emerged from the data collected 




Faculty Appointment Types and Distinguishing Features 
Type Subtype Description/Definition 
Part-Time 
 
Per-course contracted instruction 
 
Non-
Regular/Occasional No formal expectation of rehire 
 
Regular 
Collectively bargained right of first refusal for 
instruction of courses based on seniority and 
satisfactory evaluation record; dependent upon 
course offering and within formal part-time faculty 
maximum credit hour limits 
 
Separate Program 
Ad-hoc employment based on separate unit hiring 






Non-continuous contracts of a duration of not less 
than one year 
 
Non-Renewable 
One-year contract; regional search, often 
abbreviated in duration; explicitly temporary, with 




One-year contract; national search requirement 
may be waived with dean approval; full search; 
opportunity for rehire determined based on 
teaching evaluations, enrollment demand, 





Typically three-year contract; national, full search; 
opportunity for rehire determined based on 
teaching evaluations, enrollment demand, 




Continuous employment with protections 
 
Assistant Professor Probationary status (six years); full search 
 
Associate Professor Tenured; full search 
 
Professor Tenured; full search 
and tenure track (TT). Each of the three overarching types was also attended by subtypes 
that were distinguishable relative to one another in important ways. Many of these faculty 
types became preferred under certain conditions by decision makers or otherwise profited 
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from decision systems in terms of their proliferation. In the next section I describe the 
basic steps by which faculty hiring occurred in practice. 
The Process of Hiring Faculty. 
 Among all three study sites, I found two basic faculty hiring processes: one for 
tenure-track and FTNTT faculty—with little to no distinction between the processes 
yielding those hires—and one for part-time faculty. These processes were fundamentally 
separate and served different organizational purposes. A second context that is important 
to remember from chapter three is that part-time faculty who have worked in the past 
must be rehired each semester, with no formal expectation of future employment. 
However, the data in this study revealed rehiring to be important to the cultivation of a 
stable part-time faculty workforce and procedurally different from initial hiring. I note 
those differences throughout. 
Tenure track and FTNTT hiring: from the bottom up. 
 The data revealed two ways in which tenure track and FTNTT faculty hiring 
proceeds in a bottom-up fashion: position requests and selection and approval. Position 
requests moving from a department to the dean and being passed from the dean to the 
provost often represented the first response of participants when asked how faculty hiring 
occurs. That is, in consultation with faculty department chairs would identify either a 
shortcoming in the department as currently staffed (e.g., not meeting enrollment 
demand), or they would identify an opportunity of value (e.g., offering coursework in an 
important new area of the discipline). Typically, chairs would identify needs in 
consultation with the faculty, but it would then be their responsibility to persuasively 
relay a request to hire a faculty member upward to the dean’s office. 
145 
 
 From there, the dean may halt the request and refuse to present it to the provost 
for final approval, the dean may approve and forward on to the provost, or more often 
than not the dean may ask questions (constructively or skeptically) before determining 
which stance to take. Ted, an associate dean at Little Big Town University explained his 
philosophy as the point of contact for department chairs on position requests: 
[I’ll advise chairs either] “Right now, strike while the iron is hot,” or “Hold up for 
a couple of months. Things might look better.” […] It’s kind of like another dean, 
a friend of mine in [another college], always talks about. For the end of the fiscal 
year, he would have files of projects of how to spend—[equipment needs] and this 
and that. It’s kind of like that, where we know where the real outrageous gaps are 
in our units. And so, any time there’s going to be an opportunity, we‘re ready to 
go. Kind of informally, the dean does that—we’ve talked through rankings of 
what the highest need is. So they’re sort of ready to go when the call comes 
through. 
 After meeting with the provost’s approval, a position request typically went 
through a series of perfunctory oversight procedures. For example, position requests at 
Little Big Town University were filled out using an online form, which then required the 
signatures of the dean and the provost but also the college human resources liaison, the 
university human resources officer, the chief finance officer, and the president. Given the 
extraordinary budget constraints at the time of data collection, the nature of the 
president’s oversight of the process was far less perfunctory than it would otherwise have 
been. It took a presidential exception to open even a replacement position. However, 
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under normal circumstances the substantive final approval came from the provost, and 
that could be said of the other study sites as well. 
 Given approval of the position opening, for both tenure track and FTNTT 
appointments, the department chair proceeded by identifying a search committee of 
faculty members in keeping with the local policies and traditions for representation and 
diversity. A human resources officer would then provide training on compliance with 
applicable laws and university policies. The dean’s office would work with the search 
committee and the department chair to finalize a position description and advertisement 
language and to post notice of the opening. The search committee would receive 
application materials and select several candidates (usually three to five) to bring to 
campus for a day of interviews and demonstrations of teaching and possibly research 
colloquially known as a job talk. During the campus visit the candidates would also 
interview with the dean or an associate dean and the provost or an associate provost. 
Some agreement on a rank order of preferred candidates would be sought among all 
interviewing parties, and then the search committee would move as swiftly as possible to 
make an offer.  
 The delegation of responsibility for oversight of full-time faculty hiring processes 
to the provost was normative across all three study sites, but it is also important to note 
the nuanced character of the bottom-up flow of position requests at Industry State. The 
president there, Fred, had implemented one additional step for all full-time faculty hires 
of a roughly 30 minute final stage phone call with him, one on one. He guessed he does 
18-20 of these calls each year, and this is how he described his role: 
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What I say to them on the phone is, look, you’re highly recommended. I wouldn’t 
be talking to you if you couldn’t do the job. But I want to tell you how I see the 
university, and where the university is going, and to see if you fit into that. And 
that’s why I do it. I talk about the culture of the university. I talk about the work 
ethic. I talk about being student centered—I don’t talk very much about their 
academic credentials, because I know them. They’ve been tested, they’ve been 
vetted out […]. It really connects with the faculty that the president has an 
investment in the institution, and it makes a big difference. 
Even here, where Fred has carved out a unique additional role for himself in the process, 
the purpose was not to provide an additional level of oversight (although he had recalled 
two occasions in which candidates had performed so poorly he had recommended the 
search committee to go with their number two choice). Rather, the goal of the president 
generally remained perfunctory with regard to the basic approval of the hire but 
additionally informative toward the candidate who was nearly certain to receive an offer. 
 From position requests through selection and approval, those processes originated 
with department chairs and flowed upward to central administration. These processes 
were widely considered traditional, and some participants, like Joan, a department chair 
at Little Big Town, described them as “ideal.” These processes varied remarkably little 
between tenure track and FTNTT faculty appointments. 
Tenure track and FTNTT hiring: from the top down. 
In several ways, tenure track and FTNTT hiring also emerged as a top-down 
process. That is, provosts and deans shaped department chairs’ understanding of hiring 
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contexts by conveying: funds, market information, and operational strategies and 
priorities. In most cases they also provided enrollment data as a measure of existing 
faculty productivity against which they could gauge the financial value of adding new 
positions. However, department chairs who participated in this study had also begun to 
develop their own redundant and supplementary data systems. The consistently unique 
contributions to departments from above, then, potentially included funding, market 
assessments as to whether additional faculty members would prove fiscally sustainable 
and beneficial, and also messages about the alignment of proposed new positions with 
strategic goals and priorities. 
Once again, university presidents played somewhat idiosyncratic roles in 
initiating the flow of these resources from the top of the organizational chart. Recall the 
previous discussion about the hiring freeze orchestrated by the president of Little Big 
Town. The message in terms of strategic priority was clear, and that was to say the 
university would focus on cutting expenses almost exclusively. At Industry State, the 
president played a much more modest top-down role than a bottom-up role. He neither 
opposed the hiring of new faculty nor stated at the outset what the character of those hires 
should be. He was, however, ultimately responsible for ensuring the university budget 
effectively funded faculty labor costs, and the responsibilities for executing faculty 
compensation was funneled down through the provost, dean, and department chair levels 
of the university. Thus, information flowing from top-level management to department 
chairs also influenced faculty hiring. 
The president of Bright Lights University, who I have not yet discussed, inhabited 
the highest level of a considerably top-down faculty hiring program. He interpreted the 
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university’s strategic plan in such a way that he decided to embark on a multi-year full-
time faculty hiring project, which would add approximately six to eight new full-time 
positions each year over five or more years. He delegated execution of that strategic 
priority to the provost, and the provost worked with the deans to develop a program of 
interdisciplinary faculty cluster hiring that would be overlaid atop the bottom-up position 
request, selection, and approval process. This program would account for at least four of 
the total new positions in each year of the planned full-time faculty growth. Greg, a dean 
at Bright Lights elaborated on the initiative: 
And [cluster hiring] is happening at other places. There was a piece last fall in the 
Chronicle, an entire ad about it. You know, there’s just a lot of talk these days 
about interdisciplinarity and the need to promote diverse thinking, in terms of 
cognitive diversity. One way to do that [is to get] faculty from different 
disciplines working together, teaching together, and get students having the 
opportunity to work with students and faculty across disciplines. So, a cluster hire 
then identifies a theme or content area that people from several disciplines might 
contribute to. […] The position is not so different [from other full-time positions]. 
It’s just got an additional element to it. So, it will still say, your appointment is in 
what is now the Department of [X], in the School of [Y]. In addition, you will be 
a fellow in [cluster program Z].  
In each instance, whether it’s the flow (or lack thereof) of position funding, or the 
identification of market opportunities and strategic priorities embodied in Bright Lights’ 
cluster hiring initiative, central administrators influenced full-time faculty hiring in 
important top-down ways. 
150 
 
Part-time hiring: from the bottom up. 
Part-time faculty hiring was primarily a bottom-up process across all three study 
sites. It was also a strikingly more circumscribed process, rising only to the level of the 
dean, for only perfunctory oversight. Provided departments had enrollment-based need, 
deans sought to facilitate the hiring of these low-cost, low-commitment faculty. Some of 
the situations that precipitated understaffing for classes included unplanned staffing 
vacancies, like illness, departure, sabbatical, and perhaps even an ill-timed retirement. 
Most commonly, though, all three universities maintained regular pools of part-time 
faculty (people with informal expectations for rehire, often for the same or similar 
courses from semester to semester) just to meet well-anticipated and accurately projected 
instructional demand. Kyle, the provost at Little Big Town explained his role succinctly: 
“The provost doesn’t get involved in that at all. I don’t even sign off on part-time help.” 
Will, a department chair at Bright Lights University explained the process from 
his perspective: 
Well, I have, as the department chair, the authority to hire adjuncts. Okay? So, I 
don’t need any right—I don’t need to go the dean or to anybody. I mean we have 
sections that we have to fill, and hiring that adjunct is under my authority, but 
often times I’ll rely on the expertise of [an associate chair]. So let’s say we have a 
section of [Course X] that’s open. So then we say, okay we need to find adjunct 
faculty. If we don’t have enough people whom we already know and have 
experience with, then we’ll say, “Okay, does anybody [in this department] know 
anybody who would be good?”And then we’ll you know, look at their CVs and 
then chat with them. Not a heavy-duty formal interview but at least, you know, 
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some kind of familiarity with them. And then they join us. So it’s not like that 
decision needs to go any higher than my office. 
Due to the budgeting approach at Bright Lights University, the faculty member Kyle 
hired would be compensated out of the dean’s budget, but when the enrollment need was 
clear, Kyle operated with full confidence he would receive the funding. 
 By contrast, the hiring of a part-time faculty member at Little Big Town 
sometimes took extra effort on the part of the dean’s office in order to facilitate the 
request, and sometimes, due to the budget constraints passed on to them by the provost, 
they were simply unable to facilitate even well-reasoned part-time hires. This was 
frustrating, because as Ted, an associate dean there noted, the financial proposition of 
part-time instruction virtually always represented an opportunity to generate revenue: 
One of the things that’s really difficult and problematic is and one of the reasons 
why we’ve had, we’ve relied on adjuncts less than others is we’ve had to make 
budget cuts, and it’s one of the only places we really had a lot of discretion. So 
even though, in a broad sense, universities rely on adjuncts because it’s incredibly 
profitable—the cost of labor is low, and they usually teach classes that have large 
number of students—here, we’ve had to make budget cuts. And to this point, 
there’s been no real stomach to lay off more expensive faculty and permanent 
faculty, so that’s been the only place we can really find [places to cut]. 
Ted did go on to talk about one way in which he’s been able to facilitate some critical 
part-time faculty hiring at times, but as I explain in the next section, that opportunity 
emerged as a top-down process for hiring part-time faculty, not a bottom-up process. 
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 Across all three study sites, oversight of part-time faculty hiring was conducted 
on a perfunctory basis and only at the middle management level of administration (i.e., 
dean’s office personnel, or in the absence of a dean structure an associate provost). 
Financial distress combined with central budgeting models resulted in dean’s office 
personnel often being unable to facilitate the hiring of part-time personnel either as freely 
as they would have preferred, or as made good sense in their view for the budget. 
However, hiring decision processes for part-time faculty were largely bottom-up and 
were remarkably simpler and easier across all study sites than those for full-time faculty. 
 A notable exception to the perfunctory character of dean oversight in part-time 
hiring came when a part-time faculty member received poor student evaluations. Such an 
occurrence was often noted by deans, who then responded by investigating the situation 
with department chairs and perhaps even blocking the rehire of the faculty member. 
Greg, a dean at Bright Lights University shared the following example: 
Just in June, in one department there were three part time faculty members with 
somewhat problematic course evaluations from the spring. I spoke with the Chair, 
he looked into them. His feeling coming back was that one of the three should not 
be rehired, one should be rehired but needs some counseling and guidance (and 
that he would do that), and then in the third case there were two [course] sections. 
One wasn’t so strong, the other was very strong, and the person has a long history 
of successful teaching, so it was fine to go ahead there. And I concurred in those 
decisions. 
Greg went on to provide some context for part-time faculty hiring processes by sharing 
information that was mostly consistent across all three faculty sites: “On the initial hire 
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phase, a CV and recommendation letters, and previous experience are crucial. At the 
rehire phase it really is pretty much the [student] course evaluation, unless other 
anecdotal information just comes to the Department Chair.” The one exception to the 
finding that given continued course demand part-time faculty might informally anticipate 
continued teaching opportunities was to be found at Industry State University, where 
part-time faculty members are subject to a mandatory classroom observation by the 
department chair each semester. This gave the dean one additional source of data, besides 
student evaluations, which could trigger an intervention against rehiring the instructor. 
 On the whole, though, deans provided only perfunctory oversight of part-time 
faculty hiring. Department chairs held greatest responsibility for those decisions, and they 
showed strong inclinations for rehiring as often as possible, versus conducting fresh 
searches. Melissa, a union official at Bright Lights University summed up the preference 
for rehiring part-time faculty: “[Department chairs] are hoping to rehire the adjunct to do 
the same thing again, or to do another course, because it's a big hassle to hire people.” 
This approach fits well as an example of the decision making concept of satisfice: 
selecting the first option that satisfies predetermined criteria. Rehires were typically the 
first available option to find instructors that had met the singular criterion of not having 
received a poor evaluation in the past. This central criterion for continued part-time 
employment, not of having performed remarkably well but of having avoided performing 
remarkably poorly, was distinct from criteria applied to full-time faculty both on and off 
the tenure track. Full-time faculty were assessed based on their accomplishments, not the 
absence of failures. 
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Part-time hiring: from the top down. 
Two examples of top-down hiring decision processes emerged with regard to 
part-time faculty. In the first instance, recall the comments in the previous section by 
Ted, the associate dean at Little Big Town University. He was often frustrated at having 
his hands tied by budget cuts in being able to facilitate the part-time faculty hiring 
requests of department chairs in his college. One avenue that was sometimes available to 
him in helping department chairs to staff the necessary courses was to help them find a 
part-time faculty member to teach that course through the university’s separate evening 
and online program. He explained:  
I had to cut a lot of part-time salary last year, and so one of the classes that fill to 
capacity every time is [Course X], because a lot of majors require it. We ended up 
putting all of our [Course X] classes at 5:30 pm or later so that we could get this 
[online] unit to pay for them. So, we didn’t have any [Course X] classes during 
the day, only because we have this university rule that for this other unit to pay 
for our class it had to be either online, or after 5:30 pm, or on the weekend. So 
we’re scheduling based upon this sort of arbitrary rules just to get around various 
budget issues, and it’s not really related to the needs of the student or anything, 
but it’s just a pure bureaucratic function. So it can be an odd situation that faculty 
find a little bit maddening, and I guess administrators [like me] do as well. 
The president, provost, and vice presidents of the university had identified evening and 
online education as one of very few growth areas into which they were willing to invest 
money from the shrinking budget, and thus they created the online unit as a revenue 
center and not just a cost center—a sharp divergence from the budget models employed 
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with academic units. Thus, top-level administrators influenced part-time faculty hiring for 
online courses by providing resources, hiring approval, and encouragement for growth. 
A second important top-down influence on part-time faculty hiring decisions 
could be seen in the compliance through the provost’s office at Industry State University 
with the 15 percent clause in the faculty contract. That is, the faculty union has bargained 
in a cap of 15 percent of course sections in any department being taught by part-time 
instructors (not including remedial education, and with some additional exemptions). 
Because the union would hold the university accountable at the level of the president for 
contract violations, the provost had been charged by the president to ensure compliance 
across departments with the cap on part-time instructors. The provost’s office approached 
the challenge of complying with the 15 percent rule while also meeting enrollment 
demand and abiding by course caps by generating and sharing enrollment data with 
department chairs. Thus, the provost’s office ensured compliance with faculty contracts 
across departments. 
The full-time, part-time divide. 
 To this point, I have described top-down and bottom-up decision processes for 
both part-time and full-time (inclusive of tenure track and FTNTT) faculty. I have not yet 
discussed the subject of faculty cross-over between part-time and full-time employment 
within the same institution. The boundary between full-time employment (whether on or 
off the tenure track) and part-time employment, was only rarely a porous one. Two 
avenues emerged from the data by which faculty might cross the divide.  
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First, tenure track and FTNTT faculty could become part-time faculty by 
resigning and seeking new employment on a part-time basis (e.g., retiring, or not 
renewing a FTNTT contract). These types of soft retirements for tenure-track faculty, or 
accommodation of FTNTT requests to scale back duties, were often viewed as an 
opportunity to retain experienced, well-evaluated instructors by department chairs. Thus, 
the rarity of these situations did not preclude organizational interest in accommodating 
them. Multiple department chairs at Little Big Town noted they had brought back 
formerly tenured faculty in their retirement to teach classes on a part-time basis. 
From the other side, part-time faculty were only rarely afforded the opportunity to 
make a shift into FTNTT or tenure-track employment. The most common of these rare 
events occurred when a department was able to make a case for hiring one FTNTT 
faculty member over multiple part-time faculty. Such arguments could be persuasive in 
cases of emergency, such as when a FTNTT or tenure-track faculty member would be 
unexpectedly unavailable. Another persuasive argument would include both an evidence-
based assertion that academic advisory and service requirements could not be achieved 
with a short-handed faculty and that an experienced, knowledgeable part-timer could fill 
the role on a temporary basis. These arrangements were typically only available for fixed 
lengths of one year (though in some cases policy included contingencies for a second 
year of emergency coverage). Following their stint as FTNTT faculty members, those 
who were previously employed on part-time terms would be required to return to those 
terms of employment. 
This study revealed two examples of exceptions to the challenging cultural barrier 
between part-time and full-time work. One was a faculty member at Bright Lights 
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University who had been able to move into a FTNTT position on a multi-year contract 
basis following her entry into the university as a part-time instructor. Another was 
Lauren, a tenured department chair at Little Big Town University. She began her story by 
explaining her entry into part-time faculty work as a moonlighting venture that she 
continued mainly for personal enjoyment. She continued: 
To be completely honest, I was addicted to the money I was making in industry. 
You can’t compare—I’m still not making what I was making back in the early 
nineties. But, like I said, one day the decision was made for me [and I was laid 
off]. Fortunately, a sabbatical replacement was advertised in a nearby small 
liberal arts college, and I took that. All the while I’m being advised by my 
colleagues here, at this university, who had been fighting for a new position for a 
number of years. So, the timing was just right. I was looking for a position, they 
were fighting for a position, so I took this full-time, one year, fixed length 
position [at the other college]. I knew with a pretty good guarantee the following 
year a tenure track position was going to be advertised at this institution. I mean, I 
couldn’t have planned it better myself. You know, I now had five years of 
experience including full-time. I had history at this institution. I worked with the 
department, so it really did fall into place. But still, with the full hiring process 
there was a national search. They brought on four candidates and reviewed them, 
but I got the position and never looked back. 
Lauren’s story revealed an exception to the hard and fast boundary between part-time and 
full-time faculty work. Yet, it depicts substantial difficulty in doing so. With four years of 
part-time experience on her campus plus industry experience, Lauren had to both gain 
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full-time experience elsewhere and compete with four other national finalists for a tenure 
track position before making the change to the tenure track at Little Big Town. 
A flow chart depicting top-down and bottom-up decision processes for full-time 
and part-time faculty hiring across university research sites can be seen in Figure 2, on 
page 158. In Figure 2, the line dividing the full-time and part-time side of the figure 
indicates the near impassibility between part-time and full-time faculty employment 
within the same university setting. The solid vertical arrows represent the consistent flow 
of the resources listed alongside them (e.g., position funding and the various types of 
information exchange discussed in this section). The hashed vertical arrows show the 
situational, or inconsistent, flow of those same resources. Finally, the curved arrows on 
the part-time side of the figure show the repetitive character of these processes in 
rehiring. 
In this section I shared a descriptive understanding of faculty hiring processes in 
unionized comprehensive universities. In short, as a process of decision making, full-time 
faculty hiring presents a more complex and resource-dependent proposition than part-
time faculty hiring (and rehiring) does. Full-time faculty hiring requires: a) more time, 
attention, funds, and information, b) from a greater number of personnel, c) at every level 
of the university organizational chart, whereas part-time faculty hiring requires few such 
resources. Importantly, the greater comparative draw of full-time faculty hiring on 
finances accounts for only part of the much more substantial investment universities 
make in those faculty members. In the next chapter, I unpack a theoretical understanding 
of faculty hiring processes in unionized comprehensive universities.
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Figure 2.  
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Chapter Five: A Grounded Theory of Faculty Hiring Processes in Unionized 
Comprehensive Universities 
In the previous chapter, I shared the descriptive findings of this study. In this 
chapter I explain the theoretical findings. In brief, administrators at all levels of the 
organizational chart (i.e., department chair, dean, and provost) follow a cycle of activities 
that results in both direct and indirect (or systemic), outcomes in faculty hiring. First, 
they scan the environments in which they are situated for possible risks to their work 
including faculty hiring. Second, they perceive risks, including risks of opportunity, from 
their own viewpoints. Third, and of central importance, they assert decision role changes 
in response to the risks they perceive. That is, they take action. Finally, they establish 
ownership of new decision responsibility. A visual model depicting the grounded theory 
appears in Figure 3, on page 161, and the structure of this chapter follows that of the 
model in moving from one analytic category to the next.  
The core category30 of the grounded theory I present, asserting role change, 
represents the point at which a decision maker’s cognitive perception of risk results in a 
behavioral response. Risk responses demonstrated pursuit of changed decision roles so as 
to either centralize decision control up the organizational chart, or to decentralize it 
downward. Therefore, risk is a key concept in this grounded theory and one that deserves 
revisiting. March (1994) initially explains risk in terms of rational choice decisions, for 
which the value and probability of consequence is weighed and compared across multiple 
alternative choices. Risk aversion for rational choice decisions thus refers to a decision 
                                                 
30 Recall from chapter three Holton’s (2007) explanation of a core category in grounded theory: “Its 
primary function is to integrate the theory and render it dense and saturated [and explains] how the main 
concern is continually processed or resolved […]” (p. 279). 
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maker’s devaluation of choices with a low probability of even the most favorable 
outcomes (March, 1994). This explains why many people choose not to play the lottery, 
but because decision makers in this study did not employ a measured analysis of either 
value or of probability in faculty hiring decisions the rational choice explanation is not of 
great use here.  
In rule following decisions, by contrast, March explains risk-taking as a personal 
trait, which my analysis shows to be more applicable to faculty hiring decisions: 
The average risk-taking propensity of higher-level managers appears to be 
somewhat higher than that of lower-level managers. One possibility is, of course, 
that organizations monitor risk-taking propensity and differentially promote 
managers who are prone to taking risks. Alternatively, however, it is possible that 
risk-prone managers are promoted not because the organization seeks risk-seeking 
executives but because it promotes those who do particularly well (p. 51). 
This explanation—the rule following view of risk—has particular utility to my analysis. 
It at least partially explains why participants in this study tended to perceive risk 
differently according to their titles and specifically why in many cases upper level 
administrators sought changes in decision rules more readily than department chairs. 
Those who have set themselves apart for promotion often do so by exhibiting distinctive 
decisions, not conforming ones. In rule-following terms, risk aversion may carry the 
consequence of protecting decision makers from both failure and success. Of course, this 
explanation does not account for department chairs who had not aspired to dean and 
provost roles as a definition of success (there were several in this study). Nor does it 







decisions and thus gain promotion. With these caveats in mind, the grounded theory of 
faculty hiring processes that I present in this chapter emphasizes the role of risk in 
producing and reproducing faculty hiring processes.  
Figure 3. 
A Grounded Theory of Faculty Hiring Processes in Unionized Comprehensive 
Universities 
 
Decision Makers Scan Environments 
Decision makers did not conduct themselves in a vacuum. Instead, faculty hiring 































this study often intimated the importance of environmental factors in interviews, which 
ultimately informed the creation of the first category of my grounded theory. These 
included: regulatory, fiscal, contractual, leadership, socio-cultural, and institutional 
resources environments. The opportunities available to them in the pursuit of faculty 
hiring and rehiring were at turns constrained and enhanced by environmental factors. 
However, the environments alone do not explain faculty hiring decisions. It is a first step 
to examine which sorts of environments were on the minds of decision makers as I 
inquired about faculty hiring, and why. 
Scanning regulatory environments. 
Participants were keenly aware of multiple aspects of their regulatory 
environments, and these environments often imposed hiring necessities and constraints. 
For example, Fred, Industry State’s president confided the fact that he sometimes 
portrays a faculty union at his institution to the state legislature as an intransigent, 
antagonistic organization, even though on the whole he has a solid working relationship 
with union officers: 
But, that 15 percent rule—that I like, because we are a public institution. We do 
have political influence and involvement and intrusion. So, if we have to go [to 
the state legislature] for additional dollars, or we’re spending more money, being 
able to say, “Look, we’ve got to hire more staff, because we have this obligation 
under the contract, which binds us to do that.” I use that to our advantage, to build 
the institution. So, it is good to have some common guidelines. At times it isn’t, 
but for the most part, if you ask me whether the union contract got in the way of 
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me being president at this university, I’d say definitely not. It has not been an 
issue. None whatsoever. 
Beyond an assessment of union relations, this anecdote implies the president maintains a 
sober view of the regulatory relationship between the state and his university. He 
arguably employs a savvy technique in carrying out his duty of regulatory compliance by 
deflecting some legislative and state agency criticism of university operations onto the 
faculty union. I provide this example not because it is indicative of how the many 
administrators in this study felt about faculty unions, but because it reflects the finding 
that participants reflected readily on the state legislative environment vis-à-vis faculty 
hiring. 
 Another aspect of the regulatory environment participants monitored and assessed 
is that of accrediting bodies, both regional (university as a whole) and disciplinary (at the 
level of the department or college). For example, Howard, a department chair in a 
professional discipline at Little Big Town University had for years been contending with 
the stifled growth of his small but vibrant department amid draconian state budget cuts. 
At the very top of our interview, he raised the following anecdote: 
We have two undergraduate programs in our department: [Program A] and 
[Program B]. [Program A] has been accredited for many years. It started with six 
faculty members to deliver the program. Currently we have four. The two that 
departed have been replaced by two faculty in [Program B]. [Program B] started 
about six years—seven years ago, and we are about to go for accreditation. We 
understand from anecdotal information that three faculty are a minimum to 
deliver the breadth and depth of a [Program B] that is accreditable, and so 
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currently we have a third faculty of fixed term, one year on board, and we hope to 
extend that next year, but we’ll go for accreditation. And the only reason we got 
that position is because we want to accredit [Program B]. 
A sizeable portion of that interview continued to focus on the obstacles and outlook for 
getting the faculty human resources necessary to program accreditation in place (and in 
time) for a successful review process. Clearly, the environment for accreditation 
compliance drew attention from decision makers. Participants in this study exclusively 
noted the added value of full-time faculty members, and ideally tenure track faculty, 
toward achieving and maintaining accreditation.  
It is important to note that regulatory environments were scanned for potential 
risks, such as receiving a negative accreditation review due to too small numbers of full-
time faculty, by several participants across multiple university sites in this study. 
However, in only this one instance was a hiring decision so directly linked back to the 
regulatory environment. This finding supports the broader analytic point that indecision, 
or the lack of stimulus from potential risk (or recognition as such), is tantamount to a 
decision to continue normal routines of faculty hiring without change. That is, perceiving 
neither risk nor opportunity, decision makers tacitly facilitated established hiring patterns.  
 Scanning fiscal environments. 
 Participants at all levels noted fiscal environments influenced faculty hiring 
decisions. This was communicated especially powerfully by Karen, a dean at Little Big 




The first year [in my dean role] I cut $650,000. I have a $14 million budget. The 
first year $650,000, the second year $1.2 million, and that’s just on top of faculty 
who retired that don’t get replaced, so I’m not even counting those. I’ve reduced 
my part-time overload budget in the last three years by $700,000. And if you’re 
paying a faculty member only $3,500 per class, that’s a lot of classes. Just do the 
math. 
The fiscal environment was critically important for participants in this study to watch and 
assess, and Karen’s view from the dean position suggests some disappointment in the 
realized flexibility of part-time faculty. That is, while those positions could be cut swiftly 
and easily from the budget, their low wages resulted in only small cost savings, even at 
scale. Having reduced its part-time faculty workforce to 15 percent of the total faculty, 
Little Big Town University remained deeply afflicted by budget deficits. Yet, those cuts 
were easy to make from a bureaucratic and a political perspective, and even small savings 
could not be ignored at the dean and provost levels.  
Regardless of whether the institution was in relatively strong or weak financial 
shape, attention to fiscal environments often precipitated faculty hiring decisions. 
Contrary to common economic explanations of faculty hiring, the lower cost of part-time 
faculty instruction did not result in increases in those ranks in the one institution in this 
study that had endured deep budget cuts. Rather, those positions had been dramatically 
diminished in recent years. 
 Scanning contractual environments. 
 Where faculty collective bargaining held implications for faculty hiring, study 
participants readily shared their understandings of those situations. The most compelling 
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example of participants assessing contractual environments stemmed from a faculty 
contract clause at Industry State University, which stated no more than 15 percent of non-
remedial course sections in any one department could be taught by part-time faculty. By 
contrast, Dan, a faculty union officer at Bright Lights University explained: 
There are long term adjuncts [at Bright Lights]. We have an adjunct union, so the 
adjuncts, to a certain extent have been able to negotiate their conditions—I think a 
good thing for them, and I’m actually on a committee at the moment which is 
considering ways of integrating adjuncts further into the governance of the 
university. So there are steps with adjuncts, and the more senior the adjunct the 
more benefits accrue in terms of health coverage, and also the more courses they 
can teach.  
Participants treated faculty contracts as strict legal boundaries to the field of play for 
hiring decisions. As with the 15 percent rule at Industry State University, they sought not 
to circumvent contract agreements at the point of execution but rather to improve upon 
them through the periodic bargaining process. Remaining attuned to the state of 
contractual environments was important for participants in this study. In one study site, 
faculty contracts only indirectly influenced faculty hiring decisions by setting parameters 
for faculty workloads and imposing rules around the distribution of compensation and 
other resources that affected central budgeting. In another, the contractual environment 
directly affected faculty hiring decisions by requiring a predetermined ratio of part-time 
to full-time faculty be maintained. 
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 Scanning leadership environments. 
 Participants also agreed the leadership of central administrators mattered to 
faculty hiring processes. For example, Rob, a dean at Little Big Town University 
reflected on leadership changes and concomitant changes to departmental budgeting, 
saying: 
I’ve been doing this for a while, so it depends on the administration. The current 
administration sweeps [savings from cost efficiencies]. [Under] previous 
administrations, I kept the money, and that discretionary money became 
reinvestment money that I could put back in the units. People in STEM subject 
areas love equipment, love labs and whatever. I was able to often use that money 
to upgrade their equipment, buy additional equipment, all those kinds of things 
that they sort of cherished. So, there was a little bit of an incentive to be more cost 
effective, because they knew that the money I had left over I’d distribute back out 
to the units and, you know, try to do as fair as I possibly could. When you sweep 
money you lose that. You lose those discretionary dollars you can use to motivate 
faculty and encourage innovation and entrepreneurial endeavors. 
It should be noted here that campus leadership was both praised and criticized across 
participant interviews and within them. Participants’ assessment of leadership 
environments often depended on the context of a given issue or initiative. As Rob’s 
example regarding the locus of budget responsibility indicates, the leadership 
environment could have a substantial impact on the availability of choices to decision 
makers—especially where budgets and budget policy affected the level of hiring 
discretion. The decision of whether to propose the hiring of a faculty member on a new 
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line, the replacement of a retired or a departed full-timer, the rehiring of a regular part-
time faculty member, or the hiring of a new part-timer was greatly dependent upon the 
leadership, or perceptions thereof.  
 Scanning organizational socio-cultural environments. 
 Participants noted specific aspects of their organizational and socio-cultural 
environments, such as organizational culture and internal university politics, which 
played important roles in shaping faculty hiring mindsets. For example, Will, a 
department chair at Bright Lights University reflected:  
I think in an institution like Bright Lights, where you have a good bit of 
professional orientation as well as the liberal arts […] that there’s always going to 
be space and room for [part-time] faculty. So I think we’ll always have [part-time] 
faculty. But the issue is to make their working and living situation positive and 
effective to allow them to become the best faculty members that they can for the 
institution. 
Bright Lights’ origins as a prestigious professional school that only later adopted a liberal 
arts mission informed Will’s tolerant view on the substantial use of part-time faculty 
instruction. Multiple participants reflected on the idiosyncrasies of their universities, 
colleges, and units and considered those points of differentiation and identity important 
context for faculty hiring decisions. 
Politically, Joan, a department chair at Little Big Town shared an anecdote about 
trying to select a candidate for a faculty position while working with a dean who had 
been the previous department chair in her department: 
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In the past I had a dean that was from [another] department, and she would trust 
anything I would say, you know? I’m [in my discipline]; she’s in [hers].  
Nowadays that’s not true. I have a dean who is from [my discipline], and there’s 
been a lot more conflicts with that dean, because she’s using her knowledge to 
make decisions about qualifications that she should not be entitled to make. And 
that’s a problem, because [contrary to established practice] I will not, as a 
department, have the part-timer unless the dean approves it. 
Joan’s situation was not resolved, but it is clear that her hiring decisions were constrained 
by the dean and that interpersonal and positional politics had come to disrupt her 
established hiring practices. 
Cultural and internal political environments were frequently important points of 
reflection for decision makers in this study. They served to inform decision makers about 
how to engage their roles in faculty hiring. 
 Scanning institutional resources environments. 
 Finally, decision makers noted the institutional resource environment was 
important in faculty hiring processes. However, institutional resources—particularly 
those deemed to be scarce and therefore of greatest concern—were discussed differently 
across study sites. For example, classroom space was a closely managed resource at 
Bright Lights University, the urban university, which had an important impact on how the 
university staffed its courses. Matt, a dean there, explained the impact of spatial resources 
on faculty hiring in an urban institution:  
Our [student to faculty] ratio is about fourteen or fifteen to one. Which is pretty 
good, and we want to keep it there. And you know right now [Bright Lights] is 
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also rather distinct from other institutions in that we don’t admit anybody that’s an 
undeclared major. They get admitted into a specific program, and we admit a 
specific headcount, because being and urban campus our facilities are really 
tightly scheduled from eight o’clock in the morning until ten o’clock at night. […] 
So, we’re very exact and tight in our headcount for students, and we base our 
faculty needs on that very tight and specific headcount. 
The level of importance attributed to the spatial environment was highest at Bright Lights 
University because of its scarcity. However, all participants made decisions of whether to 
add a course section to meet demand (often using a part-time instructor) with the contexts 
of classroom capacity and the capacity of instructors to teach additional courses. 
 To summarize, participants in this study frequently assessed the many 
environments in which their work, including faculty hiring, was situated. These 
environmental factors did not alone result in faculty hiring decisions, but in various ways 
they pulled on decision makers’ attention and set the stage for decisions to occur. 
Decision Makers Perceive Risk 
 Readers will acknowledge my discussion of data revealing participants’ 
environmental scanning in the previous section as implicit evidence of their perception of 
risk. Participant views of risk (including opportunity) were not always evaluative, or the 
result of thorough examination of available alternatives. They were often visceral and 
instinctive. It is also important to acknowledge that even when participants perceived 
similar risks, they in many cases prioritized their concerns differently. These areas of 
divergence among participants contributed to disagreement, or tension, among 
individuals and constituencies. For example, one department chair at Little Big Town had 
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built a new academic program over several years, and it had proven to be a modest 
revenue generator with a good outlook for growth. With a critical accreditation review 
quickly approaching, the chair needed an exception made to the university hiring freeze 
in order to assure approval. The provost’s concern focused much more narrowly on 
cutting the university budget to reflect reductions in state funding. Both parties perceived 
the same risks (the university’s failure to cut costs quickly enough and the university’s 
insufficient revenue), yet each saw them in a different order of priority. 
 Beyond just perceiving risks relevant to faculty hiring decisions, overt and latent 
messages about the relative importance of some risks versus others were embedded in 
participants’ narratives. Another example could be seen in Bright Lights’ 
interdisciplinary faculty cluster hiring initiative. The subtext in interviews with deans 
suggested that underlying their enthusiasm for the initiative they had come to believe 
there might be some opportunity cost (e.g., falling behind competitor institutions in 
implementing a new strategy, or missing a chance to enhance mission fulfillment by 
addressing interdisciplinary challenges). From several department chairs’ perspectives, 
opposing the initiative based on the grounds that it was administrative encroachment into 
faculty jurisdiction over the curriculum presented notable risk. However, the opportunity 
cost of opposing significant numbers of full-time faculty hiring was greater. Matt, a dean 
at Bright Lights, acknowledged this situation from his vantage: 
The [department] chairs have seen it as an opportunity to break down barriers and 
have been very positive about it. The faculty less so. They’re a little more inclined 
to want to hire replacements, clones of what they had, so they’re a little less 
adventurous. But, you know, it’s working, and I think the proof will be how well 
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these new colleagues fit in, and work with their colleagues that are already here, 
and I think that will work out, so they’ll see the value in that, but [the faculty are] 
not embracing it as much as administration is. 
In this brief passage, we note the tension between college and department-level 
personnel. Matt makes a light but pejorative comment about the cluster hiring initiative 
being the alternative to hiring “clone” replacements of retiring faculty members. He also 
describes the initiative as an “adventurous” one (insinuating disapproval of traditional 
bottom-up hiring by juxtaposition). Finally, he offers optimism that these cluster faculty 
would “work out,” which potentially serves to downplay the amount of risk associated 
with launching a major hiring initiative. In short, Matt shows himself to be among the 
several college-level participants who viewed the relative risk of filling a large number of 
new faculty lines under traditional methods to be greater than that of filling them through 
an innovative program. Some department chairs held opposing views. 
Differences among these understandings and assertions of relative risk set the 
stage for disagreement as to the best ways in which to respond to those risks. In other 
words, participants held sometimes divergent priorities in their work, and in many cases 
the order of their priorities impacted faculty hiring. Importantly, in most circumstances 
part-time faculty hiring was either not viewed as a risk (nor an opportunity) by 
participants in this study, and when it was it typically emerged as an issue of lower 
priority in comparison with full-time faculty hiring. As a result, the issue of part-time 
faculty hiring often exited the model at this point. This allowed the relational aspects of 
the hiring process to proceed unchallenged and unchanged and for role tension among 
decision makers to be avoided. 
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Asserting Role Change 
 Participants sought to impose their preferences for change on faculty hiring 
processes in either of two ways. Goldstein (2005) surfaces two apt concepts from the 
literature on university budgeting decisions, and these hold corollary utility in explaining 
faculty human resource decisions, which are partly budgetary. The first concept is that of 
a control-based system. The second, by contrast, is that of an accountability-based 
system. Goldstein explains: 
At what level should financial decisions be made? Most experts believe that the 
best decisions are those that are made closest to the action. In fact, the real issue is 
where the organization is on the continuum between control and accountability. A 
system of accountability allows greater latitude with respect to decision making 
than one that relies on controls to prevent problems from occurring (p. 62). 
What becomes apparent from this discussion is the relationship between a control-based 
system and an accountability-based system such that they each comprise a different side 
of the same coin. Both concepts are defined in relation to each other. In other words, each 
is a concept about both control and accountability. In a control-based system, decision 
control and accountability are both centralized, whereas in an accountability-based 
system decision control and accountability are both distributed. I borrow these concepts 
of budgetary control and accountability and adapt them for use in my theoretical model of 
faculty hiring decisions. When applied to faculty hiring decisions, I found tensions up 
and down the administrative hierarchy increased when accountability for decision making 
became separated from control. Regardless of one’s place on the organizational chart, 
decision makers became uncomfortable when they felt they had a major stake in the 
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outcome of faculty hiring decisions yet had little say in the matter. Because faculty hiring 
was perceived to hold such important implications (i.e., risk and opportunity) throughout 
the university, most participants sought to protect or gain additional decision control. 
 Multiple participants noted the inexact, or “messy” attributes of faculty hiring. 
Being aware of the risks entailed in faculty hiring decisions, and in many cases 
disagreeing over the best path forward for departments, colleges, and institutions, 
participants often noted discomfort, or tension in the process. In responding to this 
discomfort, the act of which characterizes this third analytic category of the grounded 
theory, participants sought to affect either of two changes: a) consolidating central 
administrative control over faculty hiring, or b) distributing greater control and 
accountability for faculty hiring to academic units. It is important to recall the impact of 
environmental contexts (e.g., regulation, fiscal conditions, socio-cultural factors, etc.) in 
limiting the discretion available to individuals and constituencies. However, one 
important finding of this study is the proclivity of central administrators for control 
versus the proclivity of departmental personnel for the same. This point of divergence 
served to escalate tensions, particularly in cases where one constituency consistently 
effected its will.  
 Decision makers employ a control response to risk. 
 By definition, a control response places greater discretion in the hands of central 
administrators, such as provosts and presidents. No department-level administrators at 
any of the three study sites communicated support for greater central control over faculty 
hiring processes. In fact, many of them complained about the high degree of control 
central administrators had cultivated, which revealed tension between department chairs 
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and provosts. I now discuss three examples of control response: 1) budgetary “sweeping” 
(participant terminology), 2) administrative programming, and 3) revising the hierarchy. 
Budgetary “sweeping.”  
The control response known as budgetary “sweeping” to participants in this study 
was present in some form at all three research sites. Sweeping occurs when funds that 
would ostensibly otherwise remain in departmental and college budgets as discretionary 
savings instead get taken back by the provost to be redistributed according to her or his 
discretion. Two examples from the data are indicative of the various degrees to which the 
sweeping principle can be taken in practice: faculty salary savings and equipment 
allocation. 
For the most part, department chairs in this study were of a subsequent generation 
to those who had battled against sweeping policies. Lauren, a department chair at Little 
Big Town University explained: 
I certainly do know of examples of people that have very large […] grants that 
were maybe over a five year period that did free up money, or in theory provided 
money for the [primary investigator] to have a course release, but I can guarantee 
that money did not go to the department. That went to pay the electric bill for 
some other [unit]. It’s the same thing as sabbatical. If you take a half academic 
year sabbatical, you retain your entire salary. If you take a full year sabbatical, 
you get half your salary. In theory, on paper, that half salary that you give up is 
supposed to go toward hiring part-time people to replace you. That’s never 
happened in my entire experience here at this university.  
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No participants in this study denied the legitimate interest of administrators at higher 
levels in redistributing salary savings toward strategic priorities, even if they did note the 
vigor with which they would press to get back a piece of that funding. 
 The comparative budget struggles at Little Big Town brought the issue of 
provostial budget sweeps into sharp relief, as evidenced by at least one dean’s anecdote 
of a pitched battle over a departmental expenditure of less than one thousand dollars. Not 
surprisingly, the provost employed budget sweeps as part of a strategy to reduce the size 
of both the full-time and part-time faculty, which was not a situation shared by the other 
two sites. However, sweeping policies were in place in all three. The major difference 
was simply a lower level of tension among decision makers at different levels due to 
healthier budgets. Under tight budgets at Little Big Town, I observed protection of 
accountability-based decision roles down the organizational chart and assertion of a 
decision role of greater control at the top.  
 Administrative programming. 
Administrators at the provost level, and sometimes at the dean level, in the three 
university sites showed varying levels of inclination toward greater control over faculty 
hiring through programmatic means. That is to say, in ways that ranged from mild to 
strong in juxtaposition, central administrators sought to enhance their roles in faculty 
hiring. Three examples of these hiring programs stood out, with one per study site: 
interdisciplinary preference, shared faculty, and cluster hiring.   
 In the first example, at Industry State University, the provost held the weakest 
control (and the department chair the greatest) for decisions about faculty hiring. Lauren, 
the provost explained: 
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[…] at the adjunct level, usually there’s not that much conversation about 
[interdisciplinarity] unless it’s extenuating circumstance. For example, we have 
one who is a really well known fiction writer, and he worked for a gaming 
company for just a little blip of time, and his contribution to the gaming company 
was in building worlds. He was talking to us about having some interest and 
perhaps teaching for us and was interested in teaching a class on building worlds. 
Now, when I’ve had a conversation with the departments on that I’ve said I want 
that to be an interdisciplinary class. I want game design kids to be able to take it, 
but I also want English students to be able to take, and others who might have 
interest […]. But anyway, for full time faculty if there’s an interdisciplinary 
component that makes that hire of more interest to me. 
She went on to explain the administrative logistics behind such hires and how she had a 
strong preference against joint positions in which more than one department held 
budgetary responsibility for the position (a view widely shared among study participants). 
This type of push from central administrators for curricular cohesion across the university 
met with little resistance among department chairs (recall Industry State did not yet 
employ deans as of data collection). That is, easing student access to courses across the 
curriculum was viewed as a legitimate concern of central administrators and was 
therefore not a point of major tension with department chairs. 
 At a relatively moderate level of central assertion of decision control, Little Big 
Town administrators at both the college and university level showed a preference for 
shared faculty across departments versus faculty who could serve only one department. 
Ted, an associate dean there explained: 
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One of the things this university has done is try to embark upon administrative 
reorganization that’s also all a bit more curricular, and one of my goals has been 
that when we start hiring in the future we start thinking about multiple degree 
programs. With a shrinking student-base, certain kinds of specialties cannot be 
sustained within a single department anymore. For example, 10 years ago, we had 
an African-American historian who taught strictly within the history department.  
She actually left for another position. The department continually requested a 
replacement line. It didn’t come through, and then finally, during one brief 
window of hiring that we’ve had a line was permitted, but what we did is design a 
position to be an African-American history and politics position so that the 
position could be shared between two departments. And it’s actually been pretty 
successful, because [before the shared faculty approach] the classes didn’t really 
fill very well because they only really drew off one cohort of one major. […] So, 
I’m thinking as we go, if we ever start hiring again, we’d like to see where units 
could actually share positions. 
Department chairs at Little Big Town did not complain about having to share instructors 
with other departments on the rare occasions for which exemptions from hiring freeze 
were allowed. The limited possibilities for any sort of faculty hiring at all formed an 
important context for deeming shared hires a major success. Deans and associate deans 
celebrated these achievements alongside chairs. 
Finally, the leading example of a relatively strong control response by central 
administration with regard to programs of faculty hiring could be observed at Bright 
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Lights University, where the provost and deans had embarked on a cluster hiring 
initiative. One department chair described cluster hiring as: 
[…] identifying a thematic area and then hiring, and creating new positions (or 
potentially modifying replacement positions, but I think most of this was done 
with new lines) so that you’d have people hired into different departments that all 
are thematically aligned in one way or another.  
The university might hire four faculty members (e.g., one in geography, one in chemistry, 
one in biology, and one in history), all of whom carry some expertise touching on an 
interdisciplinary set of problems, such as the preservation of clean water sources. 
Steve, a former associate department chair at Bright Lights shared the following 
experience at the outset of the cluster hiring initiative: 
This year, we had a new provost, and the first thing she did was to block one of 
our new hires, because she wanted to introduce a new hiring strategy. So, the 
faculty, the hire and the search that we came back at the new school year 
intending to conduct didn’t happen, because at the very last minute she decided to 
change the rules, or at least reverse that hiring decision. 
Steve went on to temper his discussion of tensions with the provost over the blocked hire 
and the introduction of a program of cluster hiring: “Our feeling here in this institution is 
that broadly speaking, in terms of all interactions with administration, things have 
improved [since the prior administration].” In this case, the department chairs were 
ultimately a key facilitator of the cluster hiring program. Important context to recall is 
that after a decade of union-busting and antagonistic behavior between the faculty and the 
central administration, the new president made a commitment to enter into a significant 
181 
 
growth phase focusing on full-time and potentially tenure-line faculty. Department chairs 
felt the change in leadership was refreshing, and they were not quick to criticize the 
manner in which the president’s commitment was executed. 
 Embedded in the faculty hiring plan the president presented, however, was a 
strong assertion of decision control by the provost. The provost declined to participate in 
this study (though she did not oppose the study being conducted at Bright Lights), so it is 
impossible to say what sort of risk stimulus she felt that produced the control response. It 
may plausibly have been a perceived opportunity risk, as Steve the former department 
administrator supposed, which is to say she may have simply interpreted her role as an 
active one and seen the anticipated faculty hires as a mechanism through which she might 
leave her mark in a positive way. 
It is also important to note the provost at Bright Lights University used a deans’ 
advisory council to make team decisions regarding the cluster hiring themes. Between the 
deans’ council support and the relatively warm reception to the overall hiring plan by 
department chairs, tensions over cluster hiring were not robust. However, provostial 
assertion of control over faculty hiring decisions was clear. 
Revising the hierarchy.  
In some ways, provosts changed administrative, or even academic structures, 
which were attended by latent effects that increased provostial control over faculty hiring 
decisions. One way in which these effects were realized consisted of adding a layer of 
administration between department chairs and provosts and implementing a dean 
structure for the first time in university history. A second example of a way in which a 
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provost revised the traditional administrative hierarchy was to create a parallel academic 
program that was not subject to traditions of faculty governance of academic policy. 
 In the first case, the provost at Industry State University had for some time 
employed one exceptionally productive associate provost in managing the duties of a 
traditional dean for all four colleges. This associate provost was well-respected among 
the department chairs in this study, and he was viewed as a vital asset by the provost. The 
risk in placing so much operational importance on any one person seems obvious from a 
structural perspective. If for whatever reason that person becomes unable to carry out 
those responsibilities (e.g., departure, promotion, retirement, illness, etc.), the 
organization would struggle to accomplish important work. 
 This was an administrative problem, and it was solved administratively, by 
inserting a middle level of management. Four deans, one per college, were in the process 
of being hired as I collected data for this study. The results of the new dean structure 
could not be observed during this study, but one plausible outcome, albeit potentially 
unintended, would be for the new layer of management to act as a buffer between the 
provost’s office and the departments in faculty hiring decisions. Such an outcome would 
be consistent with the experiences of deans at both Bright Lights and Little Big Town 
Universities. Ryan, a dean at Bright Lights, explained: 
It’s middle management, there’s no doubt about it (chuckles), so a lot of job is 
translational. A lot of my job is [saying], “Here’s what the department wants,” to 
the provost, and then [saying] back to the department chair, “Here’s what the 
provost says.” And sometimes you wonder, why don’t the chairs talk to the damn 
provost and let them hash it out and then they’re done with it? But the dean 
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provides a kind of necessary buffer between the provost and the department 
chairs, I think. I strategize with both sides. I develop strategy for department 
chairs to be successful in advocating for the definition of a particular line [for 
faculty hiring]. Then I strategize with the provost about how to broaden that line 
to work with the strategic direction of the institution.  
As Ryan explains, the dean is not only a mediator for differences of opinion between 
department chairs and provosts. She or he contributes insight on faculty hiring decisions 
as with other types of decisions. It is, however, important to recognize a latent effect of 
implementing an intermediary, which was to transfer some decision making authority 
from department chairs up to deans and provosts. 
In a second example of centralizing hiring control through the hierarchy, all three 
study sites had implemented revenue-generating academic programs outside of the 
traditional curriculum, whether online, evening, or summer curricula. In two such cases 
(Industry State University being the exception), administrators governed not only the 
administrative functions of a separate unit but the curriculum itself. Dan, a faculty union 
officer at Bright Lights University shared insights about the administrative governance of 
summer curricula: “Here, [summer instruction is] almost like a separate college. The 
department may propose something to [the Continuing Education department], but 
Continuing Ed is what runs the summer things, and that's I think really problematic.”  
Dan goes on to explain the challenges for part-time faculty who need the additional 
income in accessing summer instruction jobs, which are limited in number and are often 
awarded to full-time faculty instead. Administratively run academic units found in the 
study sites were responsible for revenue targets, not just cost cuts. Designation as a 
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revenue center was the purview of the provost, or the president, and that person charged 
these units with assembling a course listing that met market demand. While the 
administrators in charge of these units often consulted department chairs prior to 
selecting instructors, the relocation of courses out of academic departments constituted a 
shift in decision control over faculty hiring up the organizational chart.  
In both examples of revising the hierarchy for central control, the implementation 
of a dean structure and the administrative pursuit of parallel academic units, department 
chairs widely accepted the change in decision roles. In the case of the new dean structure, 
department chairs seemed to take pride in adjusting to a more common university 
structure, and they agreed with the view that the university had a legitimate interest in 
stabilizing its middle management with a structural change. No one complained. In the 
case of the administratively run online instruction unit, department chairs were content to 
use it as an avenue to resources in a time of exceptional budgetary duress. 
 Decision makers employ an accountability response to risk. 
 The alternative to a control response by participants was an accountability 
response. That is, some study participants demonstrated a proclivity for locating 
increased responsibility for faculty hiring within academic units. Many participants at the 
department level, and even some at the college level, espoused this view clearly and with 
some conviction, and this view became manifested in their behavioral responses to risk 
stimuli. Engaging expertise, negotiating, and “playing the game” (participant 




 One way to enact an accountability response to a risk stimulus was to engage the 
expertise of the faculty. Often, department chairs employed an expertise argument in 
asserting their own authority over hiring decisions, though some were more successful 
than others in winning over deans and provosts. There were three ways in which, up and 
down the organizational chart, participant preferences were sometimes well-aligned 
toward affirming faculty members’ expert judgment: academic advising, accreditation 
compliance, and faculty service to the university (i.e., governance). 
 Tony, a department chair in a professional field at Industry State University 
offered a rationale touching on both academic advising and accreditation compliance that 
yielded accountability responses regarding faculty hiring decisions: 
We know that advising is important and that it’s a concept of retention, so we 
want to do our own advising for our students. And because we’re [accredited by 
group X], we have these very significant gateways through the program. You 
know, you start out as a freshman, and there’s places along the way where we 
stop them, and we have conversations that, “You’re not going to be a [member of 
this profession. That’s not going to happen. We’ve seen these dispositions. You 
don't have the content knowledge. You haven't passed certain exams, licensure 
exams,” you know, “your early field work wasn’t successful.” So advising is 
important because that’s what moves you through the program. All of us do that. 
Part-timers don’t advise, so they don't contribute to that piece of the experience 
here. That’s why we need to have full-timers, so we work at that.  
186 
 
Tony felt he was able to do a good job moving the provost toward full-time faculty hires 
in his department based on the advising imperative and based on the requirements of the 
accrediting agency for his discipline. Perhaps because the provost could neither advise 
every student in Tony’s department personally, nor advise them effectively on how to 
gain licensure, decision roles around defining faculty needs in the department became 
acceptably located primarily in the department itself—an accountability response. 
In addition to advising and accreditation compliance, a third area in which faculty 
expertise was related to an accountability response was that of faculty service. 
Participants at all levels and in all three university sites acknowledged the importance of 
faculty service to the execution of important university initiatives. One of the most 
forceful explanations came from Ryan, a dean at Bright Lights University: 
So, we have a newer president. The president draws on the former strategic plan 
and encapsulates a new strategic plan and says we’re going to work in these five 
areas […]. They all involve faculty, and because most institutions have well 
developed processes of governance you can’t make decisions or move forward 
with particular initiatives unless you have faculty involvement. […] There’s just 
so many ways of working on this, but all of them are going to require some 
faculty members to participate. So, you run out of faculty, and what we find here 
is that we’re constantly tapping the same faculty members to provide leadership, 
or energy, or insight into some of these new areas. And, I would say that even if 
there are no new big initiatives, just things like searches [exhaust faculty time].  
The risk Ryan and others perceived here is that the central administration of the 
university will continue to encounter an opportunity cost for its reliance on part-time 
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faculty. Specifically, the new president will be stymied in bringing the university into its 
next phase of development if the faculty service capacity remains insufficient to execute 
new initiatives. Ryan went on to relate the full-time faculty hiring plan as an 
accountability response by central administrators. As I have explained, the cluster hiring 
aspect of the planned faculty growth constituted a control response, so the behavior was 
complex. To some extent, the interest in addressing the faculty service capacity problem 
stemmed from administrative self-interest, but behind that reality there was also a real 
respect for faculty work. Administrative acknowledgement of distinctive faculty roles in 
classroom and service work shaped a new approach to faculty hiring. 
 Negotiating for decentralized decision control. 
 Collective bargaining and agitation for leadership change, two forms of 
negotiation, were other ways in which department chairs achieved greater discretion in 
faculty hiring decisions. In the case of the former, Sally, a union officer at Industry State 
University explained the rationale behind “the 15 percent rule” in the faculty contract, 
which I have described before: 
Our [union] chapter has very much framed faculty hiring as an important aspect 
of workload. The previous chapter president framed it very much in terms of class 
size. If you don’t hire full-time faculty, we see a constant trend in class sizes 
increasing beyond what we set them as when we designed the curriculum. And 
that’s a workload issue, because the difference between having 25 students in 
your classroom and having 30 students in your class actually makes an 
appreciable difference on your workload. Also the union is trying to manage 
issues like workload and advising, because adjunct faculty don’t do any advising.  
188 
 
So, if you have departments with a lot of adjunct faculty but a lot of students, the 
advising more often becomes very heavy [for the full-time faculty].  
Sally went on to explain how the union had effectively repositioned the financial threat 
perceived by the president related to hiring more full-time faculty as a subordinate one to 
the political threat of a contract violation on the 15 percent rule. 
 In addition to collective bargaining’s direct influence on faculty hiring decisions 
at Industry State, organized agitation for leadership change emerged as one factor that 
could potentially produce an accountability response to faculty hiring decision roles in 
other study sites. Joan, a department chair at Little Big Town University noted: 
However, [faculty unions] have shown multiple times they have the power, 
especially over the last three years, to kick out a provost and a president, and they 
have done so. So, if it’s a matter of organizing the faculty in one direction they’ve 
done that, and they were very successful with the results they obtained.  If it’s a 
matter of pushing back the president and the provost about certain type of changes 
or emphasis, they’ve done that very well also in conjunction with some members 
from the state legislature who are more ready to listen to the faculty. 
This statement would prove to foreshadow a similar ouster of the president and provost at 
Little Big Town not long after data collection was completed for this study. The data 
were less clear with regard to the effectiveness of union agitation for leadership change in 




 Playing “the game.” 
 Finally, in addition to multiple variations on wielding faculty expertise and 
negotiating for control in faculty hiring decisions at the department level, there were at 
least two ways in which departmental administrators (and some dean’s office personnel) 
suggested they might achieve greater discretion in these decisions by playing “the game,” 
in their words. One was through persuasive, evidence-based argument. The other was 
through budgetary process changes. Neither avenue emerged from the data as a highly 
effective one for affecting greater departmental responsibility for faculty hiring, but this 
did not prevent participants from enthusiastic effort. 
With regard to evidence-based argument, despite participant endorsements of 
enrollment data, teaching evaluation data, workload data, and other metrics in arraying a 
powerful rational argument (e.g., for new, replacement, full-time, or part-time faculty), 
traditional methods of bottom-up faculty position requests were reported to be effective 
in only limited ways. This was troubling for department chairs, because they often felt 
provosts and deans had emphasized the importance of relying on data to make a rational 
case for faculty hiring, yet the deans and provosts did not respond on a rational basis in 
kind. Two counterpoints, made in sequence by Sarah, the provost at Industry State 
University, illustrate one potential disconnect between the espousal of data importance 
and the perceived lack of follow-through by central administrators when department 
chairs felt they had played this game well: 
[We provide] a dashboard of data for each one of the departments, and we give 
them three years of data. It has a lot of information on the department about how 
many majors they had, how many minors they had, how many students transfer in 
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and out of their program, how many semester credit hours they generate. But then 
it also gives them a cost, and they can see what their cost is in comparison with all 
the other departments. Everybody has the right to see everybody else’s data, so 
you can identify the departments that are contributing a lot to the university’s 
bottom line and those that cost a lot. That has really been beneficial in 
conversations. If you’re seeing more students, seeing more majors, I might think 
about [investing in some additional faculty]. 
One can understand the take-away that the provost values the use of data in faculty 
position requests highly. Now note the immediate follow-on comment from Sarah, as 
though she was playing devil’s advocate to her own previous assertion: 
Well, and then you have the other end, where the faculty come and say, “Look at 
how much money I’m making. […] If you give me three more forestry instructors 
I can make even more money. Well, the truth is no. You won’t make more money. 
There might be a few more students who will take forestry classes if we even 
extend them more, but we don’t have enough students coming in to fill up all of 
those other course requests, so you’d start going in the other direction. 
Provosts and deans typically collected enrollment, cost, and teaching evaluation data for 
distribution to departments, ostensibly for uses including appeals for instructional 
staffing. However, in the same breath they tended to discount the analyses of those data 
by the departments themselves in favor of their own analyses. Further obstructing rational 
arguments for faculty hiring from department chairs at Little Big Town University was a 
strict hiring freeze in response to state budget cuts. Further obstructing rational arguments 
for faculty hiring from department chairs at Bright Lights University was a dean and 
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provost-level priority for an interdisciplinary cluster hiring program. Perhaps ironically, 
the sort of evidence-based reasoning most highly valued by the academy—with which 
department chairs, deans, and provosts would align themselves most readily—was often 
the least effective route to approval to hire a faculty member. 
 Perhaps the very least likely avenue for redistributing decision responsibility back 
toward the department level of the universities was the pursuit of alternative budget 
processes to that end. Department chairs, and even some deans, readily lamented the fact 
that departments were responsible only for their costs and not for their revenues. In other 
words, they were debited in the central budget for the expenses incurred in running their 
programs, but they were not credited with the tuition revenue tied to course enrollments. 
This is related to the point several participants made during interviews, that due to their 
low wages and often full classrooms in introductory courses, part-time faculty members 
were immensely profitable for universities. Fortunately for many of the department chairs 
in this study, who preferred to employ more full-time faculty members, the greater net 
dollar value of a part-time instructor’s work to the university was not taken into account 
by the budget system at any of the three study sites. Unfortunately for them, this same 
fact of budgetary procedure formed a major impediment to innovative decisions on 
instructional staffing at the department level. 
 Yet, because not even a single department chair or dean in this study had pursued 
redress of the budget procedure challenge they identified, it constituted the single least 
important factor in producing accountability responses in decisions of any kind. 
Surprisingly, no participant identified a responsibility centered budgeting (RCB) model 
as a goal for change. This despite the fact that RCB is both well-known as a corrective 
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measure to the problems associated with viewing departments as cost centers only, as 
well as the fact RCB has become increasingly popular in research university contexts 
(Carlson, 2015; Goldstein, 2005). 
 In sum, participants in this study demonstrated proclivities toward central control 
and decentralized accountability in faculty hiring decisions. Table 3 and Table 4 on page 
191 display the most compelling examples of these activities and behaviors according to 
the data.  
 
Table 3. 
Data-Based Examples of Central Control Responses in Study Sites 
Control Response Examples 




Administrative Programming Cluster hiring 
 
 
Revising the Hierarchy Adding distance between academic units 
and central administration 
 
Table 4. 
Data-Based Examples of Decentralized Accountability Responses in Study Sites 
Accountability Response Examples 
Engaging faculty expertise Prioritizing faculty student advising 
 Leveraging accreditation standards 
  
Negotiating Bargaining for faculty contracts 
 Agitating for leadership change 
  
Playing “The Game" Data-based proposition of new and 
replacement faculty lines 
 Agitating for changing budget processes 
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The core category of this grounded theory of faculty hiring decisions involves 
either a decision maker’s control response or accountability response to perceived risk. 
This analytic category is of special importance in that it departs from the cognitive 
character of the preceding analytic categories in the model and embodies the first point of 
action, or behavior. Importantly, participants in this study tended to demonstrate 
unwillingness to cede control over faculty hiring to others. For example, the provost at 
Little Big Town University, Kyle seemed to suggest he had little interest in part-time 
faculty hiring, saying: “I don’t even sign off on part-time help. […] For God’s sake, I 
don’t want to have to sign off on all the part-time [hiring].” However, by dramatically 
cutting the size of the part-time faculty and requiring a provostial sign-off for exemptions 
to the hiring freeze, his actions differed from his words. Even where participants 
suggested they had insufficient time and attention to give faculty hiring, they were often 
reticent to give up control. Rather, conflict tended to occur when one or more decision 
makers attempted to alter formerly established decision processes to assume greater 
control. 
Decision Makers Establish Changed Roles 
 Given either an affected control response or an accountability response to 
perceived risks, those playing a part in faculty hiring processes met the adjustments in 
their roles with either of two attitudes: acceptance or resistance. In none of the study sites 
did participants’ resistance of role changes halt the operations of the department, college, 
or university. Thus, across all three study sites the outcome of participant role changes in 
faculty hiring processes became established and did not revert. They became the new way 
of doing things pending future change. This is not to say tensions became resolved 
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among individuals and constituencies, but it is important to note that tensions became 
relaxed sufficiently for the university to carry out regular business. 
One apparent exception to the assertion that tensions relaxed is that of Little Big 
Town University, where tensions remained high enough to destabilize university 
leadership. Both the president and provost departed the university after short terms in 
office following data collection for this study. It remains unclear whether, following the 
appointment of a new president the proclivity toward control response by central 
administrators will continue or whether the resistance that contributed to a change in 
leadership, viewed as a risk, will precipitate future accountability responses by new 
leaders. Such possible changes have yet to be seen, and data collection for this study did 
not include observation of the transition period. It is plausible that new leadership could 
impose new ways of providing greater decision control to department chairs and deans. 
 Decision makers accept or resist rule changes. 
 The most common response to changing roles around decision control among 
participants —and thus the rules guiding decisions—was to accept the changes. In many 
cases, participants expressed displeasure in the research interviews with what they 
understood to constitute diminished roles in faculty hiring. Nonetheless, in most cases 
those participants were compliant, even if skeptical or disgruntled. Will, a department 
chair at Bright Lights University explained: 
You have, [what] I would describe as a faculty oriented president. But within the 
faculty themselves there’s still a fair amount of suspicion. They’ve been trained 
very well in the art of resistance and passive aggressive and sometimes aggressive 
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behavior towards what they see as intrusions in faculty governance. But it’s a 
culture change. 
What Will suggests here is that faculty had accepted the approach of the new president in 
dealing with faculty and academic policy with wary optimism. Whereas his predecessor 
had acquired a reputation of behaving antagonistically to the tenure-line faculty, 
particularly with regard to a major expansion of contingent faculty ranks during his 
presidency, this president had said he was interested in working constructively with the 
faculty, even increasing tenure-track positions. As I have said, although many of these 
new positions will originate as constructs of the provost and the deans (i.e., cluster hires) 
the faculty had largely accepted shift in decision control at the time of data collection. 
 In contrast to the many participants who accepted changing decision roles, some 
participants found ways to resist, defy, or subvert these changes. The portrayal of a 
resistant faculty by Kyle, the provost at Little Big Town University, contrasts strongly 
with Will’s description of faculty acceptance at Bright Lights University: 
If the president, provost, or the board of trustees says, “We need [Little Big 
Town] to develop a program in X,” [then faculty hiring could originate outside 
academic departments]. That doesn’t tend to work as well, because the faculty 
like to think they own the curriculum, and it’s their creativity that’s creating all 
these opportunities, despite the fact they are not the ones who are poring over the 
data about where the jobs are and where the hot disciplines are and what the 
students are interested in. 
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Almost as though in response to her provost, Joan, a department chair at Little Big Town, 
elaborated on the resistance of faculty at the department level to the provost’s assertion of 
control over faculty hiring: 
In my department we have three faculty members who are eligible for retirement.  
The youngest one is 66, the oldest one is 72 […], but they’re still here because 
they don’t see their discipline, at least a specialty in their discipline, being 
replaced [if they retire], and they’re concerned about that. 
Joan went on to explain how the full-time faculty in her department had been cut in half 
in recent years and how they now struggled to offer important courses frequently enough 
to support the curriculum. The passive resistance shown by faculty members who relied 
on tenure protections and chose not to retire seemed to have been effective in a small 
way. Perhaps it even contributed to the board of trustees’ decision to release the president 
and provost from employment soon after the conclusion of this study. However, it 
remains to be seen whether decision rules ultimately revert back toward departmental 
responsibility and any faculty positions can be regained under new leadership.  
Summary. 
 The model depicting the grounded theory of faculty hiring processes in unionized 
comprehensive universities, with which I began this chapter (see Figure 3, p. 161) 
emphasizes the role of risk and rule-following in decision-making among department, 
college, and university-level administrators. Data analysis revealed four sequential stages 
in faculty hiring decisions: scanning environments, perceiving risk, asserting role change, 
and establishing decision responsibility. In Figure 4 (below) I superimpose data-based 







Figure 3. Evidence shows the changeability of decision makers’ roles in faculty hiring 
processes over time in relation to one another. Tension begins to build between and 
among decision makers at the point where they perceive risks differently. As tension 
builds, disagreements arise over roles in hiring processes among department chairs, 
deans, provosts, and presidents. Finally, by asserting control over faculty hiring, decision 
makers set precedence for future practice.  
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•Holding a grudge 


















 I have now shared a grounded theory of faculty hiring processes in unionized 
comprehensive universities, which explains these faculty hiring processes in terms of 
decision making in organizations. It positions faculty hiring largely as a manifestation of 
rule following behavior in response to risk stimuli (including the threat of missed 
opportunity). Specifically, it attributes faculty hiring outcomes to tension among views of 
budgetary and strategic role fulfillment (i.e., central control versus authority and 
accountability distributed among academic units). In the next chapter, I share the 




Chapter Six: Discussion 
 To begin this study, I introduced the question of how instructional faculty hiring 
occurs in unionized comprehensive universities. I explained the significance of that 
problem in light of vastly expanded ranks of part-time contingent faculty across 
American higher education. I further explained the importance of understanding the roots 
of this phenomenon in unionized and comprehensive university settings. In chapter two, I 
proceeded to review relevant literature on faculty work, comprehensive university 
settings, and decision making theory and practice. In chapter three, I detailed my 
approach to the research. Finally, I shared the descriptive findings of this study in chapter 
four and shared a grounded theory analysis in chapter five. In this final chapter I draw 
implications from the findings of this study for institution-level faculty hiring policy and 
practice, as well as future research. 
Discussion of Key Findings 
Rather than a strongly intentional, outcomes-driven process, faculty hiring as a 
whole is the product of a changeable, relational process. That is, faculty hiring in the sites 
for this study demonstrated characteristics of collaborative decision making and political 
decision making, and decision makers often showed great interest in performing an 
appropriate role relative to others. The resultant grounded theory analysis I provide can 
be summarized by a dynamic model depicting role conflict as key to decision making 
(see Figure 5, p. 199). It describes a process by which, under some circumstances, 
decision makers may pull control over faculty hiring more closely to provosts, who hold 
the keys to central academic budgets. Under other conditions, the model describes a 
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process by which control over faculty hiring decisions may be pulled further down 
toward department chairs. 
 This grounded theory of faculty hiring processes in unionized comprehensive 
universities operates based on decision makers’ perceptions of risk, which both stem 
from and reinforce their senses of who they are and what someone like them ought to do 
in a given situation. Department-level, college-level, and central administrators all 
demonstrated attentiveness to various environments that could influence their work. 
These included: regulatory, fiscal, contractual, leadership, socio-cultural, and institutional 
resources environments. When scanning these environments, decision makers would 
demonstrate sensitivity to risk stimuli. That is, they would perceive risks to their work. 
This is not to suggest decision makers’ risk perceptions were calculated and weighed 
consciously against one another to determine the best among several courses of action. 
More frequently, their sense of risk was visceral and relatively unmeasured. Decision 
makers inhabiting different positional roles and adopting distinctive personal roles might 
in the first place perceive divergent risks from those their counterparts perceived. 
Secondly, even when they did perceive similar risks they might prioritize them 
differently. Perceptions and prioritization of risks led to behavioral responses. These 
responses were either supportive of increased central decision control (often along lines 
of budget authority), or they contributed to increased decentralization of decision 
responsibility. Where there was disagreement over risk perceptions among decision 
makers, responses to risk could serve to exacerbate tensions. Finally, having been 
executed, those behaviors would set new precedent and become established within the 
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 Part-time faculty hiring as comparatively low-risk. 
Part-time faculty hiring, in many cases, represents a low-risk pursuit. Under 
normal conditions (excepting conditions of budgetary duress, or if poor teaching 
evaluations trigger closer attention), the hiring and rehiring of part-time faculty requires 
far fewer resources than full-time hiring, such as personnel, time, funding, and attention. 































management, and requires little to no time of existing faculty in the department. In many 
cases, a department chair must simply justify the need for the additional course or section 
in terms of enrollment needs, confirm the availability of a part-time instructor who has 
taught the course before, and give notice of hire (rather, rehire) of a candidate to dean’s 
office personnel to ensure the instructor receives payment. Thus, tension does not build 
among administrators at different levels of the organizational chart, and decision roles 
remain uncontested. This finding is consistent with Cross and Goldenberg’s (2009) 
finding in their study of non-tenure track faculty in elite research universities to the effect 
that hiring off the tenure track follows a decentralized, highly routinized process. This 
study’s corollary findings for comprehensive universities could be summarized in much 
the same way under normal conditions. 
 This study partially supports findings in previous research that part-time faculty 
hiring constitutes “triage” efforts (Delphi Project, 2012, p. 16). That is, given what could 
be construed as an emergency, such as a sudden illness that precludes an instructor from 
carrying out her duties on short notice, a department chair would indeed scramble to fill 
the vacancy. Whether constrained by space (as in Bright Lights University), or by faculty 
contracts (as in Industry State University), alternatives to hiring a new part-time faculty 
member often did not include redistributing enrolled students into other course sections. 
Additionally, as decision makers considered policies and practices for compliance with 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, or what is colloquially known as 
the Affordable Care Act) at the time of data collection, it became apparent that 
opportunities for adding a course to the load of a regular part-timer may also become 
constrained. Vetting and hiring a prospective new part-time instructor takes far less time 
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and resources than it does for a full-time faculty member, but on short notice that process 
can indeed resemble triage.  
 For the most part, though, participants in all three institutions downplayed the 
frequency of such emergencies. Perhaps due to experience with the very same conditions 
that made dealing with unplanned instructor vacancies challenging to resolve (e.g., 
workload restrictions in faculty contracts, spatial restrictions, hiring freezes), 
administrators took pride in their certainty of course enrollments months in advance. 
They had developed coping mechanisms, such as early course registration and strict add-
drop deadlines that aided enrollment projections for all except entering first-year 
students. The implication of this finding for the use of triage as a metaphor for part-time 
faculty hiring is that while it applies well to some situations, those situations may be less 
common in institutions that have learned to deal with key resource constraints. 
 More commonly, the findings of this study concur with Cross and Goldenberg’s 
(2009) characterization in elite research university contexts: “The growth in non-tenure 
track faculty […] is not always the result of conscious policy but instead often emerges as 
a by-product of other initiatives” (p. 29). Several department chairs in this study reflected 
that they were troubled by the lack of professional development, mentoring, and 
community building opportunities they were able to provide to part-time faculty. Harry, a 
department chair at Bright Lights University, demonstrated this conscientiousness 
particularly well: 
I wanted a social event to get my full-time faculty and my part-time faculty to 
intermingle, to share ideas, and we were going to get together at a bar. I was 
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going to pay for drinks out of pocket. None of my part-time faculty RSVP’d to the 
event. I got a couple of maybes, but no one said, “Yes, definitely, I am coming.” 
Many rued the support system for part-time faculty, but Harry’s was the leading effort I 
discovered toward improving it, and it failed. The underlying problem is that part-time 
faculty roles were shaped by processes of satisfice. Rather than maximize their 
effectiveness, part-time faculty were hired and rehired with an aim toward efficient (i.e., 
quick) selection and a hunch, or a hope that student evaluations would be deemed better 
than poor. These hires were very much by-products of other priorities. 
 In addition to the routine, bottom-up process of part-time faculty hiring in times 
of stable budgets, I also found procedures for part-time faculty hiring that were top-down, 
or had been reshaped as a result of cost-cutting by top-level administrators. Given the 
right conditions, findings showed how part-time faculty hiring may originate outside of 
academic units. At Little Big Town, which had endured severe state budget cuts that had 
accumulated over multiple years, the provost treated an entrepreneurial online instruction 
unit as a revenue center, allowing it the budgetary flexibility to spend much of its own 
revenue so as to grow its part-time instructor ranks. Academic departments and even 
colleges, by contrast, were subject to budgetary sweeps of any revenue or cost savings 
they generated. Even as full-time faculty vacancies went unfilled, revenue-generating 
part-time positions were cut. This approach indicated a forgoing of cost-benefit analysis 
of instructional staffing in favor of cost-only consideration. Another top-down influence 
on part-time faculty hiring was found at Industry State University, where the provost was 
responsible for enforcing the faculty contract rule limiting the amount of part-time faculty 
labor in any one department. These circumstances were important exceptions to the 
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finding that part-time faculty hiring was typically understood up and down organizational 
charts as a low-risk endeavor. 
Part-time faculty hiring as relatively simple. 
 Recognizing that in the absence of budgetary duress and with few caveats part-
time faculty hiring and rehiring fell into an easy routine, the juxtaposition with tenure 
track and even full-time non-tenure track (FTNTT) hiring also highlighted important 
differences in procedural complexity. Traditionally, full-time hires were made in a 
bottom-up fashion, beginning with a position request from a department chair, flowing 
through multiple discussions with middle managers, and gaining provostial approval. 
From there the search would begin. Search durations might be abbreviated for FTNTT 
hires, but any full-time search involved training from the office of human resources, the 
formation of a faculty search committee, the drafting of a job description, the placement 
of advertisements, and interviews. Tenure-line searches would yield a multi-step 
interview process. Timing was viewed as being of added importance to getting top 
tenure-track candidates before they accepted other offers. Once the offer was made, the 
candidate would often enter negotiations with the dean over a bevy of compensation and 
support details. Full-time hires on and off the tenure track required provostial, 
presidential, and even board action to be finalized. From initial position request to 
finalization of the hire, the FTNTT hiring process might take a few months to a year, and 
a tenure-track hiring process would take no less than one year and up to two. These 




 Central administrators (i.e., deans and provosts) were also influential in key ways 
for full-time faculty hiring. They provided guidance on market (i.e., student) demand and 
institutional strategy to either support, qualify, or reject position requests. Budget 
responsibility was their primary avenue into the process. Whereas department chairs 
called upon disciplinary expertise in advocating for positions, deans and provosts ensured 
funding flowed in keeping with university strategy. Bright Lights University offered a 
unique example in which central administrators chose not to sit back and await 
departmental position requests but instead decided to shape key aspects of position 
descriptions themselves. They identified interdisciplinary problems of the kind they 
hoped their university might address, and they solicited competitive proposals from 
department chairs across the university for new full-time position descriptions that would 
conform to these parameters. The more involved central administrators became in 
shaping full-time faculty hiring processes, the more resources (i.e., personnel, time, 
effort, and funding) they contributed in addition to those of departments.  
Full-time faculty hiring, whether top-down or bottom-up, represented a major 
investment of university resources, the picture of which serves to place part-time faculty 
hiring in sharp relief. Ironically, the low-effort, low-expectations approach to part-time 
faculty hiring resulted in considerable pools of regular part-time faculty and a preference 
for rehiring over new hiring in many units and divisions in this study. “By-product” 
(Cross & Goldenberg, 2009), or convenience, was therefore a good characterization for 
part-time hiring, not because department chairs were flippant regarding the importance of 
effective part-time instruction, because they were often very thoughtful, and not because 
they lacked the time, because by all accounts they invested a great deal of time in their 
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work. Part-time faculty appointments were by-products precisely because department 
chairs, deans, provosts, presidents, and boards had come to treat them as organizational 
release valves that allowed them to focus more resources on priorities. Where part-time 
faculty hiring was constrained, it was largely not due to an administrative focus on 
academic mission fulfillment but as an entailed effect related to budgetary and 
compliance efforts. To be clear, part-time faculty were not hired out of intent to reduce 
costs or maximize revenue, but when they were cut from the rolls the motive was 
expressed in budgetary terms. In some situations the amount of part-time faculty was 
monitored and limited in accordance with faculty contracts or accreditation guidance. 
Implications for Faculty Hiring Policy and Practice 
 Part-time faculty hiring is attractive for its efficiency. 
I have discussed the finding of this study that part-time faculty hiring decisions 
were comparatively simple and convenient in contrast to full-time faculty hiring 
decisions. I have additionally provided a sense of just how relatively cumbersome the 
process of fulltime faculty hiring can become as department chairs, deans, provosts, and 
even presidents seek to exert influence on entailed decisions. Part-time faculty hiring is in 
many circumstances perhaps more comparatively efficient than ever before, as full-time 
faculty hiring becomes burdened by centralized budgets and new administrative hiring 
programs and structures. Part-time hiring may continue to offer a quick and convenient 
alternative to increasingly complex one- to two-year full-time faculty hiring processes in 
many university contexts. These positions are generally not only the most affordable—
the process of staffing classes through them is often the simplest available. Part-time 
positions tend to be both cost-efficient and procedurally efficient. 
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An important exception to this finding included the hiring freeze at Little Big 
Town University, where although part-time instructors cost little and generated more 
revenue than full-timers their use had been cut back to 15 percent of the total faculty. 
This finding supports the notion that part-time faculty are valuable because they are 
flexible enough to be cut from tight budgets quickly and easily. However, it does not 
support the notion that part-time faculty positions are utilized on the revenue side of 
budgets by relocating them to areas of high enrollment from areas of low enrollment. 
Revenue-side cost efficiencies of part-time hiring may not be realized, even in 
circumstances of great need. 
One implication of this finding is that department chairs, deans, and provosts can 
more seriously acknowledge the limitations of large part-time faculty workforces in 
stabilizing budgets. Eliminating those positions can indeed be accomplished easily, 
especially when compared with tenured positions. However, the cost savings associated 
with such reductions may prove deeply disappointing, even at scale. Decision makers 
might instead work to create more fiscally sustainable full-time workforces in good 
budget years and, rather than avoiding tough decisions in times of financial exigency, use 
opportunities of constraint to make politically difficult adjustments in keeping with the 
university strategic plan (e.g., eliminate underperforming and unsustainable programs, 
shift tenure lines to support growth areas, and implement full-time position buy-outs).  
 Part-time faculty hiring is detached from instructional effectiveness. 
In discussing instructional faculty hiring, participants in this study often raised the 
topic of teaching assessment, which may be viewed as a form of quality control. 
Typically, teaching assessment meant the collection and analysis of student course 
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evaluations, and in some cases full- and part-time instructors were subject to routine 
teaching observations by department chairs. Clearly, administrators were concerned that 
the instructors they had hired met some acceptable level of effectiveness. 
However, consistent with previous research (Eagan & Jaeger, 2008), many 
participants affirmed the use of most part-time faculty members in teaching remedial and 
introductory level courses. Participants offered several reasons for this arrangement, such 
as: 1) full-time faculty having greater expertise appropriate to upper-level courses, 2) 
full-time faculty preference to teach upper-level courses, and 3) a lack of faculty contract 
restrictions on the number of part-timers employable in remedial courses. Study 
participants holding a variety of positions noted their efforts at populating lower-level 
courses with full-time instructors, as a student retention initiative, but this thinking had 
not penetrated decision making around faculty hiring. Although decision makers in this 
study subsequently sought to provide the most effective instruction with the staffs they 
had already hired, concerns about instructional effectiveness seldom directly influenced 
their pursuit of part-time faculty hiring.  
Of course, as previous research has suggested (Gappa, Austin, & Trice, 2007; 
O’Meara, Terosky, & Neumann, 2008), part-time faculty instructors can inhabit different 
social classes. In some cases, participants in this study also noted the use of some part-
time instructors who maintained professional careers in areas relevant to their subject of 
instruction, brought added value from an employment standpoint, and taught specialized 
courses. Additionally, some retired full-time faculty members had been brought back on a 
per-course basis in some contexts. These kinds of part-time hires, one may argue, pose 
the prospect of greater balance between instructional hiring efficiency and effectiveness. 
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Administrators at all levels should cease rationalizing unplanned part-time faculty 
expansion and implement policies recognizing mission-relevant uses of those roles (e.g., 
working professionals who have valuable experiential wisdom, or late-career faculty 
interested in a phased retirement). Part-time faculty will likely remain an important tool 
for keeping faculty labor costs in check while keeping student-faculty ratios low in many 
universities. Such decisions should be made based on student learning outcomes data, 
budget data, and explicit strategic direction. Likewise, faculty unions claiming that 
faculty working conditions are student learning conditions can become more persuasive 
to that effect if they cease sacrificing student instructional needs for full-time faculty 
prerogatives. Where the ratio of part-time faculty to full-time faculty is collectively 
bargained, some allowance should also be made to ensure students in remedial and 
introductory courses gain exposure to full-time instructors. Recall that the faculty union 
at Industry State University had negotiated a low cap on part-time faculty of not more 
than 15 percent in any one department. However, largely because remedial courses were 
exempted from that rule, the university’s part-time ranks represented about 50 percent 
overall. 
Preferences for data do not effect rational choice decisions in faculty hiring. 
Given the high value placed on evidence, argument, and deliberation in academic 
contexts (Lamont, 2009), I expect many readers will be uncomfortable with the role-
based (i.e., non-rational) decision process I lay out as the central finding of this study. An 
important concern to those wishing to insert a greater degree of rationality into faculty 
hiring decisions in their universities will necessarily be greater use of data. Teaching 
assessments are a starting point for determining whether individual part-time instructors 
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are adequate candidates for rehire, but rational choice decisions at the level of university, 
college, and department instructional staffing will focus on more robust assessments of 
the costs and benefits associated with existing paradigms of faculty hiring.  
First, university budget officers should collect and report data on unit revenues 
alongside unit costs. While mission pursuit in education cannot be summarized with a 
dollar figure, and while revenue centered budgeting models may not be best for many 
institutions, this study’s findings suggest decision rationality at the department and 
college level are often hindered by the low level of value attributed to unit-level 
revenues. One can expect such data to reveal what we already know with certainty: part-
time faculty instructors generate greater revenue per student than full-time faculty. 
However, deeper analysis of both costs and revenues at the department and college levels 
may contribute to stronger understandings of the budgetary margins and the point at 
which a full-time faculty member becomes a sustainable financial investment. None of 
the sites for this study had undertaken such an effort. 
Second, managers and leaders at the department, college, and university levels 
should collect and report data on faculty productivity by appointment type. These data 
should include accurate accounts of all services and products relevant to a given position. 
For some faculty this will include an array of publication types, internal service, external 
service, and revenue generating activities alongside course loads, advising loads, 
mentoring activities, and teaching assessments. These data will not necessarily resolve 
the differential valuations of each work component by different individuals and groups. 
However, they will inform hiring strategies by improving the predictability of outcomes 
and the generation of department, college, and university productivity goals. Bright 
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Lights University came closest to achieving this standard when central administrators 
worked with deans and department chairs and all were able to agree evidence pointed to 
inadequate capacity for necessary faculty service (i.e., academic governance and support 
of administrative initiatives). This assessment informed a plan to hire more faculty 
members with job descriptions to improve the capacity of the faculty for internal service. 
Third, decision makers should further develop and align their understandings of 
faculty appointment types in their departments, colleges, and universities. This study 
revealed an array of fundamental differences within the three overarching appointment 
types (part-time, full-time non-tenure track, and tenure track). Some of these differences 
were clear and ubiquitous across department and college lines, while others were 
ambiguous and provincial. Rational hiring decisions can only occur if the functions of 
different faculty types are well understood in advance. In rational choice decisions, 
anticipation of outcomes informs and precedes selection among alternatives. 
University leaders have opportunities to influence faculty hiring decisions. 
This study’s findings hold multiple implications for university leadership. First, 
two contexts shaped particularly strong platforms for central control over faculty hiring 
decisions. One of these was observed in Little Big Town University, where continuous, 
acute cuts in state appropriations supported: a strict hiring freeze, a policy of budgetary 
sweeping, and provostial investment in an administrative-reporting instructional unit 
(online education). A second example was observed in Bright Lights University, where 
the previous president had been so antagonistic in faculty hiring that even as the new 
administration’s administratively guided faculty hiring program raised concerns among 
faculty, department chairs embraced it.  
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One important implication stemming from the findings regarding notable central 
control of hiring decisions in Little Big Town and Bright Lights Universities is that 
strong central leadership that is arguably responsive to an agreed-upon threat may be 
tolerated despite hardship. This implication is consistent with Birnbaum’s (1992) 
suggestion that higher education leaders in political environments may do well to identify 
an external challenge to galvanize internal factions. Decision makers and faculty 
constituent groups may exhibit greater tolerance for discomfort if circumstances suggest 
tensions could be worse under alternative leadership. A deterioration of this belief among 
faculty and other stakeholders may have been what ultimately led to the ouster of the 
president and provost at Little Big Town following data collection. 
A second important implication for university leadership is informed as much by 
what this study did not find as what it did find. That is, in two out of three study sites 
(both publics) no participant even hinted that a governing board had exerted any 
oversight over faculty hiring. In the third study site, Bright Lights University, multiple 
participants alluded to governing board approval of a planned expansion of full-time 
faculty ranks. Unfortunately, neither the provost, nor the president acceded to my request 
for an interview (though neither opposed the study), and I was unable to learn how the 
proposal for full-time faculty growth had been presented to, or received by the board. As 
the legal fiduciary bodies responsible for strategic mission pursuit, governing boards 
might conceivably pose effective questions regarding the aptitude of a university’s 
instructional staff for carrying out the core teaching mission. In keeping with earlier 
points of discussion, greater board attention could prove constructive to: a more thorough 
understanding of the financial implications of faculty hiring, more robust use of data in 
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decision making, and a reduced focus on role and control. In short, governing board 
attention could potentially raise the importance of strategic hiring processes for 
instructional faculty. 
Implications for Future Research 
Management and leadership in risk-laden contexts. 
March (1994) explains that decision makers in hierarchical settings are more often 
promoted to managerial and leadership posts as a result of decision making that 
differentiates them from others. Decisions that set a person apart from the group may 
demonstrate some openness to risk-taking, and to the degree those risks pay off, decision 
makers may feel encouraged to seek out opportunity through risk-taking in the future. In 
university leadership, and particularly in faculty hiring contexts, future research may 
build upon this study’s findings to say more about administrative motivations to seek 
decision control in response to perceived risk.  
Additionally, future research may be useful in enhancing understanding of how 
decision makers weigh multiple risks to form priorities. Some readers may be struck by 
the risks entailed in unchecked employment patterns yielding large numbers of part-time 
instructors. Others may feel the participants in this study were appropriately focused on 
more pressing needs. What data from this study have helped me to conceptualize but not 
yet to conclude is the emergence of a leadership syndrome I will call organizational 
vertigo. In conditions of organizational vertigo, decision makers begin by assessing risks 
(including opportunity). As leaders predisposed to risk-taking, they inevitably favor 
change over the status quo. Over the course of a career, these decisions are either praised 
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as bold or derided as foolish. Those who continue an upward career trajectory become 
vulnerable to interpretive decision biases (March, 1994) in the form growing appetite for 
bold shifts that may be less strategically well-focused. Much like a mountain climber 
trapped by an avalanche, the decision maker’s disorientation may become overshadowed 
by an instinct to dig. The result is change for change’s sake, with reduced attention to 
strategic direction (i.e., careful decision making tied to data-based considerations of 
consequence). Again, this is a concept that I have generated while analyzing the data for 
this study, yet I do not have sufficient evidence to support its applicability here. Future 
research on decision making in risk-laden contexts may help test and shape the concept of 
organizational vertigo, among others, and determine possible uses for constructive 
diagnosis. 
Future research should expand the literature base on comprehensive universities, 
which remain understudied. One key area for further exploration will be whether and how 
comprehensive university leaders learn to combat mission creep. Comprehensive 
universities are not the only institutional type subject to mission creep (Ward-Wendel  & 
Wolf, 2005), but their often divergent origin stories, or organizational sagas (Clark, 
1972), may render them particularly vulnerable to a lack of unifying direction. Yet, out of 
the crucible of strained finances and strategic ambiguity a new generation of university 
leaders may yet be forged. Just as during the latter part of the 20th century university 
leaders learned how to pursue visions of grand, multifaceted expansion (Kerr, 2001), 
many of their counterparts in the first half of the 21st century now acknowledge they must 
come to terms with the maturation of the sector. That is, the foreseeable future consists of 
budgetary constraint, not growth, and new achievements must rely upon reallocated 
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resources rather than additional resources. Comprehensive universities may be forced to 
learn those lessons early and thus in some ways become instructive examples. Future 
research could be useful in revealing and interpreting such lessons for use in corollary 
contexts. 
Finally, I hope other researchers will join me in testing and refining the grounded 
theory I have generated in this study in other university contexts. Future research might 
include case studies with a deductive approach to determine whether, how, and to what 
extent the grounded theory I present here is applicable in community colleges, liberal arts 
colleges, and research universities (especially with regard to post-docs and contingent 
research faculty), larger institutions and smaller institutions, and so forth. I have argued 
that comprehensive universities are important in distinctive ways, particularly as 
institutions that serve American socio-cultural and economic needs. Yet, they are only 
one part of a large, disparate sector of higher education in the United States, and our 
economy and our society relies upon many other institutions in important ways as well. 
This study could form an important starting point for a robust program of research with 
implications for improving faculty hiring processes across the sector. 
Shared governance in changed faculty contexts. 
Traditionally organized public and nonprofit institutions of higher education have 
a storied history of reliance on a system of checks and balances known as shared 
governance. In 1966, The American Association of University Professors (AAUP; 
representing a membership comprised of faculty) was joined by the American Council on 
Education (ACE; with a membership of college, university, and state system 
administrators) and the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges 
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(AGB; with a membership of higher education board members) in codifying the 
principles of shared governance into a Statement on Government of Colleges and 
Universities. The introduction to that statement concludes: 
[…] a college or university in which all the components are aware of their 
interdependence, of the usefulness of communication among themselves, and of 
the force of joint action will enjoy increased capacity to solve educational 
problems (Kreiser, 2006, p. 136) 
The degree to which this principle is often effective in practice, and the manner in 
which the full statement should be interpreted to apply to various types of decisions, 
remains in some ways contested (Bahls, 2014; Birnbaum, 1992; Birnbaum, 1989; Bowen 
& Tobin, 2015). However, few experts would argue that in the values-laden context of 
American higher education constructive argument does not form a major pillar (Gehrke 
& Kezar, 2014; Lamont, 2009). What the cultural traditions of shared governance suggest 
is that many university constituents share responsibility for upholding those values in key 
decisions. The groups and individuals who may therefore be of utility in bringing about 
stronger communication, commitment to collaboration, and a collective sense of purpose 
in faculty hiring include: university and state system administrators, faculty, university 
and system governing boards, students and alumni, and the public and their elected 
officials. Future research may better assess these efforts and point out how constituencies 
can work constructively on challenging issues. Such research would follow in the 
tradition of similar studies of shared governance processes surrounding academic 
program closure (Eckel, 2002, 2000) and post-tenure review policy implementation 
(O’Meara, 2004).  
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Alternative release valves in faculty hiring. 
I have described part-time faculty hiring as an organizational release valve. Under 
normal conditions it is both cheap and easy and thus generates little tension among 
decision makers. Yet, in Bright Lights University FTNTT positions had also grown 
substantially in the years leading up to this study and had proven exceptionally malleable 
by administrators (deans faced few constraints in shaping creative job descriptions and 
compensation). As part-time faculty numbers begin to reach critical mass, as they become 
more vocal in faculty senates, and as they join collective bargaining units, one key area to 
observe through future research will be the potential growth of FTNTT faculty as an 
alternative organizational release valve. 
Additionally, at least one participant at Bright Lights University raised concerns 
that second year master’s students were being employed at high rates as primary 
instructors (not teaching assistants) in remedial and introductory courses. I was able to 
confirm through the Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System (IPEDS) the university’s own reporting that more than 20 “graduate teaching 
assistants” were employed on a part-time basis in the most recent semester for which data 
was available (fall 2013). However, IPEDS currently uses a definition for this occupation 
borrowed from the Department of Labor Statistics, which includes: 
Assist faculty or other instructional staff in postsecondary institutions by 
performing teaching or teaching-related duties, such as teaching lower level 
courses, developing teaching materials, preparing and giving examinations, and 
grading examinations or papers. (SOC Code 25-1191, 2010) 
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Deans and department chairs who participated in this study refuted the notion that 
master’s students were being employed as primary instructors, and unfortunately the data 
collected by the Department of Education does not allow differentiation between 
graduate teaching assistants responsible for entire courses and those in support roles. I 
was unable to draw conclusions about whether this practice occurs at all, let alone 
whether it is growing. In the context of an institution with a history of union busting, the 
question of whether master’s students are becoming increasingly used as primary 
instructors takes on added significance.  
Examination of how both FTNTT faculty and graduate students are employed as 
instructors will be an important topic for future research in many institutional settings. As 
critical attention focuses on the working conditions and student learning outcomes 
associated with large part-time faculty workforces, and as those groups grow and become 
more effective at bargaining tables, decision makers may seek alternatives more readily. 
Conclusion 
 The question of how faculty hiring occurs in comprehensive university settings is 
an important one, and many stakeholders may feel unsettled by the findings of this study. 
The question is important because public and private comprehensive universities not only 
educate a substantial portion of college students overall, they serve a large share of first 
generation and nontraditional students (Henderson, 2011). The work of producing college 
graduates from these backgrounds is of critical significance to the American economy 
and to a cultural vision of a meritocratic society. Instructing these students to a high 
standard of learning and retaining them through graduation can be more challenging 
every step of the way, because they often: require different academic support, maintain 
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complicated work and family schedules, do not live where they attend class, and hold less 
social knowledge about college life than many of their peers (McDonough, 1997). How 
instructional faculty hiring occurs in these settings is an important question to ask, 
because much relies on the success of those instructors. 
 In addition to the importance of the central research question, the findings of this 
study may also prove troubling due to the importance of the instructional mission in 
comprehensive universities. First, university stakeholders, such as governing board 
members, administrators, faculty, students and alumni, and taxpayers, think of decision 
making in university settings as deliberate and rational—sometimes to a fault (Bahls, 
2014; Birnbaum, 1992; Birnbaum, 1989; Bowen & Tobin, 2015). This study finds that in 
faculty hiring, decision making largely does not follow a rational choice paradigm. Many 
other factors influence faculty hiring decisions, but decision makers spend little time 
weighing which sort of role to hire in pursuit of instructional effectiveness goals. 
 Other stakeholders may be taken aback not just by the relative absence of a 
measured approach to faculty human resources but by the questionable centrality of the 
instructional mission in some teaching universities. The universities in this study each 
showed signs of some degree of goal ambiguity. In some instances, decision makers 
showed proclivity, or at least complicity, in taking the path of least resistance in faculty 
hiring. In others, decision makers were so heavily focused on other priorities, such as 
budgets, that academic staffing occurred mainly as a side-effect.  
 Instead of the deliberative, consultative approach to decision making for which 
universities in the U.S. are well known, decision makers in this study often struggled to 
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engage others in meaningful exchanges about how to staff classrooms effectively. Rather, 
individual rule-following decisions served to heighten discord and cloud a sense of 
collective purpose. This finding may shed some light on how higher education 
instructional staffing can have made the shift from 75 percent tenure-track labor to 75 
percent non-tenure track labor in the past 45 years, with neither much alarm nor clear 
intent. 
Having provided some insight as to how instructional faculty hiring works, this 
study should help readers respond to the following question: are we satisfied with the 
manner in which we staff comprehensive university classrooms? Contrary to a simple yes 
or no, many readers will find they have to qualify their overarching response. None of the 
participants in this study showed a lack of conscientiousness in their work, and most of 
them communicated a strong sense of professional duty and vocation. I suspect, though, 
that readers who hold an array of opinions on sometimes contentious subjects (e.g., 
tenure, shared governance, etc.) might agree that key decision making characterized by 
introspection and inattention to consequences is not in keeping with academic values. 
Likewise, on at least two fronts it runs counter to the expectations of a populace 
increasingly skeptical of university effectiveness. First, as others have argued, the way in 
which many universities have developed a caste system of faculty labor may be unethical. 
This study has not offered an analysis of that proposition. Second, and central to the 
problem identified in this study, reliance on an underclass of part-time faculty instructors 
has consequences for student learning. An abiding ignorance of instructional 
consequences now characterizes most faculty hiring in many universities. Decision 
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makers should make more intentional use of available faculty appointment types in 




Appendix A: Initial Interview Protocol 
Introduction to the study 
 
Research questions and methods. For this study, I am interested in understanding 
instructional faculty hiring processes, particularly in “comprehensive,” or Carnegie 
“master’s” type institutions. I am interested in comprehensive universities because they 
are the institutional type where the magnitude of a decades-long shift toward increasing 
use of part-time, non-tenure track faculty labor has been greatest in recent years. My goal 
is not to evaluate the use of contingent faculty (plenty of others have done that) but rather 
to understand the process by which this shift is taking place.  
 
What I need from you! I am hopeful that you will help me in three ways: 
1. First, as you respond to my questions today, please also share your thoughts on 
whether I am asking the right questions.  
2. Second, I hope you will consider speaking with me if I have follow-up questions 
at a later date. 
3. At the end of this interview, I hope you might recommend the names of other 
potentially good information sources on your campus. 
 
Please note that your participation in this study will be kept confidential, and anything 
you communicate to me during participation will be kept anonymous. I will report any 
findings from this study in aggregate, and I will take a number of steps to mask your 
identity, your university’s identity, and other potentially identifying characteristics in any 
written report. Do you have any questions regarding confidentiality and anonymity? 
Remember, you may ask additional questions on this subject at any time. 
 
I want to take a moment to reiterate my intent to record given the consent you have 
provided. Has that been made clear, and is it still acceptable to you? 
 
Any questions for me before we begin? 
 
I’d like to start by asking you a couple of broad questions about instructional 
faculty hiring, because I don’t want to presuppose that the different types of hires 
begin under completely different circumstances: 
 
1. What events trigger a decision to hire instructional faculty? 
 
a. A faculty member leaves? 
b. A department is overenrolled—dynamic change in student demand? 
c. A faculty member takes sabbatical, or leave? 





2. What is the role of timing of these events in determining what sort of hire will be 
made? 
 
a. If someone leaves at a time that precludes a decent search, do you hire an 
adjunct to teach those classes? How does this contrast with retirements, for 
instance? 
b. Do you respond to a hiring need differently as it occurs in relation to 
annual budget cycle? 
c. How does the irregular timing of grant awards affect decisions? 
d. Is enrollment projection just that tough to nail down until just before 
classes begin? 
 
3. How do you describe the difference between hiring for immediate need and hiring 
toward fulfillment of a long-term plan? 
 
a. Do you have a long-term staffing plan? 
b. How do you communicate your wishes on staffing to deans, associate 
deans, and department chairs? 
c. How do you receive information on hiring needs and desires from deans, 
associate deans, and department chairs? Is it primarily through budget 
requests, or do things like periodic assessments and strategic planning also 
provide a flow of information? 
d. What role do unions and contracts play in relation to staffing plans? 
 
4. Would you tell me about your instructional faculty appointment structure?  
a. Include episodic hires, such as per course instructors and graduate 
instructors? 
i. Are some of these people stringing together multiple course 
contracts? 
ii. Have some of them been working in your university for a long 
time? 
b. What about clinical faculty and professors of practice (FTNTT)? 
c. Others? 
 
Tell me about episodic instructional faculty hiring: 
 
1. Who is involved in these hiring decisions on your campus, and how would you 
describe their roles? 
 
a. To your knowledge, do these people get advice or input from others, even 
informally? 
 





3. What information is used in making these decisions? 
 
a. How are data used to inform decisions? 
b. How is subjective judgment involved? 
c. How is campus, state, or union policy involved? 
 
4. How do the various people taking part in the hiring process communicate? 
 
a. What happens if there is disagreement? 
 
5. How does hiring part-time, non-tenure track instructional faculty differ from 
hiring tenure-track faculty, or even full-time, non-tenure track faculty? 
 
Now I’d like to ask about clinical faculty and professors of practice, both research 
and teaching-oriented, so please specify your responses as you see fit: 
 
1. Who is involved in these hiring decisions on your campus, and how would you 
describe their roles? 
 
a. To your knowledge, do these people get advice or input from others, even 
informally? 
 
2. How do the various people taking part in the hiring process communicate? 
 
a. What does the process look like? 
b. What happens if there is disagreement? 
 
3. What are the goals of the people involved? 
 
4. What information is used in making these decisions? 
 
a. How are data used to inform decisions? 
b. How is subjective judgment involved? 
c. How is campus, state, or union policy involved? 
 
5. How does hiring full-time, non-tenure track faculty differ from hiring tenure-track 
faculty? 
 
*ONLY IF TIME—ASK WHAT HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED OF THE 
FOLLOWING: 
 
Regarding tenure-track instructional faculty hiring: 
 
1. Who is involved in these hiring decisions on your campus, and how would you 




a. To your knowledge, do these people get advice or input from others, even 
informally? 
 
2. How do the various people taking part in the hiring process communicate? 
 
a. What does the process look like? 
b. What happens if there is disagreement? 
 
3. What are the goals of the people involved? 
 
4. What information is used in making these decisions? 
 
a. How are data used to inform decisions? 
b. How is subjective judgment involved? 





Appendix B: Participant Invitation 
Dear NAME, 
My name is Andy Lounder, and I am a doctoral candidate conducting dissertation 
research on faculty hiring processes in comprehensive university settings. You have been 
identified through my research procedures as someone who may fit the criteria for 
participation, and I am writing in hopes of conducting an interview with you. This study 
has been approved by your IRB office. 
My study aims to understand the hiring processes for different types of faculty members 
(e.g., tenure track, full-time non-tenure track, part-time non-tenure track) in an array of 
disciplines and settings. I am interested specifically in comprehensive, or Carnegie 
“Master’s” type universities, like yours, for two reasons. First, the work they contribute is 
extremely important to higher education. Second, they are the type of four-year 
institution where the increase in part-time, non-tenure track faculty labor has been 
greatest in recent years. My goal is not to evaluate the use of contingent faculty (plenty of 
others have done that) but rather to understand the process by which this shift is taking 
place. 
 
I would like to ask if you would consider being a participant in this study, which requires 
an interview approximately 60 minutes in duration. We would conduct the interview at a 
place convenient to you, either: (1) in your office during a time when I can visit your 
campus, (2) an alternative location on your campus of your choosing, or (3) over the 
telephone. In order to aid data analysis, I am asking that you allow me to tape the 
interview; however, I could take notes if that is more comfortable. 
 
The data used for this study will only be reported in aggregate--your name and identity 
would never appear in any reports or publications that result from the project. I am also 
well-practiced and very careful about stripping interview transcripts of identifying 
information. 
 
This study will help universities like yours in their efforts to become better academic 
homes for faculty--by shining a light on diffuse and poorly understood processes that 
have immense bearing on faculty work. 
 
If you are able to participate in this study, then I will send you the informed consent form 
to review and sign and initiate discussion on potential dates and times for the interview. 
 
Thank you very much for considering this request. 
 
Andrew Lounder 
[EMAIL ADDRESS & PHONE NUMBER]  
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Appendix C: Participant Consent Form 
Project Title 
 An Emerging Grounded Theory of Faculty Hiring Processes in 
Comprehensive Universities 





This research is being conducted by doctoral student, Andrew Lounder, 
under the advisement of Dr. KerryAnn O’Meara, at the University of 
Maryland, College Park.  I am inviting you to participate in this 
research project because you may have information about faculty hiring 
processes in your university.  The purpose of this research project is to 





The procedures involve participation in one individual interview, 
approximately 60-90 minutes in length. Future requests for follow-up 
interviews by telephone are also possible stemming from the initial 
interview (in which case the duration would be comparatively brief, 
perhaps as short as 10 minutes but possibly up to one hour depending upon 
the participant’s future consent and availability). Sample interview 
questions include: 
1. What events trigger a decision to hire faculty? 
2. What is the role of timing of these events in determining 
what sort of hire will be made? 
3. How do you describe the difference between hiring for 
immediate need and hiring toward fulfillment of a long-term 
plan? 
 
I am asking permission to audio record this conversation so that we may 
get a lasting, accurate understanding of the insights you provide. Please 
select one of the two following options: 
 
___ I give my consent to have my responses audio recorded 




Potential Risks and 
Discomforts 
 
There are no known risks associated with participating in this research 
project. Participant confidentiality will be protected as outlined in the 
subsequent “Confidentiality” section. Additionally, I wish to acknowledge 
that participants may feel some discomfort due to the participant selection 
spanning university hierarchies. In some cases, but not all, previous study 
participants (possibly those inhabiting positions of relevant authority) will 
have recommended additional participants. In order to mask participant 
selection from those providing recommendations, the PI will in all cases 
request multiple recommendations and explain that he may or may not 
invite any of them to the study. The PI also reserves the right to contact 
possible participants who have not been recommended by previous 
participants. This will not only aid in masking participant selection but may 
yield important data from diverse perspectives. The goal will be to make 
the selection of participants legitimately unclear to anyone seeking to 
divine the identities of future participants based on their own suggestions.  
Potential Benefits  There are no direct benefits to participants. However, I hope that, in the 
future, other people might benefit from this study through improved 




Any potential loss of confidentiality will be minimized by taking the 
following steps. Any data will be transcribed by PI, Andrew Lounder, or 
by voluntary or paid transcriptionists who have signed confidentiality 
agreements, and will be stored on a password protected computer for a 
period of 10 years (at the expiration of 10 years, all data will be destroyed). 
To the extent that the data include proper nouns, the names of people, 
places, and other identifying information (e.g., departments, projects, titles, 
etc.) will be stripped from the data.  
If I write a report or article about this research project, your identity will be 
protected to the maximum extent possible. I, PI Andrew Lounder will be 
the only researcher to have access to any data with full identifying 
information. Transcriptionists will have access to raw recordings labeled 
with participant pseudonyms. One research auditor (dissertation chair) and 
one graduate peer debriefer may each have access to selections of 
transcribed interviews that have been stripped of identifying information, 
in keeping with the study design. Your information may be shared with 
representatives of the University of Maryland, College Park or 
governmental authorities if you or someone else is in danger or if I am 
required to do so by law.  
Right to Withdraw 
and Questions 
Your participation in this research is completely voluntary.  You may 
choose not to take part at all.  If you decide to participate in this research, 
you may stop participating at any time.  If you decide not to participate in 
this study or if you stop participating at any time, you will not be penalized 
or lose any benefits to which you otherwise qualify.  
If you decide to stop taking part in the study, if you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints, or if you need to report an injury related to the 




[ADDRESS, EMAIL, & PHONE] 
or his faculty advisor: 
Dr. KerryAnn O’Meara 
[ADDRESS, EMAIL, & PHONE] 
Participant Rights  
 
If you have questions about your rights as a research participant or wish to 
report a research-related injury, please contact:  
 
University of Maryland College Park  
Institutional Review Board Office 
1204 Marie Mount Hall 
College Park, Maryland, 20742 
 E-mail: irb@umd.edu   
Telephone: 301-405-0678 
 
This research has been reviewed according to the University of Maryland, 
College Park IRB procedures for research involving human subjects. 
Statement of Consent 
 
Your signature indicates that you are at least 18 years of age; you have read 
this consent form or have had it read to you; your questions have been 
answered to your satisfaction and you voluntarily agree to participate in 
this research study. You will receive a copy of this signed consent form. 
If you agree to participate, please sign your name below. 
Signature and Date 
 
NAME OF PARTICIPANT 
[Please Print] 
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